335. National Security Council Report0
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN
General Considerations
Importance of Spain
1. Because of Spain’s strategic geographic location, Spanish cooperation is valuable for the defense of the NATO area and of the United States, for the following reasons:
- a.
- Spain offers additional and dispersed bases designed for the use of U.S. strategic air and naval forces which are important to U.S. deterrent and operational capabilities.
- b.
- Military forces based on Spain could influence military operations in all the Mediterranean, the Eastern sections of the North and Central Atlantic Ocean routes, Northwest Africa, and all of Western Europe.
- c.
- Spain can also provide depth in the defense of Western Europe against an attack by the USSR.
The Political Situation
2. More than twenty years after the Civil War, General Franco, who is now 68 years old, is still Chief of the Spanish State and his control has not been seriously contested. His regime is supported by the conservative elements of Spanish society: the officer class of the armed services; the wealthy industrialist, banking and landholding groups; and a majority of the clerical hierarchy. The job-holding bureaucracy of the Flange, Spain’s only legal political organization whose careers are dependent in good part on the present system, and the older generations’ deeply-rooted desire for peace and stability following the chaos of the Civil War contribute significantly to the continuance of the Franco regime.
3. Concurrently, however, there exists a pervasive political malaise in Spain, especially among the younger generations and including elements of the lower clergy. The fragmented opposition groups from the Communist left to the Monarchist right have been unable thus far to [Page 786] provide the catalysts necessary to coalesce this discontent into a coherent and effective opposition. Sporadic outbreaks of active dissatisfaction, which are not expected to lessen, indicate the less than firm basis of Spain’s present authoritarian regime, although its efficient internal security forces have swiftly smothered such outbreaks and currently maintained firm control.
4. Prospects for future stability in Spain following the demise or incapacitation of General Franco are also weakened by the lack of provision for a successor government. Spain is officially a monarchy and at the present time a monarchical restoration appears to be the most likely post-Franco development, at least as an interim government which might ensure a measure of stability during a critical period.
5. Spain has successfully emerged from its diplomatic isolation of the post-World War II period. Following the conclusion of the agreements with the United States in 1953, Spain has moved back into international society and become a member of the UN, OEEC, participates in other multilateral organizations and UN specialized agencies, and has applied for adherence to GATT. It is also seeking to improve its relations with other Western European nations by official visits, trade and cultural agreement, etc. Spanish participation in NATO, however, continues to be adamantly opposed by the Scandinavian members in particular, who regard the Franco regime as ideologically incompatible with NATO principles. At least so long as the Franco regime remains in power, Spain is unlikely to be accepted in NATO. U.S. association with the Franco regime has on occasion been detrimental to U.S. prestige among certain groups in other parts of the world.
6. Serious difficulties may develop between Morocco and Spain. Spain retains the Mediterranean port cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the small Ifni areas as enclaves in Morocco. To protect these interests and those of its nationals residing in Morocco, proper, Spain retains forces in the enclaves and also in Moroccan territory. Morocco is pressing for the complete evacuation of Spanish troops and has asserted claims to the enclaves as well as to the Spanish Sahara.
The Economic Situation
7. A deteriorating balance of payments situation reached a critical point in mid–1959 when heavy inflationary pressures and near exhaustion of hard currency reserves presented the Spanish Government with the alternatives of an immediate deflationary program or economic, probably political, disorder. With uncharacteristic directness the Spanish Government met this problem by consulting with the OEEC and the IMF and, with the assistance and encouragement of these organizations and the United States, developed and energetically instituted an economic stabilization plan. This program has been successful in stabilizing [Page 787] the value of the peseta, halting inflation and the rise of the cost-of-living, improving Spain’s gold and dollar reserves position, and eliminating the heavy balance of payments deficits on current and capital accounts. These substantial gains, however, were accompanied by a slow-down in general business activity, increased unemployment and a decrease in the amount of take-home pay. The Spanish Government is now studying corrective measures which might be undertaken to stimulate business activity, as the continuation or worsening of this situation could lead to active unrest and political turmoil. In this connection, it is in the U. S. interest to encourage a stable and growing economy in Spain as a necessary concomitant to the U.S. use of the joint-use Spanish bases and facilities.
U.S. Aid
8. The agreements signed by the United States and Spain on September 26, 1953, provide for the development and use by the United States of military facilities in Spain, and for U.S. strengthening of Spain’s economic and military posture through economic and military aid. SAC bases have been developed at Zaragoza, Torrejon and Moron de la Frontera; a navy base and naval air station at Rota; a 485-mile pipeline from Rota to Zaragoza; naval fuel and ammunition storage depots; AC&W sites, and ancillary supporting facilities. This base complex is fully operational and construction is virtually completed. U.S. capital expenditures on these facilities up to September 1, 1960, amounted to approximately $352 million, of which approximately $140 million were covered by counterpart funds generated by U.S. aid programs.
9. To support the policy of military cooperation with Spain, the United States undertook a commitment in 1953 to provide a total aid program in the amount of $465 million over a period of four years. Programming for this commitment was virtually completed in FY 1957, but the United States has continued to provide both military and economic assistance in order to promote the achievement of U.S. objectives in Spain and, in particular, to retain the over-all U.S.-Spanish cooperation required for U.S. use of Spanish bases and facilities. Through FY 1960, a total of $420 million in military assistance and $1,281 million in economic programs (including defense support, loans and P.L. 480 sales) had been approved.
10. The initial ten-year period of the 1953 Defense Agreement will terminate on September 26, 1963. Preliminary Spanish views have been expressed informally by some officials that it would be desirable to initiate discussions at an early date for the strengthening and expansion of this agreement. Spain will undoubtedly endeavor to utilize the 1963 date as a lever to obtain concessions from the United States. It is in the best interest of the United States to provide continuing military and [Page 788] economic assistance on the minimum basis necessary to retain Spanish cooperation. It is considered disadvantageous, however, to enter discussion on this point so far in advance of 1963. U.S. base interests in Spain will probably not be threatened so long as the Franco regime remains in power. It is not believed that Spanish policy toward the United States would be drastically altered after Franco’s departure unless the political situation degenerated into prolonged disorder. Any likely successor regime would almost certainly recognize that close cooperation with the United States was essential to economic stability.
11. The Spanish Armed Forces remain firmly under General Franco’s control and the regime continues to rely on their support and influence, principally that of the Army, to assure the maintenance of political stability. Basically, these forces have a capability only for maintaining internal security, for conducting a limited delaying action against a modern well-equipped force and for defending Spanish possessions in North Africa against attacks by forces from the neighboring states. All three of Spain’s Armed Services have shown marked improvement as a result of U.S. aid, but are still far from having a satisfactory capability for defense. The predominance of obsolete equipment, the limited prospects of obtaining large numbers of modern weapons, the low level of education and lack of technical experience of Spanish manpower, and the extremely limited capability of Spain’s present economy to support a modern military force, forecast a continued reliance by Spain on outside assistance to maintain the level of effectiveness which has been achieved since 1953.
Objectives
12. Access to military facilities in Spain required by the United States, and acceptance by Spain of the concept of collective security.
13. Improvement of the capability of Spanish forces to contribute to the defense of the Iberian Peninsula.
14. Maintenance of Spain’s non-Communist orientation and development of close relations with the United States.
15. Improvement of relations between Spain and the NATO nations in order:
- a.
- To tie Spain as closely as practicable to Western plans for regional defense.
- b.
- To obtain Spanish participation in NATO as soon as appropriate, without committing the United States at this time to bring Spanish forces up to NATO standards in case Spain is admitted to NATO.
16. Maintenance of internal stability as needed to accomplish these objectives.
17. Sound economic growth and stability as needed to accomplish these objectives.
[Page 789]18. The evolution of Spain toward more democratic processes.
19. The conduct by Spain of a cooperative and constructive policy in the Mediterranean area.
Major Policy Guidance
20. a. Provide Spain such minimum military, economic and technical assistance as is necessary to promote achievement of U.S. objectives and, in particular, to retain the over-all U.S.-Spanish cooperation required for U.S. use of Spanish bases and facilities.
b. In providing assistance under subparagraph a above, seek to distribute total assistance in such a way as:
- (1)
- To assist in promoting a reasonable degree of economic stability and growth, recognizing their contribution to internal political stability.
- (2)
- To develop forces to increase Spain’s capability to contribute to the defense of the Iberian Peninsula, including defense of U.S.-occupied Spanish bases.
- (3)
- To encourage the reduction or elimination of unnecessary military forces.
c. In discussions with Spain as to future U.S. military assistance, balance Spanish requests for any increases in U.S.-supported forces above the present U.S.-supported force basis against the possibility that some provision for advanced defensive weapons may be required, and against the limited capabilities of the Spanish economy to support modern military forces.
21. a. In both Spain and the NATO countries, encourage closer cooperation between Spain and our NATO allies.
b. Seek to persuade, as appropriate, our NATO allies of the advantages of Spanish membership in NATO.
c. When appropriate, encourage Spain to apply for membership in NATO and support that application when presented.
22. Encourage Spain to follow economic and financial policies designed to promote sound economic growth and stability and to improve the climate for foreign investment in Spain.
23. Recognizing that the United States must cooperate closely with the government of Franco in order to ensure effective implementation of the U.S.-Spanish agreements:
- a.
- Endeavor to avoid any identification with the policies of the Spanish Government not required for this purpose, and avoid steps that could be interpreted as an attempt to interfere in Spanish internal affairs. Maintain broad but selective contacts with all opinion groups including the non-Communist left—consistent with the need for continuous, harmonious working relationships with the Franco Government—in order (1) to encourage their pro-Western orientation and (2) to present American programs and our presence in Spain in terms of their benefits to the Spanish people.
- b.
- Continue to use U.S. influence to persuade Spain to adopt policies consonant with U.S. interests.
24. Encourage discreetly the establishment of a practical and acceptable succession in Spain which would:
- a.
- Assist in maintaining internal stability.
- b.
- Avoid a post-Franco crisis which might jeopardize our access to military facilities and the achievement of related U.S. objectives.
- c.
- Hopefully evolve toward more democratic processes in Spain.
25. Encourage broader educational, cultural, military and technical contacts between Americans and Spaniards in the interest of building up influence within Spain favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives.
26. Encourage the orderly settlement of problems and disputes involving Spain and African states in order to encourage the maintenance of Spanish influence in North Africa.
- Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6016 Series. Secret. NSC 6016/1 comprised a cover sheet; a note by Executive Secretary Lay, which stated that it had been approved by the President on October 5 and that it superseded NSC 5710/1; a statement of policy; and a Financial Appendix. Only the statement of policy and part of the Financial Appendix are printed here. NSC 6016, September 19, was discussed by the NSC on September 29 and revised pursuant to that discussion; see Document 334.↩
- Secret.↩
- Drawing rights—$50 million. Stand-by credit—$25 million. [Footnote in the source text.]↩