Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

239. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 18, 1959, 1 p.m.

Polto 1177. Subject: Ministerial NAC meeting morning December 16: Item II (Military).

The NATO Ministerial Council convened at 1015 in the large council chamber to discuss Agenda Item II (Military).¹

Guillaumat (France) responded briefly to General Twining’s Military Committee statement and objected both to substance and to the press leak.² Discussion was deferred to the restricted session.

The intelligence briefing was given by Admiral Boone,³ Chairman of the Standing Group, and the Military Progress Report (MC 5/14)⁴ was noted without comment. The meeting then adjourned for a restricted session in conference room.

Secretary General Spaak opened the discussion and introduced Secretary Gates who delivered his statement (text sent separately).⁵

Visser (Netherlands)⁶ stated that the Annual Review⁷ makes clear that military force requirements cannot be achieved by the efforts which member countries are making. Commenting on the need for a strong shield as a credible deterrent he cited unsatisfactory past experience in making quantitative reductions on the ground of quality improvements which actually did not sufficiently compensate. He noted that defense systems make sense only if they ascend individual frontiers.

A fundamental study is needed on ways to reach the goals of greater efficiency and economy and further integration of defenses; faster progress is needed on integrated production and logistics. The problem of integration should be reactivated in all fields. We should proceed in areas already begun and frankly face the political problems in other areas, such as air defense. The Permanent Council should study plans to integrate defenses. Visser recommended that a small select group make such a study, or that perhaps the Council might wish to use the Annual Review Group. The first problem is to achieve MC–70 goals; but this requires a further concept which, for the Netherlands, means greater integration.

Watkinson (U.K.) stressed the need for strengthening NATO and keeping up its defenses, particularly in the light of the intelligence briefing. Our governments should negotiate from a position of strength in disarmament talks. He noted that Britain was contributing by not reducing the British army of the Rhine—which presented problems in view of Britain’s other world-wide requirements.

Strauss (Germany) indicated that there was no reason to abandon NATO’s appraisal of the military situation or change the military goals. He noted that there probably would be an increase in Britain’s next defense budget.

In view of the need to take account of new weapons, he welcomed the addition of special agenda items on weapons developments. Watkinson supported Gates on expanding the NATO family of weapons; he regretted that the United Kingdom has not always been able to join NATO production in the past but he stated that Britain will welcome discussions in this area for the future and suggested that 2 or 3 countries join together to make specific proposals to the NATO Armament Committee. Watkinson stressed that all countries must make concessions.

NATO should reinforce present first phase forces as a deterrent, and must maintain the ability to retaliate in every type of aggression. Watkinson questioned whether we do not merely weaken ourselves by lengthy debating of types of weapons. He stressed that Britain was reequipping its forces in smaller numbers, but with greater striking power and mobility. He concluded with three recommendations: (1) to do all possible to strengthen the Alliance and insure that national responsibilities are not incompatible with strong support for NATO; (2) to make new attempts to broaden the NATO family of weapons; and (3) to stress increasing NATO’s strength for the first phase of a war, with both conventional [and] nuclear capabilities, rather than on follow-up forces.

Strauss (Germany) indicated that there was no reason to abandon NATO’s appraisal of the military situation or change the military goals. Balanced collective forces are necessary to meet high costs. Strauss regretted that there had been no positive decision on interrelation of air defenses and logistics.

He stressed the importance of equipping the shield forces with dual capability weapons and of storing atomics in Europe. Noting that Germany accepts the burden and the risks, although this was not easy when others do not permit nuclear storage, Strauss requested other countries to re-examine their attitude.

Strauss then covered in detail plans for the German force buildup, indicating the goals and progress to date in all services, and expressed Germany’s determination to fulfill the military requirements of MC–70.

Strauss noted that there were three major problems for Germany: the lack of long-term volunteers for military service, the difficulties of procuring land for military purposes, and the lengthy procedures required for technical decisions on more weapons systems. The present tour of service is not long enough; and, as disarmament publicity has had some psychological effect on the public, the need for continued military forces must be made clear. NATO infrastructure procedures are too complicated and should be revised, particularly as to real estate and the logistics systeM. Strauss expressed appreciation for French willingness to make training facilities available.

Strauss mentioned the need for adjustments in German MC–70 requirements in order to choose among parallel weapons systems. They have decided to concentrate for the time being on two types of weapons systems—Honest John and Sergeant. Other problems included: land acquisition for surface-to-air missiles, the need for air defense systems on destroyers, [1-2/2 lines of source text not declassified], Strauss questioned the value of manned fighter units in air defense, and indicated his intention to stress multi-purpose capabilities in combat aircraft.

Strauss then made several specific proposals: the Annual Review should be maintained but with greater flexibility and more of a forward look; infrastructure procedures should be more concise and shorter; the international staff should provide a brief appraisal of each country to be discussed in detail at ministerial meetings; a strong psychological potential should be developed, perhaps with a small psychological warfare staff in SHAPE especially in view of Soviet propaganda on the “spirit of Camp David.”⁸

Strauss urged that uniform requirements be set for NATO military matériel and a reasonable distribution of production tasks be worked out with less emphasis on industrial pressures and national prestige factors. He proposed a technical committee on basic military requirements to work under the Military Committee.

On the question of the Baltic, Strauss emphasized that the time has come to solve the long-standing problems. Noting that there are many questions which seem beyond the competence of either the Chiefs of Staff or the Foreign Ministers alone, Strauss proposed that such political-military problems should be discussed by Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staffs, and Permanent Representatives together. He concluded by stressing that NATO must give an impression of solidarity and strength, and expressing appreciation for the United States statement on keeping forces in Europe.

Etzel, the German Finance Minister, then discussed the German economic and financial situation. In 1958, Germany spent 3.6 percent of its GNP on defense, and if expenditures on Berlin and stockpiling costs are added, the percentage of GNP would reach 4.1 per cent. Etzel noted, however, that Germany was still divided and had continuing obligations for refugees. He stressed again Germany’s intent to meet MC–70, and to increase defense expenditures to the limit of its possibilities, as well as continuing to contribute to under-developed countries.

Themelis (Greece)⁹ noted the increased Soviet propaganda designed to provoke tension in NATO. He stated that MC–70 goals are minimums but that even if they are met, Greece will have the smallest force in the Balkans except for Albania. Greece is trying to replace old equipment and will make maximum efforts; but the program is dependent on the mutual aid program. The Greeks have increased the percentage of GNP devoted to defense as GNP increased, but as the GNP is very low, Greece has one of the largest military burdens of the Alliance in proportion to her economy. Greek efforts depend on Allied cooperation; if, for example, the Allies buy her products, it will help the Greek economy and hence her defenses. Themelis concluded by commending NATO achievements in production of equipment and weapons.

Andreotti (Italy) warned that the gaps in NATO defenses were serious, but could be overcome if all members of the Alliance exerted maximum efforts. He stressed that the saving of the Alliance depended on its unity and cooperation. Italy has made considerable sacrifices to meet MC–70 goals: her defense budget will increase by 20 per cent over five years; Italy has arranged for introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a NATO stockpile; she has established IRBMs and provided for an integrated defense. Andreotti concluded by expressing pleasure at the United States reassurances that it would continue to contribute its share in NATO and stated that Italy will continue to do all possible to meet its goals.

Mr. Spaak then appointed a communiqué committee, following which the morning session was adjourned.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1859. Secret. Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow and pouched to the other NATO capitals.
1. The verbatim (C–VR (59)46 and C–VR (59)47) records of this session, dated December 16, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559. The summary (C–R (59)46 and C–R (59)47) records of this session, dated December 16, are ibid., CF 1558.
2. See Document 233, and footnote 2, Document 235.
3. Admiral Walter F. Boone.
4. Not found.
5. No record of the transmission of Gates’ speech has been found. A copy of his speech is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1566.
6. S.H. Visser, Dutch Minister of Defense.
7. The text of the draft resolution on the 1959 Annual Review noted the possibility of progress toward the achievement of MC–70 requirements, called attention to “the unfavorable trends” in the 1958 Annual Review and still present in 1959, and considered that “unless further corrective measures are implemented without delay, the defense posture of the alliance in relation to Soviet strength will continue to deteriorate.” It further adopted as firm goals the force plans for 1960 and urged “member countries to make every effort to attain the required force levels and qualitative standards in accordance with the guidance and recommendations of the NATO military authorities for the 1959 Annual Review.” (Polto 1073 from Paris, December 8; Department of State Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–859) On December 9, the NAC agreed to submit the text of this resolution to the NAC Ministerial Meeting. (Polto 1089 from Paris, December 9; ibid., 396.1–PA/12–959)
8. Reference is to the talks between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David, Maryland, September 25–27, at the conclusion of Khrushchev’s 13-day visit to the United States.
9. George Themelis, Greek Under Secretary of National Defense.