Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

38. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, November 12, 1958.

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Jean Monnet
• John W. Tuthill

SUBJECT

• European Integration

Today at his apartment—before and after lunch—M. Monnet covered a number of subjects.¹

(1) Common Market and January 1, 1959

He stated that both Couve de Murville and Pinay had told him that France would go forward with its commitments under the Common Market on January 1 without recourse to the escape clauses. I asked him whether this decision was contingent upon “mutual aid” involving loans from Germany. He stated emphatically (several times in the course of the conversation) that this was not the case.

Monnet feels that from this decision many favorable developments will follow. On January 2, 1959, Europe will be different than today. An irreversible step will have been taken. I told Monnet of the Alphand–Dillon conversation² relating to the French concern that American interest in the Common Market might be somewhat less strong than previously. I told him that personally I did not understand how the United States position in the GATT could be interpreted by senior French officials as reflecting decreased interest in the Common Market. Consistent with our trade legislation, and to carry out our own longstanding trade policy, we had suggested a new round of tariff negotiations. In addition, we had expressed our concern that certain small countries in Africa and Latin America largely dependent upon one or two agricultural products be given reasonable access to the Common Market areas. I said further that in our advocacy of the Common Market we had calculated that the forces at work would ultimately lead the Common Market along relatively liberal outward-looking lines and away from the concept of a tight, restricted area. With the departure of Maurice Faure and Robert Marjolin and others from the Foreign Office I was, however, becoming increasingly concerned by indications that protectionist influences had obtained the upper hand in the French government and that this might spell further difficulties not only for European countries not within the Common Market but for third areas as well. I mentioned to M. Monnet Wormser’s statement to me that French acceptance of the Common Market should not lead anyone to believe that France was prepared to abandon protectionism and via the Free Trade Area or the GATT to proceed down the path of liberalizing trade in general.

M. Monnet avoided discussing the position of individuals in the French government on these issues. He did, however, state the firm conviction that the really significant development is the decision of the French government to move ahead with the Common Market without using the escape clauses. This decision would in his mind open the way for new competitive influences within the French economy. Already industry had started to adjust in anticipation of these conditions. Once January 2, 1959 had arrived and it was crystal clear that France would proceed on this basis, a new condition would be established. Increased competition would exist within the French economy and no longer would the protectionists be able to maintain excessively restrictive controls.

For the moment, M. Monnet seemed to believe that the liberalization in the OEEC and third country areas would be simply symbolic. He felt, however, that the action in the field of trade policy of the French government in the next few weeks or months was not as significant as the fact that once launched upon the Common Market there would be no turning back. This would inevitably increase competitive influences in France not only from the other five countries within the Six but ultimately from outside countries as well.

(2) Free Trade Area

As for the Free Trade Area, M. Monnet stated that the first signs of understanding on the part of the British that he had seen was the statement by Macmillan which was reported in today’s newspapers.³ The significance of the Macmillan statement as far as Monnet was concerned was the fact that Macmillan played down the tough talk of economic warfare, dismantling of OEEC and EPU, etc., and indicated instead that efforts would be continued to achieve some accommodation with the Common Market. Monnet was very critical of the position taken by Maudling and other British officials. He stated that the British had simply failed to understand that they could not split off France from the other members of the Common Market. He felt that the British statements of support for the Common Market did not ring true. Many of the British assumed that via the Free Trade Area the significance of the Common Market would be reduced. He felt that the British had failed to understand the political force of the will for building a new Europe. On the other hand he felt that the British, being realistic, would ultimately adjust themselves to the new circumstances which will exist starting January 2, 1959.

(3) Monnet Proposals for Bilateral Negotiations

I asked Monnet about his proposals for cessation of the activities of the Maudling Committee and the initiation of bilateral negotiations between the EEC and each of the 11 countries starting with the British. My specific question was whether via these bilateral negotiations he wished to achieve some kind of a Free Trade Area or a series of bilateral accommodations. Monnet stated that he hadn’t thought out this aspect of the issue. He was primarily concerned with procedure and he was convinced that the OEEC type negotiation was hopeless. He favored therefore the examination of the problem as between the Six and each of the other countries bilaterally in order to determine precisely what problems existed. Only after such examination would one know whether an overall structure perhaps like the Free Trade Area or bilateral arrangements would be more appropriate. I attempted to press Monnet further on this point saying that it would seem to me that the implication of the bilateral approach was to seek bilateral accommodations rather than a new institution such as the Free Trade Area. Perhaps—or even probably —Monnet agrees with that point of view but at least he refused explicitly to admit it to me.

Monnet stated that he was concerned about the talk of bilateral UK-French negotiations. He had serious doubts concerning the advisability of such an approach. He strongly favored having the EEC negotiate directly with the British. He stated that the danger of UK-French bilateral negotiations was that “other problems” would be brought into the discussions. In his view the diplomats would bring in unrelated issues in an attempt to obtain an overall compromise. This, in his view, would be dangerous. (Comment: Even without this consideration it is obvious that Monnet would prefer to have the EEC negotiate on behalf of all of the Six in order to strengthen that organization and give it more authority and standing. I believe however that in addition to this consideration he is seriously concerned with the possibility of irrelevant entanglements in the initiation of the bilateral UK-French negotiations at the present time.)

(4) Slow Rate of Progress Towards Integration

Monnet continues to be concerned at the slow rate of progress towards integration in the west. He stated that if there were no war for twenty or thirty years possibly the current rate would be adequate. He desires, however, a more rapid rate in view of the progress being made in the Soviet areas and the ever-present Soviet threats. He felt that the British were more at ease in dealing with the Americans and Canadians but hoped that sometime in the future they would realize that they would have to behave as Europeans. When this moment arrived, Europe would be greatly strengthened and the danger of Soviet aggression considerably reduced.

(5) Lippmann Articles

Monnet talked of the articles concerning Lippmann’s conversations with Khrushchev.⁴ He felt the first article particularly supported his own thesis and weakened Lippmann’s. (That is—the Monnet thesis that Germany must be oriented and engaged with the west in every way possible as opposed to the Lippmann thesis of a neutral zone through the center of Europe.) He stated he was keeping the Lippmann articles for the day when he would see Lippmann again and point out to him that the Khrushchev conversation reveals the weakness of the Lippmann approach.

(6) EURATOM

Monnet mentioned EURATOM and stated that the British had not taken EURATOM seriously until the time of the US–EURATOM agreement. Up until that time they had assumed that they would not need to have any special arrangements with EURATOM but once the United States agreement was a reality their position changed immediately.

I asked Monnet whether he was familiar with the Belgian attempts to erect a 6% tariff against reactors without a waiver for the first five years. He stated that he had heard of it [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I told him that we had raised the matter with the Foreign Office [1-½ lines of source text not declassified]. He [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] stated that he would “look into the matter this afternoon”.

(7) Franco-German Relations and European Integration in General

On November 8 Monnet had his seventieth birthday. On that occasion Etzel, the German Minister of Finance, came to Paris to award Monnet on behalf of Adenauer the highest award the German government can grant to a foreigner. Monnet stated that the little ceremony occurred in his office with Couve de Murville and Finet, head of the Coal and Steel Community, and one or two others present. He showed me the notes of the Etzel speech in which Etzel on behalf of the Chancellor greeted Monnet not only as a great Frenchman but also as a great European and stated that after the war Monnet had been one of the first to offer the hand of friendship to Germany. Now together the French and Germans had built a foundation which was firmly based. Monnet clearly had been greatly moved by this ceremony and told me that nothing must interfere with the recreated Franco-German relationship.

Again, he mentioned his view that much remains to be done. He stated, however, that today practically all Frenchmen supported this relationship and this was true “even of De Gaulle”. Later he went further regarding De Gaulle. He stated that it was not at all unlikely that sometime in the future De Gaulle would take dramatic action aimed at strengthening the integration of Europe. I felt it inappropriate to press him on this point but he spoke with a feeling of conviction that the General was in the process of realizing that the future of Europe lay not in the individual sovereign states but in being an integrated whole. (Comment: Perhaps the General is just bringing Monnet along, or perhaps Monnet is for his own reasons putting a very favorable interpretation on the General’s point of view. Personally, however, I feel in the context in which Monnet commented on these possibilities that he genuinely believes that de Gaulle is getting away from concepts emphasizing primarily or solely national grandeur and may in fact sometime in the future create a new drive toward the Monnet dream of a federated Europe.)

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/11–1458. Confidential. Drafted by Tuthill. Transmitted to the Department as an attachment to despatch 867 from Paris, November 14, which briefly summarized its contents. Copies were sent to The Hague, Rome, Bonn, London, Vienna, Brussels, and Luxembourg with instructions to pass to Butterworth.
1. Monnet was Chairman of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe.
2. Not further identified.
3. Apparently a reference to Macmillan’s statement on November 10 that he feared harm to Western unity if the Free Trade Area failed. (The New York Times, November 11, 1958)
4. Not further identified.