Office of the Historian

21. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State0

Paris, June 14, 1958, 7 p.m.

5950.1 had a long talk this morning with Minister of State Guy Mollet. He was in a confident and optimistic mood and said that while things were not “good” they were “better” and that he could now look at future and see an end of road.

He said that few weeks ago he had had to make most important decision of his political career. He had no reason to regret his decision. General de Gaulle (a really “great man” whom oddly enough he had not known personally until few weeks ago) had lived up to all his commitments to Mollet.

Two problems still paramount, a) new constitution and b) Algiers, in that order in Mollet’s opinion.

1.
He believes new constitution will be worked out which should be much more satisfactory to foreign governments entering agreement with France since there will some chance of French Government making commitments remaining in power long enough to carry them out.
2.

Eventual solution to Algeria not yet clear but it will probably not be integral part of France which “ultras” desire. Although de Gaulle “being Anglo-Saxon rather than French” insists that “they asked for de Gaulle now they’ve got de Gaulle; they asked for integration now they’ll get integration”.

Mollet believes there will be some sort of federated relationship, recognizing Algerian origin and individuality but linked with France.

3.

Mollet told me that de Gaulle wants him to take a trip to the U.S. Not on diplomatic mission, that is too limited, but with rather broad undefined scope to “explain to our American friends” de Gaulle’s views and policies. For example, that de Gaulle has no intention of ending the Republic, that he is not for a one-party system and what his views on constitution and Algeria are, etc.

De Gaulle would like Mollet to start rather quickly, but Mollet thinks it would be better if he waited few weeks in order get his thoughts clarified and also by then form of constitution and developments in Algeria will be more clearly defined and he will thus be talking on firmer ground.

I suggested that it might be advisable to start after Secretary Dulles’ visit here. He concurred saying this would permit him to be here for conversations and also the Secretary might be able to suggest to him specific subjects to clarify to Americans.

In answer to my specific questions he said he would also visit Canada and England and laughingly confirmed my description of him as “in charge of Anglo-Saxons”.

While in States he expects to have talks with American officials, give press interviews, etc.

This subject should be treated confidentially until officially confirmed by French.

4.
In clarification of de Gaulle’s reference to relation with West in his radio address last evening,1 Mollet said that General based this on discussions he had had with the cabinet in which the General had made it absolutely clear that while he would have preferred the EURATOM, Common Market and other European agreements had been conceived differently, France was committed to them and France would honor her commitments. de Gaulle, according to Mollet prefers confederated Europe to federated Europe.
5.
With respect to NATO de Gaulle considers that French who should be most interested and who are the most threatened are not [Page 33] assuming their full responsibilities therein and should play stronger and more effective role in their own defense and interests.
6.

I asked Mollet what de Gaulle meant by the statement in last night’s speech “being of the West but not confined to the West.” He said that the General considered that while USSR talked great deal about peace did not contribute toward it. Western democracies are constantly being placed in negative positions by USSR. De Gaulle favors in company with British and U.S. France assuming more positive approach to put USSR on the defensive, etc.

I remarked that he wanted France to be more West than the West. “Exactly” he replied.

7.
Among other things he said he did not know how General would deal with Soustelle but Soustelle could be very useful were he also to make trip to U.S. such as Mollet plans. Soustelle could explain Algerian situation and atmosphere to Americans which must be very confusing to them.
Lyon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/6–1458. Confidential. Repeated to London and Algiers.↩
  2. de Gaulle’s address on policy aims was broadcast over French radio and television on June 13. For text, see de Gaulle, Statements, pp. 9–10.↩
  3. de Gaulle’s address on policy aims was broadcast over French radio and television on June 13. For text, see de Gaulle, Statements, pp. 9–10.↩