Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

146. Letter From President Eisenhower to President de Gaulle⁰

November 17, 1959.

Dear General De Gaulle: I have scrutinized carefully your statement and your answers to press questions on November tenth and would like to take the liberty of commenting on certain portions thereof.¹

With regard to the holding of a summit meeting, I am inclined to agree with your reasoning and your analysis of the situation. I believe there is one additional point worth mentioning and that is Khrushchev’s conviction that time is on his side and his growing confidence that a détente will work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. I believe our own approach to a summit meeting should reflect our own profound belief in the inherent strength of our own cause, and the belief which I have, that on the contrary time will work to our advantage, especially in the event the Soviet Union is further opened to Western influences. Therefore, we believe probing operations of the type envisaged at a summit meeting have a definitely useful role in our relations with the Soviet Union.

In view of our long, and what I consider close, friendship I was somewhat astonished to find in your remarks certain passages that seem to imply a lack of confidence in the good faith of this nation and its Government. I hope, of course, that there is some other explanation that does not seem apparent to me. I should be less than frank if I did not express quite bluntly the concern which I feel. The passage I quote comes from the text handed to the State Department by Ambassador Alphand: “Who can say that, for example, some sudden advances in development, especially for space rockets, will not provide one of the camps with so great an advantage that its peaceful inclinations will not be able to resist it?

“Who can say that if in the future, the political background having changed completely—that is something that has already happened on earth—the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world?

“Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that on some awful day Western Europe should be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington.

“And who can even say that the two rivals, after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?”

While I am sure this was not your intention, I am disturbed by the implication in these remarks that you might consider the United States to be on such a low moral plane as to be disregardful of its commitments to its allies. I need hardly add how profoundly the United States is attached to its commitments in Europe reflected in NATO. Likewise I am greatly astonished by your apparent implication that the United States would be with the Soviets, a party to “dividing the world”. I am sure you did not mean this conclusion to be drawn because you are certainly aware of how profoundly contrary it would be to the most fundamental tenets of United States policy. Furthermore this policy is not based on any transitory features but is fixed by our Constitution and is firmly rooted in the very nature of the American people.

The equation you appear to have drawn between my country and the Soviet Union is one which I feel unjustified, and I should appreciate a word from you that it was in fact not your intention to place the United States in the same category of nations with the Soviet Union insofar as the upholding of moral commitments and dedication to peace are concerned.

I do not wish to close without likewise mentioning the most interesting portions of your press conference dealing with Algeria and the Community. Your remarks dealing with Algeria appear to be a further courageous step forward on your part, on which I congratulate you, and which we all hope will assist your country in solving this most difficult problem. As you know I welcomed your declaration of September sixteenth on Algeria and continue to support your Algerian policy. I was likewise happy to note your reiteration of the principles of freedom of choice of their political status by the members of the Community.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,²

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Secret.

1. At his November 10 press conference, de Gaulle outlined three conditions that had to be met before he would agree to a summit conference: that international relations improve between East and West in the succeeding months so that the Chiefs of State could talk in an atmosphere of détente; that the Western leaders agree to an agenda and a common position on each issue beforehand; and that Khrushchev meet personally with him. De Gaulle said that Khrushchev would visit France on March 15, 1960. For text of de Gaulle’s statements made at his press conference in Paris, November 10, see Statements, pp. 57–70.

   In a November 13 memorandum to the President, Herter urged Eisenhower to respond to some remarks made by de Gaulle at his November 10 press conference, a copy of which he enclosed. Herter wrote: “I have thought this passage so offensive that we should not let it pass, and accordingly I would recommend that you send a message to de Gaulle along these rather blunt lines.” The draft letter enclosed was approved by Eisenhower with the following additions: Goodpaster added the first two sentences to the third paragraph and the President crossed out the words “is most unpalatable to me” in the first sentence of the eighth paragraph and added, “I feel unjustified.” (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)

   Regarding correspondence between Eisenhower and de Gaulle on a possible summit meeting, see Document 143.

2. Printed from an unsigned copy.