123. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Counselor for Political Affairs in the Embassy in France (Kidder) and a French Air Force Officer, Retired (Gallois), July 29, 19590
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
To support his theory that the important thing is establishment of a close personal relationship, Gallois states that de Gaulle’s isolation from the counsels of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill [Page 237] during the war and his brooding in recent years regarding the weakness and ineffectualness of France have built up in him an intense, although probably unconscious, feeling of need to become associated with the United States on terms such as the British were during the war. What is needed is to give him the feeling that he is being consulted currently and being given information, not necessarily secret, of events before they occur. For example, if the United States has a plan to launch a manned missile into space, the General would be extremely pleased if the United States would take the trouble to send someone over to tell him about it and to explain what it means. A series of these contacts, supplemented by an occasional direct personal message from President Eisenhower from time to time, would, over the long run, do much to change de Gaulle’s frame of mind. He is now angry and often acts out of pique, as in the case of the withdrawal of the Mediterranean fleet from its NATO context. He feels that since his return to power he has been knocking at the door of the United States, but that, in sum, all he has received is a polite brush-off. According to Gallois, the General is as susceptible as the next person to the type of flattery which he suggests. The problem is basically a psychological one, and the solution rests in Washington.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
- Source: Department of State, WE Files: Lot 61 D 30, Memoranda of Conversation—1959. Confidential. Drafted by Kidder.↩