Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

251. Letter From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to President Eisenhower⁰

Paris, January 27, 1960.

Dear Mr. President: The meeting with General De Gaulle took place last Thursday afternoon,¹ lasted for an hour and 20 minutes in a friendly and constructive atmosphere, and appears to be leading to some concrete results. It seemed to me that he really wanted to reach an agreement or to arrive at an accommodation of views which would put an end to further dissension on the question of air defense. His attitude throughout was very good.

Rather than confuse the subject by writing another memorandum of the meeting, I am enclosing herewith a copy of Colonel Walters’ notes,² which give quite an accurate impression of what took place. You will note that General De Gaulle spoke of two battles: the over-all strategic atomic exchange, and what he referred to as the “battle of Germany.” In discussing the latter, he spoke of the development of that battle and the aftermath, which would lead to the battle of Britain and the battle of France, and ultimately, to guerrilla warfare, very much in terms of 1939–1945. For this reason, I was particularly pleased to have with me some charts and other information on our NATO weapons resources and a general outline of the NATO Atomic Strike Plan.³ He was clearly extremely interested in the subject, and I believe that it served the purpose of broadening his idea of “the battle.” I must say that I spoke to him with the utmost frankness and at one time felt required to ask that he restrict the information to himself alone, not even passing it to members of his Cabinet. I felt this part of our talk was quite useful.

As stated in Walters’ notes, toward the end of my presentation De Gaulle stated that he would like a solution for the French air defense, the DAT, parallel to that provided for the U.K. Fighter Command. I agreed that this could be accomplished. However, I did consider it necessary to point out that militarily such a solution was unsound, a point with which I feel he agreed. Since both of us knew that I was meeting with Debre just two days later to discuss this subject more in detail, we did not work out between us any of the details.

I am also inclosing a copy of Walters’ notes on the meeting with Debre on 23 January,⁴ which continues with the subject and raises the question of the French Mediterranean Fleet. A copy of my letter to General Ely in response to Debre’s request is also enclosed.⁵ All in all, I think we are making substantial progress on the question of air defense. In fact, we are doing considerably better than I anticipated.

I am obligated to send a memorandum on a possible solution to the Mediterranean Fleet question, but I am still tossing this around in my mind. It is not impossible, given the present attitude, that we many find a formula whereby the French Fleet may be returned to the previous status of commitment to NATO, in exchange for at least the appearance of a little more independence and a somewhat more important role. I will keep you advised of any success we have in this direction.

To sum up the meetings with De Gaulle and Debre, I think your words to these two gentlemen when you were here in December may very well prove extremely productive. I will keep you posted on the progress we make. I must say, also, that Colonel Walters was an indispensable aid, since he had a good background on the subject and this fact, together with his talents as an interpreter, permitted us to avoid the heavy atmosphere that normally characterizes a discussion which must be carried on in two languages with complete and independent interpretations. He did an extremely fine job.

The situation in Algeria is still uncertain, although I believe that De Gaulle will inevitably win. I remember Pug Ismay⁶ remarking that there once was an officer who was so stupid that even his fellow cavalrymen noticed it. I think that this remark may apply to the Massu case,⁷ since the timing and the nature of his action was so gross that even the Paratroopers must surely understand why the Government had to take the action it did. If the Government can hold control in Algiers, what now looks like a revolt may become merely an incident, and the air may be cleared as a consequence. Unfortunately, the FLN is apt to take advantage of this rift between Frenchmen and thus possibly delay further the next step toward a solution of the Algerian problem.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Larry

Since writing the above, the failure of the Army to deal promptly with the situation has caused a serious deterioration. Every hour of inaction on the part of the authorities makes the problem a more difficult one. LN⁸

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.
1. January 21.
2. Document 249.
3. Not further identified.
4. Document 250.
5. Not found.
6. Baron Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO Secretary General, 1952–1957.
7. Critical statements of De Gaulle by General Jacques Massu, commander of French troops in the Algiers sector of Algeria, and his subsequent recall by De Gaulle on January 22 precipitated a short-lived revolt among elements of the French Army in Algeria opposed to De Gaulle’s Algerian policy.
8. The postscript is in Norstad’s handwriting.