Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

322. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/6

New York, September 20, 1960, noon–1 p.m.

SECRETARY’s DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–24, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • Secretary Herter
  • Livingston T. Merchant
  • Foy D. Kohler
• Canada
  • Howard Green, Minister of External Affairs
  • Arnold Heeney, Ambassador of Canada, Washington

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Canadian Relations

The Canadian Minister of External Affairs called on the Secretary at his request.

After some discussion of current UN problems¹ the Secretary brought up the question of Canadian-American relations. He said that he had been receiving very disquieting reports about serious antipathy and antagonism toward the U.S. in Canada. He would like to know Mr. Green’s views on whether there was anything we might do and, if so, what. He wondered how much of the felling was based on military factors and how much on economic. It began to appear to us that the two Canadian parties were in fact vying in cresting anti-American sentiment.

Mr. Green replied that he thought the situation was not so bad as the Secretary had presented. There was always a certain amount of antagonism and this was to be expected. The Canadian problem was that of a little country alongside a great neighbor faced with the question of how to avoid being dominated. There were some things, such as the U–2 incident, which generated fears in Canada that the U.S. was going too far. The Secretary asked whether the feeling related to the fact that we were spying on the Soviet Union or to our admission that we were spying. Mr. Green replied that there was a general impression simply that the Americans were too excited and worried about Russia. These American fears were not shared by the Canadians. He realized that the U.S. had a great responsibility. However he felt that we were always advocating more defense and getting too tough and these attitudes alarmed the Canadians. Mr. Green thought there was a fundamental difference in the outlook of the two peoples with respect to the Soviet Union. The Canadians saw the situation as much less serious than the Americans. He thought there was no fundamental difference between the State Department and the Ministry of External Affairs. They generally agreed. However, the Canadians could not go along with the Pentagon. Even the Canadian military could not go all the way with the Pentagon. He felt, and the Canadian press was always pointing out, that we were making a great mistake in making threatening statements. [4-2/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The second major problem, Mr. Green continued, was economic and principally the question of the control by American enterprises of Canadian subsidiaries. However, this was a matter not directly involving the U.S. Government. On the official level in fact he felt that the Canadian-American relations had never been better. The Americans were the people the Canadians could talk with more directly and easily than with anyone else in the world. Consequently he would repeat that he felt the reports were exaggerated. The Secretary commented that he hoped this was the case. We could understand the difficulties created for a small nation up against a large one, which we unfortunately were. However, when criticisms were unfair, they hurt. Mr. Green said that the Canadians had an election coming up, probably next spring. He said that when they were in the opposition his party used to accuse the Liberals of being lackeys of the Americans. Now the Liberals were using the same club to beat the Conservatives. This would probably continue. He did not at the moment know anything that could be done. Did the Secretary? The Secretary replied that we had been trying to explore in our own minds what we might do and were now trying to explore this with him. In the economic field, business ties and private investments in Canada ought to be a matter which would strengthen relations, leaving aside for the moment the defense aspect. Mr. Green said that the U.S. Government had nothing directly to do with the difficulties in the economic field. He said that the Canadian Government might have to bring in legislation to control this situation. The Canadians could not have decisions about Canadian industries made by offices here in New York. There were many difficulties, sometimes involving the government, such as attempts to investigate Canadian firms under U.S. anti-trust laws. It was unacceptable that Canadian enterprises should be so treated. However, he would repeat that he thought the main currents of Canadian-American relations flowed smoothly and were outside these issues. The Secretary said that both governments must carefully watch the situation and avoid exacerbating actions.

Ambassador Heeney commented that in the economic field there has never been less friction at the governmental level within his knowledge and experience. This resulted partly from the timely handling of small issues before they grew large, over the past few years, and from the increasingly better understanding in Washington of Canadian economic problems. However, troubles continued in the private sector. Much anxiety was created by U.S. business which he recognized was simply seeking profitable investment opportunities. On the governmental level the main troubles, and the ones that plagued him, were of a military and strategic nature.

Commenting on the economic aspect, the Secretary said ruefully that we are always urged to favor and promote the export of private capital. Then all too often this seemed to result in a series of complaints and troubles. For example we had had many difficulties in the Latin American countries, especially as regards investment in fields of agriculture, mining and utilities. Mr. Green said that when the U.S. gave wheat away this disrupted Canadian markets. The Secretary pointed out that we consulted very closely with the Canadians on our wheat disposals. Ambassador Heeney confirmed this and referred to the recent very favorable report of the Joint Wheat Committee.² He said of course that the Canadians were worried about any disposal of wheat as involving some interruption of markets. He would repeat however that the defense questions were the most difficult. Mr. Green agreed that this was the case but said that this of course did not reflect anything specific that the U.S. Government is doing, except for the general feeling that the U.S. is being too provocative. The Secretary pointed out that our military had always tried to work in the closest possible coordination with the Canadian military. Frankly we had a feeling that perhaps the Canadian military had been failing to keep the civilian element properly informed on the Canadian side. The Secretary than referred to the recent “Skyshield” exercise and Mr. Green agreed that this operation had been conducted very successfully and without arousing opposition in Canada. Both he and Ambassador Heeney commented that it had been miraculous that there had been no serious accidents or incidents.

Mr. Green then inquired what the situation was on the swap of the CL–44s. The Secretary replied that, as he understood it, there was a question of Canadian objections. The exact status was then discussed and Ambassador Heeney confirmed that the American side had presented a new proposal and that the next move on this deal was up to Ottawa.

Mr. Green then went on to say that the Canadians were worried about the U.S. position on the law-of-the-sea. They did not understand why, after we had worked out a joint position with the Canadians, we now objected to conducting a canvass with a view to the conclusion of a convention embodying this position. The Secretary said that we had no objection to a Canadian canvas of views but that we were not willing to join in lobbying for a convention after the failure of the joint proposals in the recent conference.³ Mr. Merchant elaborated that our view was that a “bob-tail” convention would be so partial in nature that it would just firm up positions in opposition and not result in the establishment of any real international agreement on the subject of the law-of-the-sea. We felt in this situation that it was better to have no convention at all. Mr. Green said that the Canadians felt it was not realistic to try to hold to the three-mile limit. The Secretary then commented on the strength of the fisheries lobbies in the U.S. They had an emotional approach and were powerful out of all proportion to their value to the overall economy. Mr. Green repeated that he thought that all the principal maritime countries would sign up if the U.S. joined in the effort to obtain a convention, and the discussion of this subject terminated on that note. As the meeting ended, the Secretary expressed his appreciation for the frank exchange of views and said that he would be interested in having further discussions any time this week at the convenience of Mr. Green.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project Clean Up, Canada. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler. The conversation was held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
1. A memorandum of the conversation on U.N. matters (SecDel/MC/37), September 20, is ibid.
2. Reference is to Wheat Surpluses and the U.S. Barter Program, A Statement by the Canadian-American Committee (Washington, March 1960).
3. Reference is to the Law of the Sea Conference held March 17-April 26 at Geneva.