Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

255. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

PSV/MC/16

October 2, 1959.

SEGNI VISIT

SUBJECT

• East Africa

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 252.]

Prime Minister Segni said that he had received alarming reports from French Prime Minister Debre and from his Turkish friends, in particular, Mr. Zorlu, regarding the vast Communist expansion in Africa. Italy had few details on this but it was alarmed that Emperor Haile Selassie, who in no way could be considered a Communist, had turned for help to the Soviet Union.¹ This meant that Soviet technicians would come to Ethiopia. He compared this situation with that of President Nasser. The Prime Minister said that even though Nasser condemned internal communism, he nevertheless brought military as well as civilian technicians into Egypt. He referred particularly to the Soviet technicians who had come to the military arsenal at Alexandria. He said he would be interested to have any further information we might have on these developments. He was particularly interested in any information concerning East Africa, Somaliland and Ethiopia. He pointed out that Italy was faced with a particularly delicate situation in regard to its trusteeship in Somalia.² Italy has had good relations with Ethiopia and many Italians live there. He thought it was not only in Italy’s interest but also in those of Italy’s allies that Italy maintain good relations with Ethiopia. He pointed out that Ethiopia was the only independent Christian country in North Africa. He said that the question which poisoned relations between Italy and Ethiopia and which also caused difficulties between Ethiopia and other countries was the Somalia border question. While there was the proposal for arbitration, it seemed to have little prospect for success. He wondered whether it was not desirable to have the US, UK, France and Italy examine the situation and reach some common position so that there would be no danger of lack of agreement between the Four.

The Secretary replied that he would be glad to have a Four Power meeting. He asked Mr. Satterthwaite to comment on the Prime Minister’s exposition.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that we agreed on the complexity of this issue and the fact that it was poisoning relations with Ethiopia. We also agreed that there was little likelihood for success for the arbitration procedure. At the same time, it was felt in the Bureau of African Affairs that it was desirable not to make a final assessment of the situation until Trygve Lie³ had been heard from. We understood he would be coming to New York this month. Mr. Satterthwaite referred to Ambassador Brosio’s conversation on September 18 with Mr. Murphy in which the Ambassador had expressed the view it might be desirable to see what Trygve Lie might come up with.⁴ Mr. Satterthwaite commented it was unlikely that there would be any agreement on the compromis or on the terms of reference. It appeared that everybody agreed that the provisional line should be the border but it seemed to be difficult to get everybody to agree to accept this line.

Prime Minister Segni said that Italy had few hopes of agreement on this question. He said the problem was more than just the matter of the provisional line. He thought it was desirable for the Four allies to reach an understanding with respect to the border but he thought that their consideration of the question should go beyond and deal with Greater Somalia, Ogaden and Ethiopia. It was of considerable concern to Italy that Ethiopia, with its strategic position, should be open to communism. He desired to underline the great importance of Ethiopia in connection with the Soviet introduction of communism into Africa. Italy was deeply concerned lest Ethiopia might be transformed from a center of resistance to communism to a Communist stronghold.

The Secretary said he thought it was a good idea for the US, UK, France and Italy to meet at the Ambassadorial level to consider the problem. He believed it would be most embarrassing for a nation without borders to apply to the UN for membership.

The Prime Minister said that he certainly hoped that the arbitration efforts of Mr. Lie would succeed in determining the frontier. It would be difficult to admit Somalia into the UN if it did not have definitive borders. However, the problem was more serious than the border and he reiterated his hope that the representatives of the four countries in Washington would consider the serious Ethiopian situation. Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that care should be taken that Ethiopia should not learn of these Four Power talks. The Secretary agreed and said that the Four Power meeting should be held without publicity since Ethiopia would be irritated at being the subject of Four Power conversations.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1490. Secret. Drafted by Stabler and approved by M and S on October 26. See also Documents 252–254 and 256–258.
1. During Emperor Haile Selassie’s visit to the Soviet Union June 20–July 12, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement and Ethiopia was granted a long-term, low interest loan.
2. Italy’s 10-year U.N. trusteeship in Somalia was to expire in 1960 at which time the former colony would receive full independence. The Italians were seeking a final agreement with Ethiopia over disputed borders.
3. Trygve Lie, former U.N. Secretary-General, had been appointed “independent person” on a three-man arbitration panel seeking to settle disagreements over the Ethiopian-Somalian border.
4. No record of this meeting has been found.