Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

231. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State⁰

Rome, December 20, 1958.

279. As Italian political activity relaxes somewhat for holiday season it is possible take stock of situation if not to analyze it satisfactorily or forecast probable developments. Internal political scene is in most delicate and dynamic state in recent years. Best Embassy is able to offer at present time is inventory of factors which make forecasts precarious. As we see it, following are present current or short-term factors to be considered.

1. Government’s razor-thin parliamentary majority.

2. Disaffection of “notabili”¹ and right-wing elements of 20 or 30 deputies in DC because of: (a) personal rivalry with Fanfani [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (b) opposition to left-of-center orientation and announced objectives of DC-PSDI coalition and including prospect of possible future “deal” with PSI.

3. Apparent lack of viable alternative majority formula on presumption that present orientation actually represents present temper of vast majority of DC party and electorate. In this connection the PLI has not recently exhibited the spirit of compromise of quadripartite days.

4. Overshadowing everything are uncertainties of PSI Congress in January which could have following results in rough order of probability:

(a) A clear-cut Nenni victory in ballot resulting in an optical [sic] autonomy of the party but with a strong organized minority, leaving many unresolved institutional and ideological links with PCI through party apparatus, labor unions, cooperatives, and local governments.

(b) An inconclusive harmony session leaving Nenni in control but with unclear policy.

(c) A party split with some portion of party making clean break with philo-Commie elements. (This would represent at once most hopeful possibility and the one most immediately apt to be disruptive of present political spectrum.)

(d) A philo-Communist victory and return to the status quo ante Venezia.² (As returns trickle in from federations this appears increasingly unlikely.)

5. Uncertainty as to political attitude and activity of Church, which is being reorganized under new Pontiff.

6. Stresses on PSDI support of DC which include (a) antagonisms generated by Giuffro case and parliamentary report censuring Preti; (b) itching feet of small left-wing elements including Matteotti, Zagari and possible one or two others.

7. Emerging flirtation between extreme left and extreme right elements always inherent in opposition formula but accentuated by Milazzo case in Sicily³ (see also point 2 above) and ensuing polemic between Unit and Avanti.

8. Psychological influence of Gaullist development in France.

9. Apparent intentions of British Labor Party to stir boiling pot (primarily in connection with point 4 above).⁴

10. Increasingly dynamic adventurism of Enrico Mattei supported by President Gronchi which present and past Italian governments apparently without desire or ability (or both) to control.

Coupled with above and interacting on them are certain long-term factors, some of which are coming nearer boiling point:

1. Sincere desire of substantial proportion of intelligent democratic Italians to breach isolation of large and growing body of left-wing voters and provide a substantial left of center parliament group around which might be found a majority as an alternative to relatively static center government formula or post-war period.

2. Increasing impatience with slowness in development of “modern” Italian state.

3. Point 2 is opposed by consolidating conservative fears of increased statism and socialism and concern for loss of special positions and vested interests.

4. The resultant stresses produced by the two preceding factors tending to split the Catholic party, and the opposition to such a split by most of the Church hierarchy as well as by a great number of others sincerely concerned with future Italian political stability who realize that this large center party is principal bulwark against possible popular front.

5. The problem of the care, feeding and control of President Gronchi (long term, since he still has 3–1/2 years in office) and of Enrico Mattei.

The present government, for lack of suitable alternative, may possibly last until after DC Congress in April but some considerable regroupment appears inevitable before summer 1959. Meanwhile some temporizing may be accomplished by changing one or two ministers. In this situation all political factions are maneuvering actively. Approaches to members of this Embassy to indicate by word, deed or silence something which will support aspirations of individuals and parties are an almost daily occurrence. I am accordingly instructing my key officers that until further notice the attitude of official Americans in Rome in private conversations and unavoidable public statements is to be based on following:

United States enjoys good relations with present government of Italy as it has with past governments since war. It reposes confidence in policies of that government in so far as they are of concern to United States and expects to continue close working relations with it so long as it remains legally constituted government of Italy. We would anticipate having same close relations with any successor government which Italian people through their constitutional processes may choose provided it is based on parties and principles which are democratic in Western sense of the term.

United States’ only legitimate concern in Italian affairs is in those elements which influence its foreign policy and/or which directly touch bilateral relations between Italy and United States and its citizens and corporations. We will continue support and encourage a foreign policy which is pro-NATO and fosters close relations between Italy and the United States. We believe such a policy to be in our mutual best interests. We will steadfastly oppose continuation or extension of Soviet-controlled Communism and currents tending to support it. Specifically as regards future of PSI, United States is not opposed to Socialist parties per se or to socialism in other countries if electorate of that country freely chooses it and if it is independent of Soviet control or influence. In the special case of Italy, we have long enjoyed cordial relations with the Social Democrat Party. While we will watch with interest the efforts of the PSI or elements thereof to attain and secure its independence from Soviet Communist control and influence, we believe we have a right to entertain considerable doubts as to its ability to do so in the near future. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In this situation, conversion to a fully-independent party will be, at best, a slow process and can only be considered successful in the light of a sustained record of support for democratic principles. Meanwhile, we consider there is a real danger that, misled by apparent but unproven Socialist autonomy, left-wing elements of the PSDI, of the PRI and possibly of the DC parties may join with the PSI thus weakening the center democratic parties to the point where they will be unable to form a government. In such an eventuality we might even end up with a popular front in Italy.

Zellerbach

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/12–2058. Confidential. Drafted by Torbert and Zellerbach. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and all Consulates in Italy.
1. The term refers to a group of older Christian Democratic leaders, most notably former Prime Ministers Scelba and Pella and former Defense Minister Taviani.
2. At its 32d congress in Venice in February 1957, the Italian Socialist Party publicly broke its longstanding “Unity of Action” pact with the Communist Party and adopted a resolution declaring its unconditional loyalty to the parliamentary democratic system of government.
3. In October 1958, a split occurred within the Christian Democratic Party in Sicily. The leader of the successionist forces, Silvio Milazzo, formed a regional government with the support of a broad coalition that included both the Communists and Nenni Socialists. Milazzo’s succession was direct challenge to Fanfani’s control within the party.
4. The left wing of the British Labor Party was anxious to promote the reunification of the Italian Socialist and Social Democratic Parties.