Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State⁰

Rome, April 24, 1960, 12 p.m.

3827. Paris for Thurston and Finn.

1. Question is being asked with increasing frequency here, and no doubt also abroad, whether, after eight weeks of intense controversy, with stable solution being nowhere in sight, Italian democracy is approaching stage where word “crisis” should be applied to existence of regime itself rather than merely to process of forming new government. Our judgment is that, while there are causes for concern, matters are not yet at critical stage. Nevertheless, process by which democratic parties find themselves hurrying down a narrowing blind alley, with new elections, which none of them want, being only apparent escape, should perhaps be reviewed.

2. Basic problem of Italian politics since 1947 has been essentially this. With neo-Fascists on right (five percent of vote in 1958 elections) and Communists and Nenni-Socialists on left (respectively 22 and 15 percent in 1958) denied in practice to normal processes of constructive parliamentary government, and given maximum disruptive power by effects of proportional representation, there was not room within rest of political spectrum for alternation of power which normally characterizes parliamentary life.

3. Policies had to be worked out within and between democratic parties outside of Parliament. Process was further complicated by nature of DC party. Conflicting social interests ranging from Christian Socialists to rock-bound conservatism could be reconciled only under pressure of common danger from PCI-PSI, urgency of economic recovery and commanding leadership such as that of De Gasperi.

4. Italy could only be governed by open or camouflaged coalition of remaining parties (58 percent of spectrum) which was in fact what happened until 1958. Successive governments were constructed after exhaustive negotiation and reconciling of general and specific pressures and interests. Resulting balance was, however, soon subjected to competing pressures which came to head within year or eighteen months, when new balance of essentially same forces was found.

5. Underlying this constant surface change and maneuver (most of it conducted in terms of ideological mystifications which have little impact on electorate) there has been remarkably consistent line of policy and notable achievement in many fields. Astonishing economic recovery and expansion have led to all economic indicators being at all-time high, and unemployment is falling. Statistics are supported by reality, and signs of rise in standard of living of all classes are evident all over country.

6. Disparity between richest and poorest is, however, as great as ever and phenomenon of “rising expectations” occurs here as elsewhere, egged on by steady drumbeat of Communist propaganda. Other grounds for protest are business monopolies, corruption in government, real and imagined clerical interference in civil affairs, etc., all fortified by traditional skepticism and suspicion of government in general, and central government in particular.

7. Solidarity of Communist-Socialist Left has been somewhat weakened as development toward democratic socialism, which has characterized all other socialist parties, gradually and very belatedly operates in Italy, producing so-called “autonomous” movement within PSI, Nenni has put himself at head of this faction and is skillfully keeping DC on defensive. He has posed conditions for his support which are superficially moderate. They are, however, carefully chosen to detach PSDI and PRI from former cooperation with DC, to intensify conflict between DC left and right wings and, meanwhile, to garner votes for PS from PCI, PSDI and DC left. Nenni wants DC agreement, before he agrees to abstain (on initial investiture vote only) on (A) establishment of regional governments, i.e., further weakening centralized structure of state; (B) “democratic” school reform, i.e., elimination of church influence and of state support for Catholic schools; (C) modernization of electrical and nuclear power; (D) and an end to “discrimination” in organized labor, i.e., progressive weakening of non-Communist unions. While PSI is now substantially autonomous from PCI, all these policies happen also to coincide with PCI policies. Unofficial hints abound of Nenni’s readiness to compromise but, against background of last 15 years, skepticism of center and right of DC party is perhaps understandable.

8. Part of DC wished to join Saragat (and Republicans) in competition for left-wing vote and as tactical device toward this end, Fanfani [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] induced DC party in 1957 officially to reject “centrism” and to adopt Center-Left slogan. His policy may have helped DC Party somewhat in 1958 elections but his attempt in 1958 to govern on this basis, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was complete failure.

9. Hard realities and serious risks of PSI cooperation, without which “Center-Left formula” remains no more than electioneering slogan, have been ignored or covered over with meaningless evasions. DC Party hoped to get electoral profit without having to put it to real test. [2 lines of source text not declassified] (Moro as party secretary was so committed in this direction that he will probably be early casualty.)

10. Saragat and Republicans (together six percent of votes in last election) being dedicated to Center-Left governmental formula only realizable at present on basis of cooperation with PSI, available margin for parliamentary majority has been still further narrowed to fifty-two percent of votes.

11. Government which Segni formed in February 1959 therefore had to rest on parliamentary support of three small right-wing parties. Following substance [garble] in paragraph four above, however, this was balanced by having Moro (favorable to Center-Left) as party secretary and adopting Fanfani’s progressive policies. Liberals could stand this only so long and no doubt thought that by bringing down Segni they could extract policy changes as price of return to new center-right coalition.

12. Meanwhile DC Party organization has become progressively more and more committed to notion of Center-Left government supported by “positive abstention” of PSI. For differing reasons, very substantial proportion of DC deputies and senators, of DC electorate and of powerful elements of Catholic Church whose moral authority and vote-getting power are still great, oppose this attempt. Much of this opposition stems from vested economic interests but much of it believes that ideological inheritance and political realities of Nenni’s position make operation dangerous and, going against consistent DC political line of steady opposition to Communist-Socialist left, would negate whole premise of appeal for democratic solidarity behind DC party and risk substantial losses at next election.

13. Unifying factors (paragraph 3 above) are no longer operative and after 15 years of power DC Party gives appearance of having degenerated into league of warring factions, using ideological rationalizations only to justify competition for power. Instead of acting openly, secret undermining of policies, leaders and governments, in which they have just joined in giving unconvincing but unanimous party approval, has become normal political practice.

14. Liberals and most other observers (including ourselves) misjudged Gronchi’s relative power position. Prestige loss in Moscow trip was quickly forgotten, and faced by all-time low in DC party unity, he has still further enlarged his role in shaping form, policies and composition of governments. His first three attempts to foist on DC Party selections which went against well-known convictions of majority of their deputies and senators were thwarted by Segni and dominant Center-Right of party, but at cost of glaring and successive contradictions, surprising even Italian politics, which have led to considerable loss of prestige.

15. As to Communists, their great concern is to avoid isolation. There has been ample evidence around country of their instigating protest movements, on basis of “unity of action” with PSI, PSDI and PRI wherever possible. Situation in Leghorn (Embtel 3790)¹ may well be relevant to this campaign. PCI propaganda does not have impact which it had ten years ago but, operating against background of discontent and protest which still exists, has undoubtedly had certain effect and is not only useful electoral tactic but prepares ground for exploitation of any opportunity for popular front which may arise.

16. Important current consideration is whether present crisis is weakening constitutional system to extent that crisis of regime is threatened. Responsible journals have called it most serious governmental crisis since war.

Atmosphere has been heavy with some of same official exhaustion and public disgust or unconcern with governing process that characterized latter days of French Fourth Republic. However, parallel with France is weakened by many differences of national character, experience and especially of circumstance. Italy has no Algerian question (unless it be internal one of eroding consequence of maintenance of PCI strength). Army is not significantly involved in politics; there is no available symbolic figure such as de Gaulle and there has been no intellectual or ideological preparation, so to speak, for an authoritarian regime. Main danger lies in Gronchi’s concept of Presidential form of government and his relative strength in current situation.

17. Well-known positions of all parties and factions have progressively hardened and there is no evidence yet of any tendency to compromise. Gronchi’s latest attempt to salvage Tambroni seems worst possible course, almost as if it were calculated to destroy DC party. Unless Gronchi gives in and allows DC party full scope to choose leader and combination which they think can get stable majority in present parliament under present circumstances (some such arrangement as Segni constructed in February 1959) genuine caretaker government to prepare new elections seems only solution. Against latter prospect is fact that no democratic party, and probably not even Gronchi under present circumstances, wants them and parliamentary opinion will react against persons believed responsible for them. Italians have great confidence in special providence watching over their destinies and blind alley may in fact prove to have some other escape not yet discernible.

Horsey

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/6–2460, Confidential. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, all Consulates in Italy, and Paris.
1. In telegram 3790 from Rome, April 22, Horsey reported that rioting broke out between Italian soldiers stationed in the area and civilian youths “over local girls.” The Communist-dominated CGIL had called a 2-hour general strike in an effort to exploit the situation. (Ibid., 765.00/4–2260)