37. Current Foreign Relations0
NORTHERN EUROPEAN CHIEFS OF MISSION MEET1
At a meeting in London this month our Chiefs of Mission in the British Commonwealth and Northern European countries reviewed the political and economic situation in each country in the area. They received an evaluation of current Soviet policy and strategy from our Ambassador in Moscow and heard briefings on the Far East, European integration and the Free Trade Area, and Middle East development. In addition, they discussed current NATO military-political problems, the Icelandic fisheries problem and a second conference on the law of the sea. The following were the principal conclusions of the discussions:
Canada—Recent developments in Canadian domestic politics and foreign policy make it clear that United States relations with Canada cannot be taken for granted. Future United States-Canadian difficulties may be more political than economic since the principal economic frictions have receded. However, there is a considerable protectionist attitude in the Canadian Government and some Canadian anxiety about the extent of United States control over the Canadian economy. Politically, Canada feels it necessary to assert independence from the United States, and the Conservative Party is sentimentally attached to the United Kingdom.
Denmark—The Danish political situation is stable with the Social Democrats and their allies in power probably until 1961. Denmark’s monetary contribution for defense and therefore its support of NATO is less than it can afford but is not likely to be increased. Denmark’s support of our foreign policy is generally good, and Denmark’s provision, without charge, of base rights to the United States in Greenland and facilities in the Faroes Islands is of inestimable importance. Denmark regards our attitude toward Communist China as illogical, believing that the Chinese Communist regime should be admitted to the United Nations and recognized by the United States.
Finland—Finland is independent, anti-Communist, anti-Russian, and pro-western, but its proximity to the USSR forces the Finns in international [Page 70] affairs to keep out of big power disputes and take a neutral position. The present coalition government could well last for two or three years if it can survive economic difficulties this winter. Finland would like to join a Scandinavian customs union as a stepping stone to the Free Trade Area. Inability to join a Free Trade Area, if it is formed, would mean increased economic dependence on the USSR.
Iceland—The fisheries dispute dominates Icelandic politics, and the present three party coalition including the Communist-front Labor Alliance is held together by the reluctance of all three parties to face elections in the light of the fisheries issue. The Conservative opposition fully supports the 12-mile fisheries limit. In the light of the Icelanders’ present temper, there is no prospect of fruitful negotiations on the fisheries dispute. A temporary, tacit modus vivendi might be effected if the present cat-and-mouse tactics at the 12-mile limit could be called off. The general economic situation in the country has deteriorated during the past year, and all parties will seek markets and financial assistance from any quarter, including the USSR, with consequent danger to our base rights.
Ireland—Ireland is basically anti-Communist. Ireland’s leaders are sensitive and are isolated from world problems, a condition aggravated by Irish neutrality and the fact that the United States often appears to ignore Irish views. The Irish military is pro-American and pro-western, and it hopes for our aid and training.
Norway—In Norway the Labor Party has been in power for over 20 years except for a coalition government during the war, and there is no real alternative to a Labor Party government. In foreign affairs, while the Norwegians firmly support NATO they strongly desire a reduction in tensions and favor positions permitting step by step progress in negotiations and the consideration of schemes for disengagement in Europe. [4-½ lines of source text not declassified] The Norwegians’ distrust of military solutions makes them apprehensive of American activities and policies which may involve the use of force.
Sweden—Sweden’s basic foreign policy is nonalignment and avoidance of involvement in a world war. [5 lines of source text not declassified] Sweden is deeply interested in the problem of disarmament and believes it essential that Communist China be admitted to the United Nations to allow stationing of inspection posts in China. This attitude comes in part from fear of atomic annihilation and a desire to avoid the necessity of enormous expenditure of funds for atomic weapons, which could then be devoted to social welfare programs. The Swedes believe that no effort at disengagement such as the Rapacki plan should be lightly disposed of.
United Kingdom—British-American relations are exceptionally close and are increasingly coordinated through working parties. The British people generally support this close working relationship, and [Page 71] the only real disagreement is over our policy toward the Far East—i.e., Chinese representation, recognition of the Chinese Communists, and defense of the offshore islands. A potential problem for close United States-British relationship is the possibility that the Labor Party, in order to try to overcome the Conservative Party’s present popularity, may take positions much more left-of-center on issues such as nuclear disarmament, bases and negotiations with the USSR.
Soviet Policy and Strategy—The principal aims of the Soviet people are a better standard of living and a relaxation of the controls over them by their leaders. The principal aims of the Soviet leaders are world domination, break-up of NATO and acceptance of the status quo in Europe. The recent more aggressive nature of Soviet action in the foreign policy sphere has been influenced by the Hungarian uprising. Khrushchev’s efforts to gain support of the broad mass of the Soviet people have alienated smaller but influential groups and have thereby increased strains within the Soviet system. The United States should gain increased opportunities to make its influence felt by pointing up how little the Soviet people have been given by their leaders. An increased demand by the Soviet people for consumer goods and relaxation of controls, which would be in our interests, might well be stimulated by further expanding activities under the United States–USSR exchange agreement and the American exhibit of our science, technology and culture in Gorki Park next summer.
NATO Military-Political Problems—NATO is passing through a difficult phase. Because of stresses arising out of such disputes as Cyprus and Icelandic fisheries and the unwillingness or inability of many NATO countries to meet NATO’s minimum force requirements, there are major problems to be overcome. Nevertheless, the wider political consultation taking place in NATO has proceeded well. The special close relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom presents problems for our relations with France and other NATO countries. It would be most helpful if there could be national acceptance of the concept of balanced collective NATO forces.
The Free Trade Area—Although some of the obstacles which have impeded progress on the Free Trade Area are in the process of being reduced, further concessions from all parties will probably be required before the Free Trade Area can come into effect. It is now recognized that this will probably not be possible by January. We favor the Free Trade Area on condition that it does not relax the impetus toward the Common Market and general liberalization of trade. We will try to be helpful but direct intervention and pressure are regarded as counterproductive. The Scandinavians basically appear to be most interested and favorable toward the Free Trade Area, but each has special problems [Page 72] and they have various degrees of interest in a Scandinavian Common Market as an alternative to, or avenue toward, the Free Trade Area.
Icelandic Fisheries—All the Scandinavian countries consider that the technical aspects of the Icelandic fisheries problem have been exhausted, and that what is required are political decisions. Time is running against us in Iceland. It is our position that a second law of the sea conference should consider territorial limits and fishing limits separately from other questions. Our Navy is interested in keeping narrow territorial seas. It prefers three miles but will possibly compromise on six.
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- Source: Department of State, Current Foreign Relations: Lot 64 D 189. Secret. Current Foreign Relations was a weekly classified periodical circulated by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State to offices in the Department and diplomatic and consular posts abroad.↩
- The meeting was held October 6–8. An agenda for the meeting, a list of participants, and other preparatory papers are ibid., Central File 120.1441. No other record of the discussion at the meeting has been found.↩