Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

66. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions⁰

CA-1610

August 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Relationship of Existing Bilateral Agreements to Proposed General Agreement with Euratom

The United States Government has long believed that a general agreement with Euratom comprehending as far as possible the provisions of our bilateral agreements with the member states and expanding the field of cooperation would considerably strengthen Euratom and provide a more effective framework than now exists for our relations with Euratom and the individual member states. Negotiations for an agreement of this kind were anticipated in relevant articles in most of the bilateral agreements with the member states, in articles 103 and 106 of the Euratom Treaty, Article 14 of the Agreement for Cooperation with Euratom and in Under Secretary Dillon’s statement on policy before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on January 22, 1959.¹

Immediately after initialing the recent amendments to the existing bilaterals with five of the member states on July 2, the Department gave to the Chiefs of Mission letters (Annex A)² setting forth our understanding of the purpose of the amendments just negotiated with particular reference to our hope of negotiating in due time a general agreement with Euratom comprehending the member states’ bilateral agreements. We have now received acknowledgments to each of our letters (Annex B). The sense of these letters and discussions held in connection with the letter before it was sent revealed, in our view, excessive concern on the part of the member states about the effects that such an agreement would have on their bilateral relations with the United States in the field of atomic energy.

The member states, and particularly France, seem to fear that a comprehensive agreement with Euratom would remove certain present advantages now available to them. While this concern is understandable, it is not justified by the facts. It may not prove to be possible to permit Euratom to assume all rights and obligations now contained in the bilateral agreements, but even if it is possible, it is not our intention to hinder in any way direct contact between member states’ atomic energy commissions on the one hand and the United States Atomic Energy Commission and private institutions on the other. Despite our belief that a general agreement would strengthen Euratom, we do not think that it would in any way be an instrument competitive with the national interest of the member states in developing their individual atomic energy programs. In no sense would it be “a complete substitute for French national development” as the French reply states. Furthermore, as indicated in the letters to the Chiefs of Mission, we are prepared to consider including in the general agreement an identification of the fuel arrangements contained in the existing bilaterals which would assure the member states that there would be no limitation on their rights of access to special nuclear material provided for in the present agreement.

The primary purposes of bilateral agreements are to meet the legal requirement applying to the transfer of American special nuclear material and certain nuclear facilities and to provide adequate guarantees against the misuse of such material. A comprehensive agreement could result in a simplified system of relations whereby the United States could transfer materials to the Euratom supply agency destined for both the community and the national projects. A single community safeguard system administered by Euratom could also replace our present bilateral safeguards arrangements and thereby facilitate the transfer of material within the community in connection with joint projects. Technical and commercial contacts, exchange of literature and visits of foreign nationals to our facilities can be and have been carried out fruitfully in areas where no agreement for cooperation exists. It should be noted that extensive cooperation and consultation has developed between the United States and the European Nuclear Energy Agency (OEEC) in the absence of any formal agreement.

Addressee missions should use any appropriate opportunity to stress the foregoing upon atomic energy officials and appropriate officers of the Foreign Offices. Before actual negotiations are undertaken with Euratom, in conjunction with the member states (perhaps this fall), to explore the type of general agreement which might be negotiated, the member states should be persuaded of the actual nature of United States objectives in concluding a comprehensive agreement. However, while we should not hesitate to reaffirm our desire to strengthen Euratom, this point should not be overstressed in view of the member states’ impression that we are desirous of strengthening Euratom at the expense of their national programs. Chief emphasis should be placed on the point that a general agreement with Euratom would not be competitive with national programs or in any way hinder direct contact between the USAEC and member state atomic energy commissions.

USEC should consult with President Hirsch and other members of the Euratom Commission and staff along the same lines, impressing upon the Commission the importance of initiating a similar effort by the Community with the member states.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/8–1859. Official Use Only. Drafted by Chapin and Schaetzel. Sent to Bonn, The Hague, Paris, Rome, and Brussels for the Embassy and USEC.
1. For text of Dillon’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, February 16, 1959, pp. 247–249.
2. Neither of the annexes is printed.