Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

65. Airgram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State⁰

Paris, July 23, 1959.

Polto 6–82. Pass Treasury. Refs: Polto 12, Oslo’s G–1, Depcirtel 1450, Polto 73 and Depcirtel 53.¹

1. Depcirtel 53 most helpful and in line with our thinking. USRO has been giving consideration also to the effects deriving from the creation of OS in the broader framework of all-European cooperation and integration. In our view, this calls for consideration of political as well as economic and commercial policy aspects, particularly implications for solidarity within NATO which could stem from problems and divisions amongst its members.

2. It has long been U.S. policy to work towards economic and political integration of Europe, in the belief that by the reduction of artificial barriers there could develop a better economic, social and political situation on the continent. The hope that this would help to contain the historic Franco-German rivalry, weld Germany politically as well as economically into Western Europe, and create a stronger European family within the Atlantic Community constituted the chief political motivations of the U.S. policy.

3. The failure of EDC, and more recently the advent of de Gaulle, and the effects thereof on the kaleidoscopic German situation make it seem unlikely that further major steps towards political integration will take place in the near future. It seems to us, rather, that economic cooperation within a political framework short of further integration will be the key in which this music will be played for some time to come.

4. The establishment of the ECSC, the EEC and EURATOM has received major support from the U.S. While it is, and will remain, true that the Six, because of more similar problems and interests, will continue to be organized and ready to take steps in more areas than will the others, a divisive element stems from the very nature of such an inner group.

5. Exclusion of less developed countries from Outer Seven creates a further division which may leave them feeling isolated and alone.

6. Recognizing that these questions are still in their early stages of development, and that they are basically for Europeans to solve, we nevertheless believe strongly that U.S., in its public pronouncements, should begin to place greater emphasis on importance of closer cooperation within Europe as a whole, particularly in contrast to our prior stance which has tended to give impression that U.S. support for Six was more solid than for this broader aspect of policy.

7. It seems to us that this issue will be gradually crystallizing within the next 12 months, and that it will become apparent whether relations between Six and others will lead to some sort of a bridge between them, or to a real division on the continent.

8. Specifically, we recommend that U.S. take an early opportunity to indicate publicly and officially that we welcome development of Outer Seven to the end, we hope, that in connection with Community of Six which has long had our support, and other European countries, all can collaborate in further close cooperation on all-European scale so that Free Europe may realize its full potential.

9. We believe that later this year we probably will have opportunity to indicate more strongly the full weight of importance which we attach to bridging the gap between these divisive groupings, and USRO recommends that the situation be kept under constant review in order to make that move at the right time. However, some further developments between the Six and the Seven, which may be affected by the possibility of British elections this Fall, makes us hesitant to say just when that moment will be.

Burgess

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 440.002/7–2359. Confidential. Drafted by Wolf. Pouched to the NATO capitals.
1. Polto 12 from Paris, July 2, reported the “preliminary impressions” of the Mission on the efforts of the “Outer Seven” to form a free trade area. (Ibid., 440.002/7–259) Airgram G–1 from Oslo, July 2, reported on the arrival of Soviet diplomatic personnel in Norway. (Ibid., 601.6157/7–259) Circular telegram 1450 is printed as Document 63. In Polto 73 from Paris, July 9, the Mission reported on Dutch reservations that it shared on Italo-French proposals for political consultations within the EEC. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.00/7–959) Circular telegram 53, July 15, clarified instructions on the treatment of questions about U.S. policy toward the EEC and “Outer Seven” given in circular telegram 1450. (Ibid., 440.002/7–1559)