Office of the Historian

102. Memorandum of Conversation0

March 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • French Decision on Mediterranean Fleet and Nuclear Submarine Reactor

PARTICIPANTS

  • M. Louis Jacquinot, French Minister of State
  • M. Hervé Alphand, Ambassador of France
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Matthew J. Looram, WE

M. Jacquinot stated that the French Government had been somewhat disturbed by the US Government’s adverse reaction to the recent decision on the French Mediterranean fleet. He said that de Gaulle had always been opposed to the integration or “fusion” of the French fleet with foreign forces and had long felt that they should, instead, be closely coordinated with NATO. It was for this reason that de Gaulle had taken this decision. Nevertheless, de Gaulle and his Government continued to remain absolutely firm on NATO solidarity and on western defense. In fact, M. Jacquinot said, he had been authorized to reassure the US Government on this matter. The fact that de Gaulle was so solid on the Berlin issue demonstrated his solidarity on the basic issues.

M. Jacquinot added that the French Government very much hoped that the US Government would continue to carry out the project to provide the French Navy with a nuclear submarine reactor.

The Acting Secretary replied that the French decision on the fleet had had a very unfortunate psychological effect here. What particularly worried us was the attitude that the Congress might have towards supplying the French Navy now with a nuclear submarine reactor. This project would have to be submitted to the Congress for its approval, and, according to the law, any such U.S. assistance had to be within the mutual defense context. Given the French Government’s decision regarding its fleet and the fact that the French Mediterranean fleet would thus no longer be a part of NATO forces, the Congress might have serious reservations regarding the appropriateness of such a project.

Mr. Herter added that we had thought it particularly unfortunate that the French decision had been presented as a fait accompli, rather than having been worked out in a cooperative spirit with General [Page 190] Norstad and the NATO authorities in the first instance. M. Jacquinot admitted that the way in which the matter had been handled might have been maladroit. He thought it would now be important for General de Gaulle and his Government to reaffirm publicly France’s solidarity with NATO.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–1859. Secret. Drafted by Looram and approved by Herter on March 26.↩