Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

353. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the British Ambassador (Caccia)⁰

January 21, 1959.

I referred to the “eyes only” to the President and me memorandum from Mr. Macmillan¹ regarding his possible trip to Russia and then a stopover at Washington, as well as Bonn and Paris on the way back. I said that naturally on a matter of this sort which had domestic, as well as international significance, we would not attempt to do other than merely put forward certain suggestions and thoughts for Mr. Macmillan’s consideration. The President and I did feel that a trip to Moscow by the Prime Minister would be apt to set in motion other direct approaches by the French, the Germans and perhaps others. This would be particularly dangerous at a point when there was as yet no firm agreed position as to how to react in Berlin if the Soviets persisted.²

I said that we ourselves had abstained very carefully from anything which could possibly be deemed a negotiation about the Berlin situation in our talks with Mikoyan, although no doubt Mikoyan would have been quite glad to be the medium for direct bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.³

I said that we had the impression that one of the reasons for Macmillan’s proposed trip was that it would provide an understandable basis for a visit to Washington. I said that the President felt that this roundabout approach was unnecessary and that if Mr. Macmillan wanted to come to Washington and talk with the President about the situation, we saw no reason why he should not do so. We had invited, and there was a standing invitation to, General de Gaulle so he could hardly complain. I added that I myself had been turning over in my mind the possibility of a short trip to Europe to confer with Mr. Macmillan, General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer with a view to helping to align our policies.

Sir Harold expressed himself as very gratified with the statement that we saw no obstacle to Mr. Macmillan coming to Washington. He asked whether, in our opinion, it could be done in the early future. I said we saw no reason why it could not be done almost any time subject, of course, to the President’s engagements, but that he had no other official state visit coming up before March.

Sir Harold said that he would immediately communicate our views to the Prime Minister and thanked me for both the promptness and the substance of my comments.

JFD

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Macmillan and Lloyd Correspondence, 1958. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.
1. Not found in Department of State files. According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation, January 20, Secretary Dulles contacted the President to inform him that Ambassador Caccia had just delivered a letter which stated that Prime Minister Macmillan wished to visit Russia. The memorandum stated in part: “The Sec wanted to put the thought in the Pres’ mind and maybe after dinner they could speak of it. It is hard to say no. The Pres does not give much of a —, does the Sec? The Pres’ shotgun reaction is let him go if he is that good. The Sec would have preferred to see us work at the problem, and we may have to do it in the end,” (Ibid., White House Telephone Conversations) Dulles and Eisenhower talked along the same lines on January 21, immediately prior to Caccia’s arrival.
2. In a note dated November 27, 1958, to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, Khrushchev proposed that the Western portion of Berlin be disarmed and established as a separate free city within the German Democratic Republic. For text of this note, see Department of State Bulletin, January 19, 1959, pp. 81–89.
3. Anastas Mikoyan made an unofficial visit to the United States January 4–20, 1959, during which time he talked with Dulles on January 5 and with President Eisenhower on January 17.