Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

366. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/20a

Chequers, England, August 29, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

PRESIDENT’S TRIP TO EUROPE

August–September 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary of State Herter
  • Deputy Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Mr. Berding
  • Mr. Hagerty
  • General Goodpaster
  • Major Eisenhower
  • Mr. White
• United Kingdom
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Norman Brook
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • Mr. Blye
  • Mr. de Zulueta
  • Mr. Evans
  • Mr. Wilding

SUBJECT

• Conversation at Chequers, August 29, 1959

Mr. Macmillan began the conversation by saying that the two Foreign Ministers had had a discussion the previous day about events in the Far East and Middle East, and it would be helpful to have a brief report from them.

West Indies

Mr. Lloyd said that the first subject discussed was that of Trinidad. The United Kingdom understood the importance of the West Indies and of the bases located therein to the United States and is anxious to be helpful. It is largely a question of tactics, i.e., whether to wait or to start dealing with the problem immediately. In the discussion it was agreed that there were three aspects of importance which should be mutually examined: 1) the question of the legal position of United States base rights once the West Indies obtain their independence; 2) those subjects which the present Federation Government would like to submit for possible revision of the base agreements of 1941;¹ 3) a review of the foregoing and a decision as to tactics to be followed in pursuance of that review.

In reply President Eisenhower said that the United States security position in the South Atlantic requires a base; that the United States Government had poured millions into these bases; and now suddenly doesn’t want to pull stakes and get out. Secretary Herter pointed out that under Article 28 of the Base Agreements of 1941, either party can request revision. The question was whether these discussions should take place now or later. We shall be able to tell better after taking a look at the changes proposed to the United Kingdom Government by the West Indies Federation. The United States certainly reaffirmed its promise made under Article 28. Mr. Lloyd, in closing the conversation on this subject, confirmed that the United Kingdom and United States Governments were as one in dealing with this problem but that there was the question of tactics to be decided.

Laos

With regard to Laos, the next subject raised, Mr. Lloyd reported that the UK Government was very worried about this situation. He had received a communication from Soviet Ambassador Malik suggesting the possibility that the three chairmen of the delegations previously making up the ICC might return. The UK Government was now exploring the possibility of the three chairmen of the delegations going back. This formula possibly was intended by the Soviets as a face-saving device to the Laotian Government, but to make this workable it would be necessary to get a new Indian chairman. This would be easier if the Canadian were also changed. The President inquired whether there was anything new on Laos, and Secretary Herter reported that there had been a new raid. Mr. Lloyd reported that the evidence indicates that the dissident influence is getting beyond the two northern provinces and pointed out that we were dealing with a jungle area. In view of British experience in Malaya, it was doubtful whether the Laotian Government through military measures would be able to bring the dissidents under control.

Mr. Macmillan added that it was very important to try to prevent the area from being won over by the Communists. It was even more important at this juncture, when an effort was being made for a détente in the West, to hold the Communists in the Far East in check. The United States was familiar with the record of the British Government; that when Taiwan was threatened last year, the U.K. had stood by the U.S. The problem in Laos was technical; “you can’t get at it”. President Eisenhower inquired whether the British had any proposals. Secretary Herter added that the U.S. was now providing equipment for Laos, but it was a very tricky situation to avoid being in violation of Article 9 of the Geneva Agreements on Laos.²

Mr. Lloyd added that the previous day he and Secretary Herter had discussed the long-term problem; that the Laos situation was quite different from that of Korea where the U.S. had been in a position to and had in fact provided massive support. Mr. Gates mentioned parenthetically that the U.S. had no intention of sending five divisions to Laos.

President Eisenhower said that the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, should endeavor to control the Communists in Laos and to take action if necessary. We must give the Laotian people some hope against the Communists. We must together get into the problems and not merely talk procedures. We couldn’t just talk about getting someone to carry the job but should get into it ourselves. The President said that it must be an indigenous effort. That we should get the Philippines or some other Asian group to do something. The White peoples couldn’t do much alone. The Secretary added that it would be a mistake to attempt to get someone to mediate, which would suggest two sides to the issue within Laos, and that we had to recognize that both Hammarskjöld and the Laotians had handled the situation there rather badly. Instead of mediators, the presence of observers would serve as a psychological deterrent to the Communists from the North. Mr. Macmillan concluded by saying that we are agreed on that.

Contingency Planning

With reference to Contingency Planning for the Middle East, Mr. Lloyd reported that Lord Mountbatten would be meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on August 31. Mr. Gates confirmed that the discussion between the Foreign Secretaries yesterday on this subject had been satisfactory to both parties in London and that messages had been sent to Mountbatten and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

IBRD Loan for Canal Development

Turning to the question of an IBRD loan for the improvement of the Suez Canal, Mr. Lloyd said that the coincidence of such a loan with the discussion in the United Nations General Assembly of Egyptian restrictions on the use of Suez would be an embarrassment both for the United States and the United Kingdom. This indicated the desirability of a delay in any decision or announcement regarding a loan. Mr. Herter pointed out that Mr. Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was now in the Dolomites and this was a matter which should be discussed with him orally. Mr. Lloyd added that the Egyptian Finance Minister would soon be visiting London and Washington and that therefore they believed that timing was very important.

Mr. Macmillan said he had been informed that with the development of Mediterranean oil in Libya and Algeria, Suez would be less important and that the large shipping companies were no longer anxious to obtain improvements in the Suez Canal which would permit larger tonnage to pass through it. Mr. Herter confirmed that the development of oil in the Mediterranean would permit this product to pass directly across the Mediterranean without the use of Suez. He added that it was his understanding that Mr. Black was desirous of having any loan for the development of Suez secured by tolls but that the Bank would desire that any loan be made without political conditions. He added that the Israelis were vulnerable on this issue because of their violations of the 1948 Armistice Agreements.

Mr. Macmillan summarized the UK view by saying that this issue was a question of timing. The UK Government would be most pleased if it were possible to postpone the decision by the IBRD for a month or two.

Currency Reform in Indonesia

Secretary Herter confirmed that the question of the currency and banking reform in Indonesia had been discussed; that further information was being obtained, but that it looked like wholesale confiscation of currency and bank accounts.

Communiqué

Mr. Lloyd and Secretary Herter confirmed their view that no joint communiqué at the conclusion of the talks would be necessary. President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan confirmed that this was a sensible solution.

President’s Discussions in Bonn

With the conclusion of the discussion of the subjects of the previous day, it was suggested that the British participants would be very interested in the President’s appraisal of the discussions with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn. The President replied that his record was not complete because the afternoon session, which he had assumed would be with the Chancellor on a private basis for only five minutes, had continued for one and a half hours without the presence of his U.S. interpreter. Mr. Herter added that it might be some time before we had an approved record because the German interpreter would have to clear his notes with the Chancellor who was returning to Italy. Mr. Herter said that the Bonn discussions were of interest because they had introduced a new element of possible acceptance by the Germans of a “Free City of Berlin”. (It was later made clear that the Soviet proposal for a Free City was of course unacceptable.) Brentano had spontaneously referred to the long run possibility of the Berlin problem being settled by the adoption of some sort of free city solution. He also mentioned a UN guarantee.

The President said that the Chancellor had regarded the German question as one susceptible only to a long-term solution, requiring lots of patience with the possibility of a gradually growing interchange of persons and communications. The President in reply said that this was fine but what do you do tomorrow? At the moment we are standing on the status quo. The United States was prepared to help but over time our rights in Berlin would become less clear. The Germans therefore should propose a plan. He had suggested to Adenauer that the latter should suggest how West Germany could work out with East Germany a better exchange back and forth of persons. Adenauer had responded that experience had indicated this was dangerous, with East Germans being punished for contacts with West Germany. The President continued that he then suggested a cultural exchange, six persons for six, recognizing that initially West Germany would receive determined Communists but that if this process was maintained over time, it would gradually have an influence among the people in East Germany.

The President said that he had told Adenauer that he was getting tired of standing pat and that Adenauer had agreed to have his experts study the possibilities of a larger interchange of persons.

The President had pointed out to Adenauer that we had been firm in saying “no” to the Soviets but that it was important to know what the West German Government was going to say in the future.

Secretary Herter said that he had talked the same day with Foreign Minister Brentano, indicating that the United States was tired of a negative attitude and inquiring what the Germans proposed. Brentano replied that it was important to have a breather to get over the next national elections. The Secretary had then told Brentano that it was important the latter have a talk with Adenauer about the adoption of a more positive approach. The President suggested that it would be most helpful if we could think up a program to suggest to Adenauer because if the Germans themselves didn’t move, this thing could become progressively more difficult. Prime Minister Macmillan interposed the observation that up to now the Germans had assumed that we would pull their chestnuts out of the fire and that we should be searching for a modus vivendi, a term which he much preferred to that of a moratorium.

The President said that Adenauer had stressed that the thing he was interested in was the humanitarian aspects of the twenty million people in the East Zone.

The President questioned whether the United States could be expected to keep troops in Europe forever. Adenauer’s attitude was that if you’re going to establish a neutral zone, don’t make it Germany. When the President raised the question of a corridor to West Berlin, Adenauer said that the other side would never agree. He then mentioned, however, that Khruschchev had proposed a Free City for Berlin arrangement which could be considered as a last resort. Foreign Minister Lloyd interjected to say that if the Germans were contemplating a Free City their emphasis had changed. Prime Minister Macmillan said that this discussion leads on to the question of getting a moratorium; that it had looked to him at one time as if the Soviets would accept this but that the question had then arisen about the status of Berlin at the end of the period. There seemed to have been a change in the Soviet position on our rights after the moratorium.

The President pointed out that our policy had been that changes in the Berlin situation could only be made by mutual consent and that we should not go back on this. Secretary Herter added that an interim arrangement involves the danger that we have undermined or given up our position. The Prime Minister said that his interpretation was that at the end of a moratorium our position on rights would be the same as it had been at the beginning; but he recognized that in a sense the mere passage of time would make some change in the situation and that it might have been for this intellectual or theoretical reason that the Russians had declined to commit themselves as to the position at the end of the agreement. The President said that we have a genius for getting in a hole but to protect ourselves we are always having to defend Matsu or some other out of the way place. Prime Minister commented that our cards on the table in the case of Berlin are not good ones. The President replied that any place around the Soviet perimeter, Khrushchev is in a position to move. He recalled that the previous day he had talked with the Queen Mother who had emphasized that “we must be firm”. She said this was her own conviction. Foreign Minister Lloyd added, certainly, we have to be firm on essentials. The President pointed out that in his last message from Khrushchev, the latter had said that “we must clear up the residue of war”. He, the President, wanted to point out that the division of Germany was one of the residues of war, which should be cleared up.

Prime Minister Macmillan then inquired as to what the United States thought would happen in the next stage of the Berlin problem. Secretary Herter replied that we don’t want rights in perpetuity in Berlin, but want them admitted until such time as the situation could be changed by mutual agreement. The Secretary pointed out that Gromyko in the discussions in Geneva had given away his hand regarding the Soviet expectation of an East German takeover of Berlin after any moratorium.

Prime Minister Macmillan then inquired as to our appraisal of the coming visit with Khrushchev. The President replied that he would expect with the visit, and with Khrushchev’s family accompanying him, there was the potential to make an impression on the Soviet leader. The President, therefore, was anxious that they be received well. When the Prime Minister inquired whether there was something in this visit which he would interpret as leading to a Summit, the President replied that without progress, he, the President, would not go to a Summit. After a brief general discussion as to what would constitute “progress,” the President said that if Khrushchev suggested the U.S. and USSR agree between themselves on some form of progress, the President would decline to make such an agreement but would hope that when Khrushchev returned to his own country and thought it over, he might issue a public statement which would make a Summit possible. In this manner the allies could react as they had a right to do. Macmillan inquired as to what Adenauer had to say about a Summit. The President replied that Adenauer had concurred in his belief that progress was necessary before a Summit meeting should be held. The President expressed the belief that Khrushchev would avoid embarrassing either the President or the United States while in the latter country and made the observation that “if we stall long enough, maybe this will constitute a moratorium”.

Talks with de Gaulle³

When Mr. Macmillan referred to the President’s impending visit to Paris, the President summarized his discussion with Adenauer—on the Algerian situation. The Chancellor had said that de Gaulle was in an impossible situation because, if he announced a policy sufficiently liberal to satisfy the Algerians, he would lose the support of the colons and the French Army. Adenauer had urged the President to support the French on Algeria which would greatly strengthen de Gaulle’s hand. If de Gaulle failed there would be revolution in France. The President pointed out that Adenauer had suggested unqualified support but that U.S. policy which had been set forth in public statements by Messrs. Dillon and Allen, was that we would support any reasonable solution. The President did not believe that a solution could be found merely by the use of force. Furthermore there was a strong tradition in the United States against colonialism and no United States Government would support the French in a policy which held out no early hope of a liberal settlement. The President had no intention of giving de Gaulle a blank check on Algerian policy and if de Gaulle set forth a plan in their forthcoming talks, the President would reserve his position until its contents could be studied.

The President emphasized that, additionally to the need for a liberal program, it was most important that the French take the lead in fighting their battle in the United Nations. If a resolution of censure was proposed in the United Nations and the French Delegation walked out, it would be impossible for the United States to support their attitude.

Mr. Macmillan said that the United Kingdom had a great sympathy for the French in their Algerian difficulties. The French had a great record of colonial achievements there. They had developed the country and given its inhabitants the benefit of education and freedom from disease. The President would recall from their wartime experience the work in reforestation and in other things. The result was that in the past hundred years the Arab population had risen from 3 millions to 17 millions. The French now had the difficult problem of transition from dependence to self-government and a way had to be found for a constitutional development suited to a multi-racial community. The development of a multi-racial state was not peculiar to Algeria; it confronted the United Kingdom also in Africa.

Mr. Macmillan agreed that the French should be willing to set forth publicly a liberal policy for Algeria and said that once this had been done they could hope to command the sympathy and support of their Allies. The United Kingdom might be placed in a similar position in the United Nations over the Nyasaland issue. If the subject were raised the United Kingdom would be obliged to claim it was not a matter over which the UN had jurisdiction, but the UK was prepared to explain its position and to defend its policy.

The President repeated that he was not prepared to give de Gaulle a blank check over Algeria but if the French produced a liberal policy they could count on U.S. support. He thought it most important that a definite time period, say six, eight or ten years, be established for the exercise of self-determination.

President Eisenhower said that it was most difficult to understand de Gaulle’s attitude toward the North Atlantic Pact. He was being asked to support the French in their political difficulties; at the same time they were showing little readiness to cooperate in the Alliance. If General de Gaulle in their forthcoming talks was unwilling to recognize NATO as the bastion of defense for Western Europe, the President would be unable to find any common ground with de Gaulle. The President said that he would not agree to any tripartite domination of NATO. He did not want formalized machinery for tripartite consultation. He would, however, be willing to offer to de Gaulle the same facilities for informal consultation on matters of common concern as already existed between Mr. Macmillan and the President.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Meetings. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ivan B. White and approved by Goodpaster.
1. For text of an agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding leased naval and air bases in the West Indies, signed at London March 27, 1941, see 55 Stat. 1560.
2. Article 9 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Laos of July 1954 prohibited the introduction into Laos of armaments and military equipment, except as specified for the defense of Laos. For text of this agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1505–1539.
3. Regarding Eisenhower’s discussions with de Gaulle, see Documents 129 ff.