Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

246. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (Burgess) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Paris, December 26, 1959.

Dear Chris: Since the spirited debate in the Ministerial Meeting on last Tuesday morning¹ we have been taking stock and getting further reactions, though most of our colleagues are now out of town.

It would be easy to interpret this “revolt” as merely an expression by the smaller powers of NATO of a desire for greater prestige through participation in Summit preparations. There was, of course, some of that psychology, but comments we have received along with the full report of the meeting show that it had much deeper sources.²

First, I think the reaction was touched off by fear of De Gaulle’s “triumvirate”. They are deeply afraid that we may fall in step with this idea, and the communiqué of the Big Four meeting³ sounded like that to them, particularly the commitment to a series of meetings and the breadth of the agenda, both of which went beyond proposals submitted for consultation.

Second, there is clear evidence that these countries were reflecting their own political problems.

It is noteworthy that Greece and Turkey took the lead in the debate. Greece is carrying a very heavy defense burden for her in face of strong left-wing and communist opposition. Communist guerrillas are on her frontier. Any flavor of détente or implication of lack of importance of Greek efforts could bring a fall in government.

Turkey is constantly tempted by Soviet approaches on credit or trade. To stand up against these takes much political courage. The Turks felt that the broad proposals in the letter to Khrushchev ran the risk of undermining this position.

The Belgian government, as we know, has a very serious political problem in getting appropriations to support their NATO commitments.

Certainly, we have always taken the internal German political problems very much into consideration with regard to anything concerning Germany. What the smaller allies were reflecting was similar problems, which it is all too easy to overlook unwittingly. Retaining the firm support of these “committed” countries is, we all know, as important as an appeal to the “uncommitted.”

The request for closer consultation, put forward so strongly, is one which we should take very seriously. I would hope that the United States would take the lead in insisting on the fullest and frankest prior NATO consultation on preparation for the Summit.

As to the techniques for consultation, there should of course be regular reports. This, I believe, should be supplemented by personal contacts. Some of the sub-committees might well meet in Paris. There should be visits of people between this mission and the working groups.

Please forgive me if I also suggest that at the next Western Summit this mission should be tied in more closely than it was this time. We should be able to identify and help avoid some of the rocks in the road.

Sincerely yours,

Randy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–2659. Secret; Official–Informal.
1. See Document 245.
2. See footnote 1, Document 245.
3. For text of the final communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Heads of State and Government meeting on December 21, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1960, pp. 43–44.