Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

303. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State⁰

Madrid, January 31, 1958, 11 p.m.

791. As instructed Deptel 917, January 27¹ Foreign Office and chief high general staff were informed January 30 by Embassy and chief team mid-February, [sic] Was emphasized that team is technical and will not discuss air defense requirements or military assistance. Embassy reserving action on request in [for] Franco interview. We have suggested that team will be ready commence discussions Tuesday February 18. Chief JUSMG has recommended team arrive Madrid February 13 day before Ambassador departure for US in order have adequate time for discussion with US officials Madrid before commencing talks with Spaniards. Talks should conclude by twenty-first. Country team concurs.

In opinion country team problems posed by Spaniards in recent weeks are largely interrelated and collectively constitute all-out attempt increase substantially amount US economic and military assistance. We think this true even of vulnerability question although recognize their expressed views also reflect some sincere concern over possible impact future war might have on Spain, given existence US bases their territory.

Problem preoccupying us, however, is whether or not some general response to questions raised by Spanish Chief State is desirable.² Country team inclined to think such would be beneficial for several reasons.

Almost since signing agreements in 1953³ we have engaged in parrying Spanish aid requests that have substantially exceeded our capacity or willingness to respond. This has been particularly pertinent with respect to our economic programs under which both our recommendations and ultimate allocations have consistently fallen short of Spanish requests. On military side, Spaniards have been waiting, with increasing impatience since July 1956 talks⁴ for some indication US future assistance intentions beyond original $350 million commitment.

However, each successive expression Spanish desires involves larger amount of aid and each successive US response that falls short creates greater frustration and irritation on part of Spaniards. They are motivated not only by general vulnerability fear but need resolve economic difficulties that have continued mount during period since agreements were signed. We in turn are motivated by our security requirements for bases in an operationally ready condition. Difficulty is to relate these two national requirements in manner that will preserve mutuality of interest in 1953 agreements and at same time avoid excessive costs to US.

At present we are confronted with new series Spanish economic and military requests which collectively are unreasonable in respect to what they can hope to obtain; individually several of them are unrealistic. To a degree it should be possible to whittle down some of these economic and military aspirations during technical level discussions with them. (Economic discussions will be more or less continuous; but to hold MAP talks now as proposed Deptel 679, December 3⁵ poses difficulties which are being discussed in separate telegram.) Despite these staff level efforts it appears to country team that problems Franco raised merit acknowledgment at high-level and that such response would afford us important opportunity to help reestablish general relations on basis more likely endure during period ahead when we critically need bases here. Response could include, but not be limited to, following points: refer to continued US interest in being of minimum possible assistance helping Spain help itself, but point out our world-wide commitments and emphasize present impossibility predict beyond annual basis precise character and amount aid; emphasize we have substantially exceeded our 1953 commitments but have made decision nevertheless undertake some further military and economic assistance; indicate our willingness within obvious limitation to respond favorably to reasonable Spanish requests but point out how impossible it is for us contemplate, for example, moving bases, constructing new ones, and on basis present policy providing military aid of magnitude General Barroso has in mind (Embtel 788);⁶ express appreciation for part Spain is playing on western defense team (though regrettably not member NATO) and emphasize that bases are significant Spanish contribution to deterrence war.

If undertaken, country team believes such an approach should be made by me to Franco on instructions from Department. Would plan meet initially with Castiella prior my return to States February 14 and inform him that problems raised during Secretary-Franco meeting are under active consideration. While in Washington (February 18, 24, 25) I could meet with Department officials in order define approach to be taken in conversations with Franco. At that time I would hope find it appropriate reveal to him $15 million additional FY 1958 defense support and be authorized inform him change in counterpart distribution ratio to 90–10 Export-Import Bank and DLF loans, and perhaps additional allocation cotton and edible oil under PL 480. Thus armed we believe substantial progress toward achieving above-mentioned general objectives ought be made.

Prior my trip would appreciate any general comments Department may have on approach recommended this telegram.⁷

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5852/1–3158. Secret.
1. Telegram 917 to Madrid asked the Embassy and JUSMG to inform their counterparts that a technical team would be going to Spain in February and suggested the possibility of an interview with Franco for its head. (Ibid., 711.5852/1–2758)
2. In a meeting with Dulles on December 20, 1957, Franco raised a number of questions on economic and military assistance. For a memorandum of this conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXVII, pp. 591–596.
3. Reference is to the defense and economic agreements signed at Madrid on September 26, 1953.
4. Documentation on these talks is in Department of State, Central File 752.5–MSP.
5. Telegram 679 to Madrid reviewed the U.S. military assistance program in general for fiscal year 1958, informed the Embassy that the Spanish program should be developed on a yearly basis and on the minimum level essential to maintain Spanish cooperation, and that the Chief of JUSMG should begin discussions with the Spanish military based on these premises. (Ibid., 752.5–MSP/9–2357)
6. Telegram 788 from Madrid, January 31, reported that General Barroso, the Spanish Army Minister, had proposed a program for bringing 14 Spanish divisions up to NATO standards at the cost of $325 million annually. (Ibid., 752.5–MSP/1–3158)
7. On February 12, the Department of State replied, noting that the suggested points for discussion with Spain were excellent and informing the Embassy that as individual items in the Spanish aid package were approved, the Embassy should make “frank and vigorous” statements at the Ministerial level concerning the realities of Spanish economic expectations. (Telegram 996 to Madrid; Ibid.)