345. Memorandum of Conversation0
MACMILLAN TALKS
SUBJECT
- Exchange of Views on the Limitation of Nuclear Testing
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
- The President
- The Secretary
- Admiral Strauss
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- Mr. Reinhardt
- Mr. Elbrick
- Mr. Farley
- General Goodpaster
- Mr. Dale
- U.K.
- The Prime Minister
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Sir Norman Brook
- Sir Patrick Dean
- Lord Hood
- Mr. Frederick Bishop
The Secretary stated that we shall deliver tomorrow morning a note to the Soviets which he believed would conclude, except for minor details, negotiation on the meeting of technical experts to discuss inspection and detection requirements for any suspension of nuclear testing.1 He surmised that the Soviets would not accept what our experts would regard as the minimum necessary in the way of controls and inspection. Nevertheless, he believed that we would obtain valuable insight into Soviet thinking on such matters as control posts from these talks. If it looks as though the Soviets would agree to the necessary minimum, the disposition of the U.S. is to go ahead with a test suspension, probably in the form of a one to two year suspension of nuclear testing, the prolongation of which would be contingent on progress on other aspects of disarmament. If such progress is not made, he said that we should reserve the right to resume testing. He cited certain ancillary problems such as whether underground testing should be permitted and whether the suspension of testing should proceed in stages, starting with large weapons. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
The Secretary suggested that we should concert our views more closely with the British on this matter once amendments to the McMahon Act2 make it possible.
[Page 814]The Prime Minister said that this problem has three aspects. The first is whether we can continue indefinitely nuclear tests from the point of view of the widespread opposition and the fears arising from the danger which people think they are creating. He explained that the forthcoming U.N. scientific report,3 although not alarming if read as a whole, contains inexact estimates of the consequences of the tests and some speculation which could be used to our disadvantage in propaganda. In his opinion it would be very difficult to resume tests if we once agreed to a two-year suspension. The second aspect, according to the Prime Minister, is what we will obtain in return for agreement to suspend tests. He considered that the beginning of an inspection system in which the Russians would participate would be a practical return to expect. He warned against asking for so much that it might disrupt the negotiations. The third aspect is to decide what the timing should be. He believed that it should be coordinated with the proposed meeting of Foreign Ministers and with the Summit meeting in order to give us a sustained public relations benefit, not one which would dissipate after a day or two.
The President pointed out that we can’t agree to an inspection system with just two or three inspectors. It must be a real installation. As far as the U.S. is concerned, he thought 20 stations would be required. Admiral Strauss intervened by saying that as many as 40 would be needed in the U.S. and 70 for the Asiatic land mass, including Communist China. The Prime Minister speculated that the Soviet inspectors as far as the U.K. were concerned would have to be located on Christmas Island and not in England.
[Here follows further discussion of this subject.]
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1022. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dale and approved by the White House. See also Documents 344 and 346–347.↩
- For text of this note, see Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1958, p. 1083.↩
- The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Public Law 585; 60 Stat. 755–775.↩
- Reference is to the Report of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, June 13, 1958 (U.N. doc. A/3838).↩