Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

250. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, January 23, 1960.

PRESENT

• Prime Minister Debre, Mr. Guillaumat, General Ely, General Puget,¹ Col de Villemain, Mr. Racine, LtCol Walters, Major———²

After a pleasant lunch during which no substantial matters were discussed, while coffee was being served the Prime Minister said he understood that General Norstad had seen General De Gaulle two days before and had talked with him concerning air defense.³ General Norstad said that he had, in fact, had a good talk with General De Gaulle concerning Air Defense matters and he had also discussed SACEUR’s atomic strike plan with him, and that this had seemed to interest General De Gaulle very much.

On the subject of Air Defense, General De Gaulle had indicated that he would like to have for the French DAT a status analogous to the status of the British Fighter Command. General Norstad said that he had told General De Gaulle that this was an offense against judgment, splitting the battle in the middle, but that if General De Gaulle for other considerations felt that this was necessary, he, General Norstad, was prepared to accept this, to support it, and to make it work. Under such a status the DAT would be directly under SHAPE instead of under AIRCENT and, therefore, CINCENT, who was a French officer. At the present time AIRCENT’s air defense deputy was and has been for the last four years a French officer. While these posts were not fixed by nationality, generally they went to officers of the same nationality, and presumably this officer would continue to be French in the future. Mr. Debre inquired whether AIRCENT was a British officer and was told he was. He said the thinking of the French Government was that they should retain at least some element of air defense under national control. General Norstad pointed out that under MC 54⁴ national identities were retained, and that certain safeguards were included, namely, aircraft could not be brought into or diverted out of areas such as Fighter Command or DAT without prior national consent. General Norstad stated that he was thoroughly acquainted with this arrangement with Fighter Command because he, himself, had negotiated it with Mr. Macmillan. He had written a letter on this subject concerning Fighter Command’s arrangement, and had given it to General Beaufre for circulation to the French authorities.⁵ There were no other arrangements for advantages other than those mentioned in MC 54/1.⁴ General Norstad repeated that the solution desired by General De Gaulle was not the best militarily, although it could be made to work and pointed out that it would diminish French influence in the Central European area and in the whole question of air defense. That at the present time, the air defense deputy to AIRCENT was a Frenchman. If the French were not in the Air Defense setup, it would be difficult to retain a Frenchman in this job and it would probably pass to some other nationality. Mr. Debre then inquired as to the measure of General Norstad’s control over Fighter Command. The General explained this and indicated that the same could be done for DAT. General Puget at this point said that in point of fact Fighter Command does deal with Central Europe for coordination. General Norstad indicated that aircraft flying at speeds of Mach 2—which is a present capability—would be over Paris 15 minutes after crossing the iron curtain, and with the time space element this indicated, one could not fight a series of battles, but rather a single battle. Mr. Debre stated that he understood this. General Norstad then said that he had understood that General De Gaulle desired to have a status for the DAT similar to Fighter Command and that it would be directly under SHAPE. However, there was an intermediate solution between what was proposed in MC 54 and what General De Gaulle had asked for, which might be even more acceptable to the French, and this would be for him as Supreme Commander to delegate his authority for coordination between a new 5th Region that would be created for the DAT and Air Defense in the forward areas of Germany to CINCENT, who was a French officer, General Valluy. This would also be more effective from the military point of view than trying to put General Norstad’s headquarters into detailed coordination work, upon which they should really not be engaged.

General Norstad said he felt they should not get into technical details at this time before obtaining broad agreements on basic principles, and he was prepared to send a letter to Mr. Guillaumat or to General Ely, in which he would set forth his ideas on how this matter could be handled in a manner which would be acceptable both to the French and himself, and which could be militarily effective. General Ely said that the French were thinking of designating General Jouhoud⁶ to discuss these matters with General Norstad. The General said he felt that it would be helpful if they could get general agreement before going into detailed negotiations. General Ely said that this would be quite acceptable to him and that he would await Gen. Norstad’s letter.

Mr. Debre then asked whether the General had discussed the question of the Mediterranean fleet with General De Gaulle. General Norstad replied jokingly that his admission ticket to General De Gaulle had read “Air Defense” so he had not felt that it would be appropriate to take up other matters unless General De Gaulle had raised them, which he did not. Mr. Debre then asked whether it would be possible for the French Admiral in the Western Mediterranean to wear two hats, as a NATO Commander and one as a National Commander. General Norstad said that he felt this could be done and added, smilingly, that some Frenchman might hold him to an offer he had made previously, namely, to place MEDOC directly under SHAPE as a major subordinate command, and the MEDOC Admiral could also have a French national. He likewise offered to write a letter to General Ely on this subject and the French agreed that this would be useful. General Norstad then said that there was one additional matter which put him in an extremely difficult position and which he hoped they would not regard as a form of pressure on his part, and this matter was Bizerte. He had extended the period for the use of ten million pounds of infrastructure funds for six months. This had expired on the 31st of December. There was another month’s extension under way. If a solution could be reached on the Mediterranean, it would give him a plausible justification for a further extension of the time period for the use of these funds. If there were no French forces in the Mediterranean under NATO, it would be difficult for him to certify that a NATO requirement existed for the expenditure of these funds. He hoped that they would not regard this as pressure on his part to influence their decision, but rather to influence the timing of their decision, inasmuch as he had to make a recommendation on the employment of these funds in the near future. Mr. Debre stated that he understood this and that they would await General Norstad’s proposals. He said he felt that this conversation with General Norstad had been a very good and very useful one. He said that he had problems at the present time but felt he would surmount them. He stated twice “February will be a very good month.” He thanked General Norstad for what he had told them, and General Norstad then left.

Outside the conference room General Ely indicated to General Norstad that the French did not expect Admiral Barjot⁷ to live a great deal longer and would like to replace him with Admiral Ortoli,⁸ but that for human reasons no mention should be made of this at this time. General Norstad said that he hoped no mention would be made because it would certainly crush Admiral Barjot. However, if he had no French naval forces under him, it would be difficult for him to justify a French Naval Deputy, but that if a solution to the present Mediterranean problem could be found, he would be happy to accept any flag officer the French wished to designate for the post of Naval Deputy. General Ely said, confidentially, that the problem did not lie with Mr. Debre, who had made proposals even more favorable to SACEUR, but with General De Gaulle, and he hoped that General Norstad’s conversation had served to clarify General De Gaulle’s thinking. General Norstad then left the Prime Minister’s office.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s office.
1. General André Puget, French Deputy of the Air Staff.
2. As on the source text. General Norstad was also present.
3. See Document 249.
4. Not found.
5. Norstad’s letter to General André Beaufre, Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAPE, has not been found.
4. Not found.
6. General Louis Jouhaud, Chief of the French Air Staff.
7. Admiral Pierre Barjot, Naval Deputy, Allied Command, Europe.
8. Vice Admiral Paul A. Ortoli, French Military Adviser to the SEATO Council.