Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

247. Letter From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to President Eisenhower⁰

Paris, January 7, 1960.

Dear Mr. President: I was delighted to see you looking not only well, but extremely well, when you were here in Paris just before Christmas. After your strenuous trip you had reason to be tired, but certainly gave no appearance of it. Believe me, this was reassuring to everyone.

You will recall that just before your taking off we discussed briefly a meeting between President De Gaulle and myself on the question of air defense.¹ I followed this up immediately after your plane left by talking to Debre, who indicated that his office would take the initiative in setting up the meeting and that it would probably take place about the 8th or the 9th January.

I understand that it is now De Gaulle’s plan to return to Paris about the 15th of January, at which time he will be briefed by Mr. Guillaumat, the Minister of Defense. Shortly after that there will be a major meeting of the Defense Council. From this schedule it appears unlikely that I will meet with the President before the 20th of January or even later. While this does not follow the schedule which I think you had in mind at the time we talked, it is perhaps best to permit a normal foundation to be established on the French side.

Air Defense was highlighted at the December Ministerial meeting of NATO not because it is the only problem or the greatest military problem of the Alliance, nor even the most urgent, but rather because it was a symbol of the principle of collective security. It is important and it has an urgency, it is true, and thus it makes an extremely useful foundation for a discussion on a somewhat broader basis. I propose, therefore, to give to President De Gaulle a rather complete picture of the NATO military status, but to do so on the basis of providing a context in which to consider the problem of air defense.

I am sure you have been told that at the Ministerial meeting the French agreed to consider the Air Defense technical papers now current² with a view to seeing whether they provide a basis for a higher degree of unification in the Alliance. The NATO Council charged the French authorities with doing this promptly and directed that a report be submitted to the Council not later than two months after the adjournment of the meeting. From what I have heard informally, the French authorities are giving considerable attention to air defense at the present time and, at least on the Ministerial level, seem to hope for a fair measure of success. I must admit that I find no basis for any great optimism. You may have noted that just within the last few days Couve de Murville, speaking for the Assembly, said: “... To give, both in peacetime and in war, over the entire French territory, the authority—meaning in particular the right to open fire—to a Commander-in-Chief who is not directly under the orders of the French Government, for purposes as vital as Air Defense, that is a matter which poses for our government a problem the seriousness of which I ask the Assembly to understand. Great Britain faced that question under similar conditions, and a solution was found for her. The solution for France is more difficult, considering her geographical situation. I hope that the discussions which are going to take place will enable a solution to be reached.”³

This language would appear to express a hope, but at the same time Couve may be destroying the foundation on which such a hope must be based. I remind myself, however, that the speech was made in answer to some of the strongest criticism that has been directed against the present French administration and it was made, of course, for political purposes.

Rest assured that I will do my best to contribute to removing this source of irritation. I cannot promise success, but I will at least not aggravate the situation further. You will be kept informed of the meeting with President De Gaulle and of any other significant developments.

With warmest regards and respects,

Sincerely yours,

Larry

P.S. In connection with another Franco-American-NATO problem, the Mediterranean Fleet, you may be interested in reading the enclosed copy of a letter which I have just sent to the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad. Secret.
1. No record of this conversation has been found, but see footnote 2, Document 244.
2. Not found.
3. Ellipisis in the source text. Couve de Murville made these remarks in the National Assembly on December 29.
4. In the enclosed letter to Twining, January 7, Norstad referred to a recent French proposal tabled in the NATO Standing Group on the French fleet in the Mediterranean. Norstad believed that “the French may be moving toward a proposal to take the Mediterranean, or the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, out of the NATO context.” He further believed that “the present Fleet question can be settled quietly within about 30 days of the time the Standing Group releases it to me for action or the problem passes to me in default of a Standing Group decision.”