Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

197. Letter From President Eisenhower to President de Gaulle⁰

August 30, 1960.

Dear General De Gaulle: As I promised in my recent brief note,¹ I have now given serious study to your letter of August ninth.² I would first like to respond to your suggestion that we meet with Prime Minister Macmillan in September. In this connection I recall our conversations of last May³ in which we agreed that, in addition to other forms of tripartite consultations, meetings of the three of us would be of great value in world politics. I continue to hold to this thought. I believe that in this case we must give careful thought to what public presentation we could make so as not, on the one hand, to use the Berlin situation as an excuse and thus run the danger of provoking the Russians nor, on the other, to offend our allies and thus weaken our common defense posture.

With regard to the time of such a meeting, I have myself already scheduled numerous public engagements as well as receptions for foreign visitors during the next three months. I would in consequence find it difficult to arrange for another meeting with you in the near future. I would like to suggest, therefore, that we agree in principle to our meeting at a time and place mutually agreeable but that we suspend any final decisions until after our Foreign Ministers have met on September twenty-third. To make their meeting a more meaningful one it should be prepared as thoroughly as possible through the means we have previously agreed to. It would also seem advantageous to exchange papers in advance of this meeting. In this connection I recall that at Rambouillet you said that you would put your thoughts on NATO into memorandum form for Mr. Macmillan and me.⁴

This paper would be a valuable document for the discussion of our Foreign Ministers, who I hope will consider thoroughly the matters raised in your letter.

As I have indicated, it would be more convenient to me and probably more satisfactory all around if the meeting involving the three of us were held later in the year. I have been giving serious consideration to a trip to the United Kingdom some time before the year end to see old wartime friends from Britain and across the Channel. This might provide a suitable occasion for a meeting of the two of us with Mr. Macmillan.

Before our ministers meet in September I believe that I should address myself to some of the thoughts set forth in your letter of August ninth, and I am doing so in the friendly and forthright spirit which characterized your letter. As we have each said in the past, a frank exchange of views is essential among friends and allies.

I agree completely as to the desirability of making the Atlantic Alliance more efficient. I have always considered the Alliance a keystone of American policy. In the whole history of NATO, the U.S. did not try to push itself into a place of prominence. Instead it has responded to requests from others with understanding and in a spirit of allied helpfulness. This belief and faith in NATO is shared by the U.S. Congress, both major political parties, and the vast majority of the American people. It has provided the basis for an historic shift in the attitude of the American people towards Europe.

Twenty years ago it would have been impossible to secure the approval of the American people to a long-term involvement on the European continent of thousands of American soldiers and a good part of America’s defenses. Today, there is no real opposition to the continuation of that American presence in Europe as a part of the free world’s defenses. This attitude on the part of the American people results from their view that our European partners in NATO share with us a common desire to ensure the effective defense of the Atlantic area. If the American people, however, should come to feel that their European allies no longer share this common desire, I must very frankly say that the historic shift in American policy could again reverse itself. Our people might be no longer willing to continue their long-term involvement in the defense of Europe and pressures could mount for a complete return of American troops, with increasing dependence on a strategy in which our defenses center in the United States. I should emphasize that I am not describing here a policy change which I would advocate. I am only setting forth what I believe could be an inevitable trend in the United States.

Another point deserves to be made. Our essential alliances are not confined to the European continent or NATO alone. The U.S. has defensive arrangements with forty-three nations throughout the world. Some of these, such as that with Spain which provides us with essential bases for nuclear air strikes, are bilateral;⁵ others are multilateral. In some of these latter France is present; in others, it is not. France, similarly, has its own international relationships and alliances, of which the Community is the latest example.

For us this system of alliances provides a great measure of strength; it serves to make more effective the deterrent. At the same time alliances give members a feeling of confidence, knowing both that unified defenses provide a greater strength for all and that the very existence of special ties gives them greater international status. We recognize that there are imperfections and have sought to improve the contacts and liaisons between the various multilateral organizations. Much more can be done in this field but only with the willing acquiescence of the members.

Just as the way in which the U.S. views the world has changed in the post-war era, so has the viewpoint of the smaller and medium-sized powers. They are no longer content to let larger countries speak for them or seek to control in any way their destinies. Each instead seeks to have his voice and views considered, both in bilateral relationships and in international instances. Given the facts of the situation today I must confess that I cannot see how the three of us can so organize, as you suggest, a “real political and military cooperation” if that cooperation implies lessening or subordinating of America’s close working relationship with other nations and other alliances or if it implies a reorganization of NATO whose effect would be to remove American forces from Europe.

Once again you have stressed your opposition to the system of integration in NATO which you categorize as unacceptable to France today. I frankly must confess that I cannot understand completely your reasoning. It seems to me that to return to a prewar system of alliances, that is to say, a coalition of powers whose military efforts are not closely joined together, would diminish greatly the effectiveness of a Western alliance. The revolution in military strategy and military technology makes it more, not less, essential that nations integrate their military efforts. National forces fulfilling national missions each on its own soil could well result in a completely ineffective defense force. As I have said before any such policy would compel the return of American troops to this hemisphere. Aside from the strictly military advantages of an integrated alliance over the prewar system, there is the much greater deterrent effect an integrated force creates. When an alliance’s military forces are welded into an effective unit, any potential aggressor knows that his aggression must of necessity automatically and simultaneously be met not only by the resistance of his intended victim, but by the united effort of that country’s allies as well.

At the time it took place I regretted profoundly the withdrawal of the French naval units from the NATO forces in the Mediterranean. This action did not, of course, diminish the defense forces of the alliance in the Mediterranean although it did make more difficult the coordination of their efforts in the case of war. It did create, however, a major breach in the NATO wall of solidarity. Other actions by France in the field of air defense and nuclear storage have, I am afraid, blocked efforts to strengthen the NATO structure while no serious attempt has been made by France to explain to us or to other NATO countries its ideas on how the alliance could be made more effective. It seems to me that the French Government which has both privately and publicly said that NATO must be revised or reformed, should provide NATO and the NATO members with concrete ideas on how that reform should be effected. Otherwise, does not the continual stress on the supposed inadequacies of NATO merely weaken it further?

In your letter you cited the Congo as an example of a problem concerning which you believe we should have acted more in unison. The differences which we have had as for instance in past Security Council votes, have not been the result of any lack of consultation with one another. I have, in fact, been struck by the frequency and fullness of the consultations that have taken place among our representatives on virtually a daily basis in Paris, here in Washington, and in Brussels as well. I am enclosing a copy of the record of these consultations over the past weeks, which has been prepared for me here.⁶ If despite this process our positions remained somewhat apart, I doubt that any more formal or elaborate tripartite arrangements at whatever level could have altered this. I cannot believe that our differences were in large measure responsible for the disorder and anarchy in that country. It seems to me that our differences followed, and did not precede the Congo disorders. It is true that our attitude toward the role the United Nations should play has been different and that France may hesitate to rely upon the UN, but I believe it is a fact that in our consultations on the Congo, France did not present alternatives to a resort to the UN.

Given the speed at which events have moved, I believe our consultation on the Congo has been full and I regret to learn that you believe we are out of step. I know that our basic objectives for the Congo are identical. I hope that our governments can continue their discussions on African matters for this reason and that the French Government will make substantive suggestions capable of being implemented by us and acceptable to the peoples concerned.

I must confess, my dear General, that I cannot quite understand the basic philosophy of France today. On one hand, France rejects the concept of close union needed to make effective the alliance’s defensive forces, stating that such action takes from France the essential attribute of national identity. At the same time France proposes a close union of itself, the UK and the U.S. to work out common plans and policies with all the implications of the veto and of imposition of decisions on others which this suggestion holds. These two proposals appear to me incompatible. Additionally, I am sure our NATO partners would find them unacceptable.

The role which France would want to play in a special tripartite relationship is also unclear to me. Do you envisage France speaking in this forum for the other continental members of the alliance? Do you believe that it would be wise to diminish the close relationship of my government with that of Chancellor Adenauer, a relationship which has since the war served to draw the Federal Republic firmly to the West? These questions puzzle me.

I am basically uninformed as to your thinking on the mechanism for intra-European consultation. I believe the United States has a legitimate interest in the form and in the purpose of this mechanism, given the possible effect on the NATO alliance of the creation of another consultative mechanism.

This letter has perhaps been over-long but I believe that it contains some of our apprehensions and some indication of our reserves. I hope you will feel free to answer frankly and fully the questions I have posed in the same feeling of close friendship which I have for you and for France. As you know, I have always attached the greatest importance to our meetings and to our correspondence. I know that you will agree with me that a candid exchange of views can make more fruitful our future discussions and those of our Foreign Ministers.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Prime Minister Macmillan in view of the fact that you sent to him a copy of your letter to me.⁷

With warm personal regard,

Your good friend,⁸

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Dillon sent Eisenhower on August 24 a proposed reply to de Gaulle which was drafted by Brown and approved by Kohler, Merchant, and Brown. Dillon informed the President that while Herter, who was in San José for the American Foreign Ministers Meeting, August 16–21, had not read this draft, he was “in accord with its general contents.” On August 26, the President approved Goodpaster’s minor textual revisions. The President also approved some minor changes in the text suggested by Houghton and the addition of two sentences, the third and fourth, to the sixth paragraph. (Telegram 862 to Paris, August 30; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/8–3060) The text of this letter was transmitted in telegrams 816 and 850 to Paris, August 26 and 29 respectively. (Ibid., 740.5/8–2660 and 740.5/8–2960)
1. See footnote 1, Document 191.
2. Document 191.
3. See Document 172.
4. See Document 151.
5. Reference is to the Defense Agreement between Spain and the United States signed at Madrid and entered into force on September 26, 1953. (4 UST 1895)
6. Not printed. This list of meetings with the French on the Congo crisis showed there had been 21 meetings between French and U.S. officials in Washington, 17 in Paris, and 2 tripartite meetings between June 1 and August 17.
7. A copy of Eisenhower’s letter to de Gaulle was sent to Macmillan, with a request that the Prime Minister urgently report any comment he might have, in telegram 1326 to London, August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/8–2660) On September 2, Macmillan replied he thought Eisenhower’s August 30 letter was “very good and well calculated to draw him out.” This letter was transmitted in telegram 1484 from London, September 3. (Ibid., 700.5611/9–360) A copy of Macmillan’s September 1 letter to de Gaulle, in which he urged de Gaulle to circulate a memorandum outlining his approach to the problems mentioned in his August 9 letter, is Ibid.
8. Printed from an unsigned copy.