Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

201. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research⁰

No. 8374

December 6, 1960.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Abstract

On September 28, 1958, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was approved by almost 80 percent of the French voters. Many of those voting for the Constitution were not expressing approval of the document itself, which neither at that time nor since has won any considerable popular support. Rather, they were expressing their confidence or hope that General de Gaulle would be able to settle the Algerian conflict, which had led to the downfall of the Fourth Republic, or at least would avert a seizure of power by the rightist and military forces that had overthrown the former regime in May 1958.

General de Gaulle, faced by the fact that the French Army is unwilling to abandon Algeria to the Moslem rebels (the National Liberation Front—FLN), has moved cautiously and pragmatically to find a way out of the problem. He has proclaimed that the Algerian people, after hostilities have ended and there has been a “cooling off” period, must eventually decide their own fate. In the meantime he is attempting to condition them to choose close ties with France by building up the country economically and, above all, by attempting to develop a representative Moslem “third force” with which he can do business. While offering the FLN the chance to participate with other groups in formulating Algeria’s future, he rejects their claim to being the representatives of the Moslem Algerians, and refuses to conduct political negotiations with them. Instead, he appears determined to build an “Algerian Algeria” with or without them. Despite the failure of the “third force” to emerge, de Gaulle is moving ahead with increasing speed to create autonomous Algerian organs, which, he hopes, will establish in fact what the Algerian people will later establish in law at the time of the self-determination referendum.

The danger of a rightist and military uprising against this policy remains serious, for many believe—probably correctly—that autonomy will lead inevitably to independence. However, even if de Gaulle is able to establish autonomous organs in Algiers, it is unlikely that peace could be restored, at least in the short run, without political negotiations with the FLN, which both he and the army strongly resist. de Gaulle’s policy, unless it is modified on this point, is therefore probably inadequate to bring peace to Algeria in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, failure to solve the Algerian problem has cast a long shadow over de Gaulle’s attempts to strengthen France by reform at home and to reassert its traditional “grandeur” abroad.

The provisions of the new Constitution have been distorted in practice because of the overwhelming control of public affairs by de Gaulle himself. The cabinet has had no independent authority, and Parliament has been deprived in practice even of the narrow authority left it by the Constitution. The Algerian problem has tended to polarize French politics, and both the left and right, unable to act in Parliament, have increasingly resorted to manifestoes, meetings, and street demonstrations in order to make themselves heard. This ominous rise of extraparliamentary activity is underlined by the constant undercurrent of extreme right-wing plotting against the regime. There is also widespread discontent with the regime’s economic policies. The financial positions of the government and the nation have been greatly improved since de Gaulle took power, but this improvement has been accompanied by a certain stagnation of economic activity and a continued opposition to the government’s policies by workers and many farmers, who feel that the reforms were made at their expense.

In the field of foreign policy, de Gaulle has sought to attain for France a position of full equality with the United States and the United Kingdom in the Western alliance. His program includes acquisition by France of an independent nuclear striking force, full French participation in decisions concerning Western global strategy, and the establishment of French-dominated spheres of influence in Africa and Western Europe. But although France has proven its ability to develop and explode nuclear devices, and French foreign policy decisions have repeatedly underlined de Gaulle’s insistence on maintaining the nation’s sovereign independence, France has not succeeded in wielding the powerful influence in international affairs that de Gaulle claims for her.

[Here follow Chapters I-IV.]

V. Foreign Policy

Since his return to power in 1958, General de Gaulle has stubbornly and single-mindedly pursued fundamentally the same foreign policy that he proclaimed when he raised the standard of Free France in 1940. France must be, and must be recognized as a proud, sovereign, and independent great power participating as an equal among the leading world powers—in short, France must live up to de Gaulle’s mystical concept of French grandeur. de Gaulle’s view of international relations is essentially an 18th-century one of nonideological power struggles between sovereign states. He believes that states act according to permanent national interests, which are derived from their geographical and historical situations and are little modified by ideologies. In the present distribution of world power, de Gaulle considers France a natural ally of the United States and the United Kingdom in a power struggle against the USSR which is worldwide and not merely confined to Europe. De Gaulle sees the international conflict as evolving ultimately, however, into a contest between Western civilization and the despotically ruled peoples led by Communist China, in the course of which Russia may eventually return to its “natural” position as a part of Europe. If it does, France as the leader of continental Western Europe, might come to occupy the position de Gaulle sought for it in 1945, that of mediator and link between the United States and the Soviet Union.

De Gaulle’s foreign policy program has three main goals; 1) to develop French economic and military power, particularly nuclear weapons; 2) to assert French independence of external control, whether from “Europe,” NATO, the United States, or the United Nations; and 3) to broaden the base of French power by sponsoring blocs in Europe and Africa willing to accept French leadership in the formulation of their foreign policies and thus to magnify France’s influence in the world. Two years after the adoption of the new French Constitution, de Gaulle has made appreciable but far from decisive progress toward these ends. He has proved French ability to explode nuclear devices, and has started the country on the very expensive task of developing a nuclear striking force. He has asserted French independence repeatedly and sometimes dramatically, but while the world certainly pays more attention to France than it did before 1958—as shown during preparations for the abortive Summit Conference of May 1960—its greater willingness to accept French policy proposals is far from certain. Finally, de Gaulle’s attempts to build French-led hegemonies are threatened in both Europe and Africa. Most important of the many factors that have tended to impede the return of French grandeur is the fact that France lacks the necessary resources and power to qualify it for the role to which de Gaulle aspires. Other factors include the rising tide of African nationalism, the continued underlying instability of the French regime, resistance to French claims by France’s European and NATO partners, and, above all, the continued crushing psychological burden of the Algerian conflict.

French foreign policy under de Gaulle is largely the personal expression of his concept of France as a major member of the family of nations. Even though de Gaulle’s program for France has so far been only partially successful, he is not likely to modify it substantially, for he has an almost sublime confidence in his mission and his vision. De Gaulle’s desire to establish the independence and grandeur of France cannot be satisfied by partial compromises or by symbolic concessions to French claims. So long as the basic principles of French independence are preserved, de Gaulle is willing to cooperate in the defense of the free world, for he is convinced that the West is facing the greatest crisis in its history. But he sees the preservation of the free world primarily as necessary for the preservation of France as a nation, and he will not accept what he considers to be subordination to the United States or NATO as part of the Western defense effort.

A. The French Striking Force

Because of the conflict in Algeria, France has been obliged to maintain a very substantial military force. There are now about half a million men in the field in Algeria. For two major reasons, de Gaulle believes it absolutely necessary that France also have a stock of thermonuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, if need be, against the major Soviet cities, and his belief is reinforced by the prospect that Communist China, Sweden and other nations, may develop a nuclear capability. First, he believes that only the possession of its own nuclear capabilities ensures a nation’s treatment as an equal by the other nuclear powers. Second, de Gaulle fears that, at some future date, the US might be induced by Soviet atomic blackmail to withdraw from Europe and leave France to its fate. Because of this fear—a constant, if often denied, undercurrent in French military thinking—de Gaulle believes that France must have sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy a number of major Soviet cities. Since the conquest of France would not seem worth the loss of Moscow, this capability should deter a USSR attack on France. In the event of a Soviet attack, however, the French would be able to start a general war by dropping a few hydrogen bombs in the USSR, because, it is reasoned, the latter would then attack the US and bring it into the conflict.

France exploded its first atomic device on February 20, 1960, in its testing area at Reggane in the Saharan desert; a second, also successful, was exploded on April 1. Thus culminated several years of research and development, begun long before de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. In July, the Debré government introduced a bill for the development of nuclear (including thermonuclear) weapons and the means of delivering them and pushed it through Parliament in December despite heavy opposition. This bill provides for the expenditure of about $2, 360,000,000 between 1960 and 1964 and covers both the inauguration of the nuclear strike force and certain expansions of French conventional arms. When the nuclear program is completed after further expenditure in about 1970, France hopes to have an arsenal of nuclear weapons (recently estimated by an opposition Senator at 10 hydrogen bombs and 200 atomic bombs) and suitable missiles to deliver them, 50 strategic (Mirage IV) bombers, 3 missile-launching cruisers, and 3 submarines (1 of them atomic).

Initially, the delivery system for French nuclear bombs will be manned bombers (the Mirage IV), later, medium-range ballistic missiles, and finally, missile-carrying atomic submarines. At the moment French nuclear capability remains very small, but there appears no reason to doubt that the French can achieve their goal of a limited but effective capability if they continue to make the necessary heavy expenditures on their nuclear weapons program.

French atomic development has had important diplomatic repercussions in two distinct areas (leaving aside NATO). First, the newly independent nations of Africa have expressed extreme dismay at the prospect of atomic fallout in “their” continent, even though the French test site is one of the most isolated in the world and the number of bombs exploded there so far is insignificant compared to those exploded elsewhere by the other three nuclear powers. This sometimes violent emotional reaction of the Africans makes continued French atomic testing a source of growing friction between France and the former French territories in Africa.

Second, French atomic development has a potentially major effect on disarmament negotiations. Since before the de Gaulle regime France has insisted that only if all existing atomic stockpiles were destroyed could it accept an agreement banning nuclear tests. Thus France has taken the position of threatening to break up any nuclear testing agreement that is likely to be reached and of insisting that it will forego nuclear weapons only if all others do so.

B. The Assertion of Independence

The assertion of French independence, which has so characterized the foreign policy of General de Gaulle, has two major aspects: 1) refusal to subordinate France to other powers or to international bodies and 2) insistence on a major voice in the formation of basic Western strategy. In neither case does France seek to push its policy to extremes; it continues to recognize the need for a close NATO alliance, and the extra weight to which the United States is entitled by virtue of its capabilities. Nevertheless, France has gone far enough to disturb the other members of the Western alliance.

The French refusal to accept a subordinate position to others has been prompted, at bottom, by a belief that the ultimate decisions regarding France’s national fate—that is, the decision to go to war and the conduct of war—must remain in French hands. The first major demonstration of this aim, announced in March 1959, was the French decision that in time of war the French Mediterranean Fleet would be placed under French, rather than NATO, command.¹ This move was made—at least ostensibly—in order to ensure priority consideration for the defense of Algeria, as French policy requires. Even more significant, however, is French policy toward involvement in a major war. On the one hand, France does not want to be dragged into a nuclear war against its will. It has therefore refused to permit the stationing on its soil of US nuclear weapons that could be used by a US or NATO commander without French consent and thus involve France in someone else’s war. On the other hand, France wishes to ensure its ability to go to war in the event of an attack affecting its vital interests, regardless of what the other NATO powers (including the US) may do. France therefore insists, as indicated above, on acquiring a nuclear capability that will effectively be under French control. Since the US has been unwilling to provide the nuclear equipment and knowledge that France desires, France has seen no choice but to invest heavily in its own atomic development. French assertions of independence of NATO have been further intensified by the fact that the Algerian war has required the use of most of the French troops nominally committed to NATO. This diversion has irritated other NATO members and reduced French military influence in the alliance. It has also reinforced France’s belief that it cannot always count on NATO to defend French national interests.

The second facet of the policy of independence is French insistence on playing a role consistent with its claimed status as a great power. In September 1958, General de Gaulle proposed to the US and UK Governments the formation of a joint French-UK–US directorate to plan and implement Western global strategy. Such an arrangement, the French have argued, would give effective leadership of the West to the three nations that have both great power standing and worldwide interests. France recognizes that the US is inherently more powerful than the other members of the Western alliance, but claims for itself a position of at least as much influence as that of the UK. The French demand to participate actively in the making of Western decisions on global strategy, not merely to be informed of US actions. So far this demand remains essentially unsatisfied, and it has become clear that de Gaulle is rationing his cooperation with NATO in proportion to the satisfaction of his demands.

If France is unwilling to subordinate its policies to those of its major allies, it is even more militantly opposed to interference in its affairs by the United Nations, where France is under continual and increasing attack because of the Algerian war. Although de Gaulle has timed his current efforts to resolve the Algerian conflict in order to forestall or tone down UN General Assembly resolutions, he has no more intention of giving in to the “world opinion” of the UN than to any other group. De Gaulle and French opinion generally are hostile to the UN, which is felt to represent mostly dictatorships or artificial and backward nations without power or stable government. France reacts bitterly to NATO allies who fail to support it in the UN. At the same time, however, it takes the position that Algeria is an internal French problem, which the UN is legally incompetent to consider, and that any resolutions on Algeria passed by the UN are thus null and void.

C. The Construction of Blocs

Recognizing that France, standing alone, is not equal to the US, USSR, or even perhaps the UK in power, de Gaulle has sought to augment French power by assembling groups of dependent states around France. Like so many of de Gaulle’s policies, this is a very old concept in French diplomatic history.

One major attempt at bloc building has been the French Community, which has already failed, at least in the form in which it was originally conceived (see above). De Gaulle hoped to construct a Eurafrican community in which the territories of French West and Equatorial Africa would accept, at least for several years, internal autonomy and French aid, and in return permit French control of their diplomacy and military affairs. The pull of African nationalism quickly doomed any possibility of success for the Community as originally constituted. Whether stable friendly relations can be maintained between the now independent Community states and France remains to be determined. The Algerian war continues to be the chief obstacle to such relations.

More important has been de Gaulle’s attempt to group Western Europe around France. de Gaulle’s concept of a “Europe of fatherlands,” cooperating in a common interest and led by France, resembles only superficially the integration efforts, resolutely opposed by de Gaulle and his followers, of the “Europeans” under the Fourth Republic. It is true that the two efforts sought to deal with the same basic problems: the relative impotence of any single European state as compared with the two super-powers of the postwar world, and the necessity of ensuring that Germany should never again be an aggressor in Western Europe. But while the “Europeans” sought to solve these problems by the gradual reduction of local nationalism and the creation of sentiments and institutions representing a new European nationalism, the Gaullists seek rather to combine sovereign nations permanently into a cooperating bloc to be led by France, the one member that has world-wide interest and, at least in principle, is a member of the world’s “board of directors.” The French theory is that the European nations will recognize their individual weaknesses and attempt to compensate for them by accepting the leadership of one of themselves rather than become satellites of a non-European power.

De Gaulle’s detailed plans for forming a European bloc remain vague. It is clear, however, that he wants the more or less supranational European institutions, such as the Common Market and the Coal and Steel Community, to remain entirely technical in nature; they are not to become stepping-stones to a new higher sovereignty. On the other hand, he wishes to establish a machinery of political cooperation between the sovereign states of Western Europe in which France will have a dominant voice.

Under the Fourth Republic, periods in which European integration were emphasized in French policy were marked by estrangement from the UK and rapprochement with West Germany; periods in which French policy turned away from integration in favor of cooperation between sovereign states were marked by rapprochement with the UK. de Gaulle, however, has managed to make a close relationship with West Germany the basis of his policy while rejecting the integration policies so strongly favored by Chancellor Adenauer; at the same time, relations between France and the UK—of whose special relationship with the US de Gaulle is profoundly jealous—have rarely been worse. But, despite good French relations with West Germany, de Gaulle’s European projects have met with little encouragement. No European country appears willing to come under French hegemony, and all appear to prefer a direct relationship with the US in NATO to an indirect tie through a French-dominated European bloc. de Gaulle’s vigorous attempt to win acceptance for his European proposals has not only tended to isolate France in Europe but, by forcing the other continental states to make public their opposition, has openly exposed the failure of French policy. But, though de Gaulle has made a tactical retreat on this subject, he will undoubtedly continue to press forward with his plans for the organization of Europe.

0. Source: Department of State, INR Files. Secret; Noforn. In addition to the abstract and the chapter on foreign policy printed here, this 27–page report comprised a cover sheet, a table of contents, and four chapters on the Algerian problem, the domestic situation, the economic situation, and the Community.
1. Regarding the French decision to remove the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO jurisdiction in time of war, announced March 6, 1959, see Part 1, Documents 187 ff.