Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

144. Memorandum of Discussion at the 422d Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

October 29, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. U.S. Policy on France (NSC 5721/1; OCB Report on NSC 5721/1, dated April 22, 1959; NSC Action No. 2087; [document number not declassified]; NSC 5910; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 13 and 17, 1959; NSC Action No. 2120; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 19 and 27, 1959)¹

Mr. Gray briefed the Council as indicated in the attached briefing note. In calling upon Secretary Herter and General Twining to comment on the split in Paragraph 41–a dealing with cooperation with France in the nuclear field, he suggested that they might like to indicate the status of planning for a multilateral nuclear authority.²

In response Secretary Herter stated that State had done a great deal of work on the development of a plan for a multilateral authority and that in a few weeks State’s plans should be in such shape that they could be discussed with Defense with a view to developing a concerted proposal which could be brought up for decision.

[2 paragraphs (26–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President responded by saying that we should look far enough ahead to see what the probable situation would be ten years from now. He thought that it was as sure as day follows night that a number of countries would develop nuclear capabilities.

Secretary Gates said that the split was not an important one; in the longer range a multilateral authority was probably the answer. He also pointed out that this question had a bearing on the issue of U.S. deployment in Europe and upon the related matter of IRBM weapons and the custody of nuclear warheads for those weapons. It was his opinion that there was no chance at present of obtaining Congressional approval for a bilateral arrangement with France. Therefore, he agreed that we should concentrate on a NATO approach to the problem. Chairman McCone indicated that he did not believe there would be difficulty in getting Congressional approval of multilateral arrangements.

At this point Mr. Gray offered the following alternative version of Paragraph 41–a:

“a. Urgently proceed with the study directed by par. 24–c of NSC 5906/1³ and, at an appropriate time, seek French support of, and participation in, some form of multilateral European nuclear authority. Study, on a priority basis, whether, if and when France successfully explodes a nuclear device, it is in the U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France through the exchange with it or provision to it as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons; under control arrangements to be determined.

In response to this proposal Secretary Gates stated that language as such was not important to the Chiefs. After reading his proposal Mr. Gray said that he did not understand that the Chiefs contemplated aid to France until the French had exploded a nuclear device. However, he felt that we should study now what we would say to the French after they explode a device and in the meanwhile that we should go ahead with plans for a NATO authority.

Secretary Herter stated that we ought to take account of the legislative history in this regard. That history indicated that France was excluded from receiving U.S. assistance until it has demonstrated more than a capability for shooting off a single nuclear bomb. A study of bilateral aid was “O.K.” but it should be under wraps. Mr. McCone confirmed Secretary Herter’s statement with respect to legislative history. Mr. Gray pointed out that his proposal did not call for a “determination” now with respect to bilateral aid but only for a “study”. Nonetheless, Mr. McCone said that he did not like the language about explosion by France of a nuclear device because it implied that such an explosion would put the French in the nuclear club. Secretary Herter stated that the French have no illusions on this point; that they understood that more than the explosion of a nuclear device was necessary before they would become eligible for U.S. assistance. At this point the President suggested that the language of the law with respect to the “demonstration by France of a nuclear capability” be substituted for the phrase in Mr. Gray’s proposal “if and when France successfully explodes a nuclear device.”

[7–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The difficulties were primarily with our own Congress which seems to think that our situation was the same as in 1947 when we had a monopoly of the nuclear secret. The stupidity of Congress in this regard never ceased to amaze him.

[1 paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Gates stated that it was his impression that Congress was moving backwards. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Chairman McCone did not agree with this assessment. He felt that recent difficulties with Congress had grown out of their irritation with certain incidents. He reiterated his belief that there would be no problem about getting Congressional approval for a multilateral arrangement. In rejoinder the President suggested that if Admiral Rickover went up to the Hill and indicated that the Russians were behind in certain things, it would cause Congress to “freeze up.”

In response to a request by Secretary Herter that he indicate his views on the subject, Ambassador Burgess stated that he liked the emphasis upon a multilateral authority in the first part of Mr. Gray’s proposal. He was in complete sympathy with the view that we should hold back from the French. The French were out of step in NATO. He thought we should work to keep this matter within a multilateral framework. He thought the timing question was very important. If we held back aid from France we would delay the time when they would have a capability. This would give us time to develop controls or to build a multilateral framework within which controls could be developed. He concluded by saying that he thought the last phrase in the paragraph, referring to control arrangements, was very important.

Going back to his proposal, Mr. Gray suggested that, if the language of the statute were incorporated in the paragraph, it would freeze the policy to the language of the statute as it now stands whereas the Basic Policy language contemplated the possibility of obtaining changes in the statute.⁴ In response the President suggested that it would be easier to change the NSC policy paper than to change the law. Mr. Gray, however, indicated that he was concerned that the language be sufficiently flexible to permit us to seek changes in the law. Secretary Gates inquired as to the meaning in Mr. Gray’s proposal of the statement that we should study “on a priority basis” whether to provide bilateral assistance to France. Mr. Gray explained that he intended that this study should go forward simultaneously with the study of a multilateral authority under the first sentence. The President pointed out that the language was somewhat ambiguous—the first study was to be done “urgently” and the second “on a priority basis.”

Mr. Gray agreed that the clause referring to the successful explosion by France of a nuclear device should be phrased so as to make it clear that we would not help France bilaterally until it had demonstrated a nuclear capability—until it had become eligible for membership in the nuclear club. We were not going to help countries become members of the club, but might help them after they became members. He then indicated that he would revise his proposal in the light of the Council’s discussion.

Mr. Gray next read Paragraph 41–c containing the Policy Guidance dealing with Algeria,⁵ and went on to describe the split in Paragraph 46 relating to military assistance.⁶ He stated that, while on its face the Treasury and Budget position seemed to indicate that Treasury and Budget did not believe that we should not honor our commitments, that, as he understood it, was not their position. Rather the question that concerned them was the meaning of the word “commitments”. They feared that Defense interpreted “commitments” to mean all assistance already programmed by the U.S. It was the Treasury and Budget view that, in the Council discussion last August, it had been intended only to make an exception in those cases involving the good faith of the U.S.

Mr. Stans stated that Mr. Gray had accurately presented his view. Budget was not asking for deletion of the phrase with respect to commitments, but only for clarification. He pointed out the that tables in the Financial Appendix⁷ indicated that expenditures in the period FY 1960–1962 would total $130 million. This was based on FY 1958 and FY 1959 carryovers plus $25 million of new funding in FY 1960. There was also, according to the Financial Appendix, the possibility of additional funding in FY 1961. He felt that, in their study of these commitments, State and Defense should apply a strict definition, including as commitments only those strict and inescapable bilateral understandings which involved the good faith of the U.S.

Secretary Herter agreed that the whole issue revolved around the question of what was meant by commitments. He said that there were no commitments in a legal sense but only moral commitments. He called upon Ambassador Burgess for comment. Ambassador Burgess indicated that he had talked with the MAAG chief about this problem. Ambassador Burgess believed that it would be possible to sort out our commitments. The President inquired as to whether we could not examine the commitment problem on a project-by-project basis. Secretary Gates indicated his concurrence with this idea [4 lines of source text not declassified].

In response Mr. Gates noted that existing NSC policy (NSC Action No. 1550)⁸ provides that four conditions must be met before a commitment is made.

The President suggested that the difficulty here was that we tried to do long-range planning, yet we base our plans upon conditions existing at the time that we talked to another country. Then when the economy of that country improves, the country still wants us to be very strict about living up to our commitments. The U.S., he said, should take a look to make sure that it was not doing things that someone else should be doing.

Mr. Gray again pointed out the Budget and Treasury did not object to the language with respect to commitments so long as “commitment” is interpreted to mean something that the French have a reasonable belief that we have said we will proceed with, and not something that simply represents unilateral programming by the U.S.

The President said we should not violate our national honor. He reiterated his suggestion that we should take up each project and determine whether it involved a commitment. In response, Secretary Gates noted that CINCEUR had estimated U.S. military assistance commitments to France at $31 million for FY 1960 and $21 million for FY 1961. The principal item involved was the Mace missile. We would [3 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Stans indicated that he was satisfied so long as a careful look was taken at each program. Mr. Irwin interjected to state that unilateral programs clearly did not constitute a commitment. He said that he had no problem with the Budget definition of commitments.

Mr. Gray suggested that the bracketed language be clarified by insertion of the word “official” before “commitments”. The President, however, did not like this proposal, preferring the more general language contained in the paper.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Discussed further the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5910; in the light of the revisions circulated by the reference memorandum of October 19, 1959, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 27, 1959.

b. Adopted NSC 5910, as revised by the enclosure to the reference memorandum of October 19, 1959, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Paragraph 41–a, page 30: Revise to read as follows:

“a. Urgently proceed with the study directed by paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1 and, at an appropriate time, seek French support of and participation in some form of multilateral European nuclear authority. Urgently study whether and under what circumstances it might be in the U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France through the exchange with it or provision to it as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons; under control arrangements to be determined.”

(2) Paragraph 46, page 33: Include the bracketed phrase at the end, and delete the second footnote.

“c. Agreed that the commitments referred to in paragraph 46 of NSC 5910 should be interpreted as those which involve the good faith of the United States in relations with France, but should not include unilateral U.S. programming which does not represent a commitment to France.

Note:NSC 5910, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5910/1¹⁰ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

[Here follow agenda items 4, 5, and 6.]

Robert H. Johnson

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson.
1. Regarding NSC Action No. 2120, see footnote 9, Document 128. Copies of the October 19 and 27 memoranda are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, France. For the remaining references, see footnote 1, Document 128.
2. Not printed. In his briefing note, Gray outlined the split in paragraph 41–a on the subject of cooperation with France in the nuclear field. He stated the majority sought to satisfy French nuclear aspirations through some form of multilateral European nuclear authority and only if that proved infeasible would they determine whether it was in U.S. interests to aid France bilaterally. The Joint Chiefs argued, wrote Gray, that a policy of seeking French support for a multilateral authority would not deter or discourage French unilateral efforts to achieve a nuclear capability and that the United States should determine on a priority basis whether it should aid France bilaterally.
3. See footnote 8, Document 128.
4. Reference is to the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 signed by the President on July 2, 1958, permitting the transfer of nuclear materials and information to other nations. (72 Stat. 276)
5. Paragraph 41–c of NSC 5910 stated that every opportunity should be taken to contribute the weight of U.S. influence toward an early, realistic settlement of the Algerian conflict while minimizing the possibility of U.S. involvement as an arbiter and listed five ways the United States could support the approach outlined by de Gaulle on September 16.
6. In his briefing note, Gray wrote that the NSC on August 18 had tentatively agreed that the last sentence in paragraph 46 of NSC 5910 should read: “In the absence of unusual circumstances, conventional equipment and advance weapons and training should be made available to France on a reimbursable basis.” He wrote that the majority proposed an addition to this language which would permit provision of grant assistance to cover commitments already made. He added that the Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board opposed any change in the language agreed upon.
7. Not printed.
8. The four conditions provided by NSC Action No. 1550, approved by the President on May 8, 1956, were: 1) that such promises or commitments were in accordance with approved policy; 2) that either funds were appropriated or authorized by the Congress or that there was an Executive determination to seek such funds as may be required; 3) that it be determined the extent to which the recipient country might be able to support the programs contemplated; and 4) that the probable time-span over which such assistance would be granted, be determined. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
9. Paragraphs a-b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2140, approved by the President on November 4. (Ibid.)
10. Document 145.