Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

195. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

London, August 17, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister
• Rt. Hon. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal (Senior Fonoff Minister Presently in London)
• Mr. Philip de Zulueta, Prime Minister’s Private Secretary Ambassador Whitney
• Mr. Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, State Department¹
• Mr. Walworth Barbour, American Minister, London
• Mr. Brewster Morris, Political Counselor, London

SUBJECT

• General de Gaulle’s August 9 letter on tripartitism proposing September Western Summit Meeting²

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Merchant how the President feels about this latest message from General deGaulle.

Mr. Merchant said that, as he had explained to Mr. Heath yesterday³ the President was quite concerned, both as regards the proposal for a tripartite Heads of Government meeting in September, and on account of a number of deGaulle’s other comments, such as his views on NATO and his curious reference to the Congo. The President had gone just as far as he felt he could, with regard to our relations with our other allies, in meeting deGaulle’s wishes for tripartitism. The President was most anxious to get Mr. Macmillan’s views on the letter, and felt it was a subject which required close consultation. The President’s initial reaction had been that his reply should be in a friendly tone but might well pose a series of searching questions. DeGaulle seemed to wish to establish a Triumvirate to act on behalf of the West, and as something preferable to either NATO or the UN.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that neither the President nor Secretary Herter had yet reached a final conclusion on how to deal with this message. Mr. Herter also was concerned about the proposal for a Western Summit Meeting. For, as Mr. Merchant had pointed out to Mr. Heath yesterday, if the purpose of this meeting were announced as broad and general, our other NATO allies’ reactions would be strongly adverse, and at a time when NATO was already under considerable internal stress. Moreover, the adverse reactions would not be confined to NATO, but presumably be shared by other allies as well. And if Berlin and Germany were announced as the subject of the meeting, this would focus world attention on Berlin in an undesirable way, particularly in view of a possibly adverse Soviet reaction. Mr. Herter thought we might perhaps propose that our three Foreign Ministers, who are already scheduled to meet on September 23, should explore the various matters involved, and that this could at least defer the matter of a Heads of Government meeting in September. The President’s schedule for October and November was already pretty full, in view of speaking engagements, his expected reception in Washington of various top foreign visitors and the like.

Mr. Macmillan pointed out there were two questions involved, namely the proposal for a tripartite Summit Meeting, and the underlying question of what deGaulle is really after. While, as Mr. Macmillan recalled it, the President did really accept the idea of such tripartite Heads of Government meetings when they met with deGaulle at Rambouillet some months ago,⁴ the fact was that particular meeting was quite legitimate, being concerned with preparations for the anticipated discussion of Germany and Berlin at a subsequent East-West Summit Meeting.

In reply to a query from the Prime Minister, Mr. Merchant confirmed that the President had earlier mentioned to General deGaulle the possibility of meetings from time to time by the three Heads of Government.

Mr. Macmillan replied that the principle was one thing, but most important questions related to the timing of such meetings and what would be said about them publicly. If the President doesn’t want to meet with deGaulle in September, presumably the best thing would be to “play it soft”. Thus, there should be no sharp rejection of the proposal, but rather an effort to point out some of the difficulties involved. The President might indicate that it would be difficult for him to leave the United States at this time and the importance of not getting the Soviets excited now over Berlin and Germany, and instead suggest that we should first of all have our Foreign Ministers discuss the various problems involved. Their meeting should be made really important and constructive, and include a serious discussion of these matters. At the same time, the President’s reply could suggest or imply the possibility of a subsequent Heads of Government meeting. It could be pointed out to deGaulle that he had clearly raised some very important questions, which should be discussed by our Foreign Ministers, and we could then see what we think about them, possibly through further correspondence, or possibly personally at the Summit. Thus the President’s reply might appear to favor in principle such meetings, hint that such a meeting might perhaps still take place, but take evasive action regarding one in September. If deGaulle desired, he could be invited to send one of his intimates such as Courcel along with Couve.

Mr. Merchant commented that deGaulle’s views on NATO appear to strike at the basic US concept of our alliances and collective defense. Though we were still far from well-informed regarding the recent Rambouillet talks between deGaulle and Adenauer, it was our impression that the two had agreed that US troops must stay in Europe, even though deGaulle was apparently thinking in terms of an old-fashioned kind of pre-World War I type of alliance, quite impossible in this modern world.

Mr. Macmillan commented that there appear to be various considerations affecting deGaulle’s thinking, such as his desire to have France become a nuclear power. He also seemed convinced that national armies must remain under national command, at least in times of peace. His stress on this was very likely due to his conviction that the Army is essential to the survival of France and to prevent France from going Communist when he passes from the scene. And while this is understandable, it also seems clear that our difficulties with deGaulle are based at least partly on a misunderstanding on his part as to just how NATO really works. Furthermore, deGaulle seems determined to have France speak on behalf of the Continent, and, together with the US and the UK, constitute the top free world leadership.

Mr. Merchant said he thought the Prime Minister’s suggestions on how to deal with deGaulle’s proposal for a September meeting appealed to him. The President might wish in his reply to pose some questions to deGaulle to help prepare the ground for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

The Prime Minister wondered whether the President might not suggest that deGaulle circulate his views on some of these questions in advance of the September 23 meeting.

Mr. Merchant pointed out it was curious that the Germans had come back from Rambouillet with the impression that deGaulle had assured them that he would not press tripartitism further.

Mr. Macmillan said that, based on his talks in Bonn last week, he gathered that deGaulle had given the Germans such assurances only as far as NATO questions were concerned. Mr. Macmillan wondered just what deGaulle really wants from the US in the nuclear weapons field.

Mr. Merchant replied that it was our impression, based on what we had heard from some French close to deGaulle, that the General realizes that US legislation prevents his getting all that Britain receives from the US, but the General is nonetheless determined, perhaps even with a perverse kind of pride, to develop France’s own weapons despite the cost.

In reply to the Prime Minister’s suggestion, Mr. Merchant summarized the discussion as follows. Regarding the substance of some of the questions raised by deGaulle, it was not clear just what he means or wants. So we should encourage clarification of these, and perhaps remind the General that he has never, for example, circulated the memorandum he once promised on his views on NATO.⁵ DeGaulle’s proposal for a September Summit meeting presents difficulties for the reasons agreed to, and the problem is how to handle this proposal without causing resentment. We should presumably therefore temporize, and while not flatly turning down such a meeting, refer to the Foreign Ministers’ meeting already scheduled, and perhaps suggest we each distribute in advance our views on some of the questions raised by deGaulle. At the same time we should avoid closing the door on a possible later Heads of Government meeting.

Mr. Macmillan asked whether there is any possibility of the President’s coming to Europe around December, indicating he had wondered, for example, whether the President might be able to come unofficially to see his old World War II companions in Britain, and this perhaps provide cover for a meeting with deGaulle.

Mr. Merchant commented that this was a possibility to consider.

Finally, the Prime Minister said he would try to put down some thoughts on paper and send them to Mr. Merchant before he left for Washington,⁶ and these might be helpful in formulating the President’s reply. The Prime Minister presumed that he did not himself owe deGaulle a reply, since deGaulle’s letter had been addressed to the President and the General had merely sent the Prime Minister a copy, together with a covering note seeking his support for the September meeting.

Before the discussion terminated, it was agreed that, in response to any inquiries from the press, it would be said only that Mr. Merchant, an old friend of Mr. Macmillan’s, had stopped in to bring him oral greetings from the President and Mr. Herter, and they had taken the opportunity to exchange views briefly on world affairs.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/8–1760. Top Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Morris. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s Office in Whitehall.
1. Merchant, along with McCone and other U.S. officials, was in London to discuss nuclear tests with British officials.
2. Document 191.
3. A copy of the memorandum of conversation covering Merchant’s conversation with Heath on August 16, when they discussed Eisenhower’s and Macmillan’s deep concern about de Gaulle’s August 9 letter and the nature of the reply, is in Department of State, Central Files, 375/8–1660.
4. See Document 151.
5. Regarding de Gaulle’s statement that he would write Eisenhower and Macmillan about his views on NATO, see Document 172.
6. A copy of Macmillan’s August 17 memorandum to Merchant, which summarized the suggestions he gave to Merchant that day regarding the President’s reply to de Gaulle’s letter, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.