Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

369. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower⁰

March 27, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Macmillan Talks: U.K. Interest in Skybolt and Polaris

As you know, we have been discussing with the British their interest in procuring Skybolt missiles for U.K. V-bombers, and Polaris missiles for U.K. submarine deployment, on an unconditional basis so far as their use is concerned. We have thus far been reserving our position on these questions in order better to assess their relation to a NATO program for second-generation Mid-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM’s— probably Polaris) for which Secretary Gates plans to offer U.S. assistance on March 31 at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting.¹

A bilateral understanding with the British on Polaris would clearly be inappropriate so long as a NATO MRBM program is under consideration. We hope the U.K. will participate fully in a NATO MRBM program and regard this as important particularly as a means of obtaining French acceptance of the NATO Command arrangements, and of thus minimizing the prospect of independent nuclear and strategic weapons programs which could be so politically disruptive to the Alliance. I plan to discuss this general question with the Prime Minister during our Monday morning meeting at the British Embassy.²

The British appear to recognize a relationship between their interest in Polaris and a NATO MRBM program, but have been urging an early U.S. assurance on Skybolt to enable a U.K. decision to discontinue Blue Streak as a military program. I believe, and Secretary Douglas agrees, that Skybolt should be treated as a separate matter since the British want this missile to prolong the effective life of their existing V-bomber force. It would seem more appropriate, however, for you to handle the Skybolt question with the Prime Minister.

I recommend, therefore, that you inform the Prime Minister that, if and when Skybolt is produced, we would be prepared to sell these missiles to the U.K. in accordance with the usual procedures under our MDAP bilateral agreement³ and without any political conditions as to their use. However, in view of the possible effect of this assurance on NATO MRBM arrangements, I believe you should ask the Prime Minister to agree that this assurance will not be made public, or conveyed to other NATO governments, except after consultation with the U.S. on the substance and timing of any statements.

As you are aware, we have also been discussing with the British the possible availability of facilities in Scottish ports for U.S. Polaris submarine tenders. We have the impression that the British may have in mind reserving their agreement to provision of these facilities until they have obtained satisfaction on Skybolt, or on Polaris in relation to the NATO MRBM question, or on both. It would seem desirable to relate British assurances on U.S. Polaris tender facilities to our assurance of Skybolt. I recommend therefore that, in the context of your discussion of Skybolt with the Prime Minister, you tell him that we assume the U.K. is agreeable in principle to arrangements in Scottish ports for U.S. Polaris submarine tenders, and that we would appreciate confirmation of this by the U.K. Government.

Christian A. Herter

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Top Secret. The source text bears President Eisenhower’s initials.
1. For documentation on the NATO Defense Ministers Conference March 31–April 1, 1960, in Paris, see Part 1, Documents 252 ff.
2. Memoranda of the conversation between Secretary Herter and Prime Minister Macmillan at the British Embassy on March 28 do not mention this subject. These memoranda are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1619.
3. For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington on January 27, 1950, and entered into force on that day, see 1 UST 126.