Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

238. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 16, 1959, noon.

Polto 1161. From USDel. Subject: Ministerial NAC meeting afternoon December 15: continuation Item I: Review of international situation.¹

Germany (Brentano) said firm reaction of NATO last year impressed Russians but NATO cannot rest on laurels or underestimate threats still facing it. Soviets rejected Western peace plan at Geneva out of hand and are still prepared to talk concessions only from West.² Aims and methods of Russians unchanged. NATO should contribute to efforts to seek real détente. But West must avoid danger of wishful thinking or of letting down. Soviet soft line makes position all the harder.

Recognized dangers of Soviet efforts to gain influence in newly emergent states and welcomed Dillon’s emphasis on this at Bonn.³ It is duty of NATO to coordinate interests of members.

Regarding summit, solidarity of West is essential as Russians trying to split Alliance, particularly destroy German ties with Allies. Disarmament should be first agenda item. In long run German question must be resolved if tension to be reduced, by self-determination of whole German people. Final solution of Berlin problem only possible within solution German question, not separately. Present guaranteed status of Berlin must not be endangered.

Brentano appealed to Allies to reaffirm principles of December 17 declaration of last year.⁴ He welcomed Spaak and Herter’s emphasis on fact that West cannot relax, and agreed with Herter on Germany and Berlin.⁵ Germany will do its best to give greater help to underdeveloped countries. Welcomed Wigny rejection of disengagement.⁵ Said that there was opportunity to improve relations between economic groups within Alliance if questions discussed openly and frankly.

Greece (Averoff) expressed hope for real détente, saying poor country with delicate situation such as Greece naturally wants relaxation. But must not underestimate Russians who only recently have subjected little Greece adjacent to Communists, with threats from outside and interference internally.

This proves Moscow only changing tactics. Forces of Alliance holding at about same level but cohesion is less, and this is dangerous. Must keep up efforts until disarmament agreement reached and avoid idea of “moral disarmament” which would lead to unilateral disarmament.

Solidarity within Alliance raises point of low GNP per capita in Greece. Programs for undeveloped countries unfortunately do not speak of NATO members. Greece too has needs.

In summitry, Greece advocates controlled general disarmament but not limited zones. Strongly in favor of non-intervention in internal affairs, and we should strike out at radio broadcasts which violate that line. Any agreements must be cleared with all members of Alliance in advance. Must not give up any rights in Berlin. Averoff praised Secretary’s proposal for ten-year plan.⁶

Portugal (Mathias) doubted Russians meant détente. “No use to try to straighten shadow of a twisted stick.” Praised Herter proposal for ten-year plan.

United Kingdom (Selwyn Lloyd) denied stories that NATO in crisis. Praised Herter ten-year plan idea as clarifying long-range intentions of United States to NATO. Stressed need for concentration and harmony regarding summitry.

Lloyd then summarized Four-Power Working Group [Report] circulated yesterday.⁷ Stressed no decisions taken, but issues were date and place, scope of agenda, and methods of further preparatory work, for which United Kingdom suggests Washington as site. Pledged progress reports to NAC on regular and automatic basis. Believed Western Five should meet soonest possible to coordinate position on disarmament, and 10-Power Disarmament Committee should meet soonest and before summit.⁸ Stressed West must educate public opinion not to expect too much from summit.

Lloyd then expressed his views on EEC along well-known lines, saying it should not be exclusive or would lead to trade war. Danger of economic split which could lead to military and political split in Alliance must be avoided.

Military effort must be on more closely knit basis than in past. Generally supported Herter statement of this morning. Spoke in favor of interdependence. Defense Minister would speak of inability of individuals to meet force goals tomorrow. On East-West relations believes there is “beginning of a détente.” Major task of 1960 is to consolidate and improve it. There has been a change. Four reasons for Khrushchev attitude are: (1) fear of nuclear war; (2) pressures within Russia for better life, competing with high cost of arms; (3) Khrushchev concept of his personal importance; and (4) fact that détente involves no doctrinal heresy since Marx never said world domination had to be gained by war.

West must maintain present military balance. Cannot negotiate from weakness. Attack on West must be made unattractive. Must employ resources correctly so as to also deal with Soviet economic and political penetration. Should not be on defensive or afraid of greater contacts.

At summit, should tell Russians that Soviet change in tactics is move in right direction but does not go far enough. Should then try to explain our views of détente, cold war, and co-existence, establish differences of views, and educate Russians. Should give impression we want real détente if proven by action but intend to maintain defenses.

Arms control most fruitful topic for summit since common interest on both sides. Summit can only give general direction to long negotiations in Ten-Power Committee. Soviet disarmament proposals show a change as they move conventional disarmament to first stage and liquidation of bases to end of first stage. United Kingdom thinks nuclear and conventional disarmament must be treated pari passu.

On Germany and Berlin it follows from Khrushchev desires to avoid war that he wants to remove heat from Berlin crisis. But cannot assume that heat may not be turned on again, as prestige deeply involved. We should stand on Geneva formulas.

Denied any interest in disengagement, but favored geographic areas for inspection and limitation of arms citing Antarctica.

NATO only proper forum for discussion of questions leading to action on problems of concern to whole Alliance. Period of freer diplomatic play requires closest consultation on all these matters. Supported Herter proposal ten-year planning.

Canada (Green) thought situation better than a year ago but no reason to relax vigilance. One year of quiet is no proof their policy is less aggressive. We should encourage détente to eliminate risk of actual war, such as at Berlin. Should be optimistic but not unduly so and be careful of public opinion.

Progress will be slow and should avoid unilateral concessions, Canada favors series of well prepared summits. NATO consultation on summitry should be improved.

Must be closest NATO consultation on disarmament. There is no inconsistency between high state of preparedness and seeking to reach agreement.

Greece proposed that NATO help prepare Western disarmament position, suggesting it organize its political and military staffs to contribute to study. Asked Permanent Council to consider what kind of group should be brought together to let NATO deal in positive way with disarmament.

Praised Herter 10-year plan idea.

Italy (Pella) said firmness of West would aid in making a real détente. Cannot relax defense efforts until Russians give concrete proof of change. Urged closer consultation in NATO on summitry, indicating not satisfied with recent past. Unable to comment on Four Power report, as it was just received.

Welcomed Herter statement indicating United States more united with Europe for long period for defense, as well as in other fields of cooperation.

All should participate proportionately in defense effort, but 4 percent progressive 5-year increase Italy has pledged is maximum it can do at present, taking account of other problems, particularly development needs in south Italy.

NATO should coordinate policies and efforts regarding underdeveloped countries, but not be operating agency. It should also provide economic cooperation within Alliance for members with special problems.

Disarmament most propitious field for summit. Is optimistic about solution of problem between Six and Seven. Need is for close cooperation of all countries of OEEC including United States and Canada.

Dutch (van Houten)⁹ stressed Soviet objectives unchanged, and tactics could be switched easily. Even if Soviets do not use armed force for attack, they will use it for political pressure. Military strength must be preserved and maximum effort made to build up shield until disarmament not only agreed upon but actually in effect.

Warmly welcomed Herter announcement United States troops would stay long time to come, and 10-year plan idea. More coordination and unity needed, and Permanent Council should consider measures to be taken.

Preparatory talks on summitry vital, all through next ensuing months, as well as during East-West summit.

Should give no concessions on Berlin and Germany beyond Geneva proposals.

Must keep public opinion informed of need to keep up defense effort.

France (Couve) noted change from last year, when we had three crises, while this year none. Attributed this to firmness of Alliance on Berlin. Noted no change for better in ChiCom attitude.

On summit, we should not give up anything essential nor be fooled by appearances. On disarmament, West should show it is serious, but question of control very difficult. West should raise non-intervention as a cold war problem, raising questions of both arms delivery and economic aid by Soviets. Russians seek to maintain split of Germany, and to detach Germany from West and neutralize it under Soviet direction, putting Russia on the borders of the Rhine, which might be a threshold to war. Berlin is tied to German problem. Russians will try to get acceptance of peace treaty and Berlin agreement. Agreed with Wigny Western position should take up at end of Geneva.

Indispensable to maintain balance of power, including United States forces in Europe for defense of Europe.

When France last year suggested NATO policy should include not only Europe, some shock was caused, but now seems acceptable defense must be total as problem is global. This extension particularly important for France regarding Africa where has special responsibility.

Military adaptations of Alliance also necessary; subject is delicate, but changes in weapons and state of world, and greater health of Europe means some adaptations necessary. Couve said he understood Herter allusion to United States preoccupation on sharing of defense Berlin. There also could be changes in organization and responsibilities “in the sense of each taking its own responsibility.”

Special ties such as United States–Canada, Scandinavian group, Benelux, etc not bad but useful as reinforcing strength of individuals, small groups, and all.

Unity extremely important at present time.

Denmark (Hansen) was hopeful about disarmament, favored many summits, urged united Western front with consultation in NATO, favored early meeting of 10-Power Disarmament Committee, and urged reconciliation between Six and Seven; North America should not worry about economic effects of European developments. Supported Herter 10-year plan idea.

Luxembourg (Schaus) called for deeds not words from Russians. Soviet dogma unchanged and strength intact, while subversive effort undermine had. West should negotiate, though reticently. Stressed unity of Alliance, and organizing for dangerous period ahead.

Turkey (Zorlu) expressed suspicion of Communists and distrust of détente; Soviet take-over of Eastern Europe had occurred without force in period of détente. Russians seek relaxation now for chance to do same thing. Détente should be global, not local.

Zorlu strongly criticized French proposal to discuss economic aid for underdeveloped countries with Russians as dangerous move. Also did not like idea of continuing series of summit meetings, which gave Russians far too much stature above the salt in public mind. We should sit tight on our position on Germany.

Zorlu struck out at idea of extending long-term credits to Russians, particularly because Greece and Turkey unable to obtain such credits from European partners. NATO must study this problem, which has political as well as economic implications.

Spaak then proposed NAC consider issuance of two communiqués: one on Thursday,¹⁰ which would be basically military and only slightly political, and a further one next Tuesday¹¹ which would carry the real political message. Spaak proposed on Thursday to take up Four-Power Working Group report for discussion paragraph by paragraph.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1659. Secret. Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to London and Bonn and pouched to the other NATO capitals and Moscow.
1. The verbatim (C–VR (59)45) record of this session, dated December 15, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559. The summary (C–R (59)45) record of this session, dated December 15, is ibid., CF 1558.
2. For text of the Western peace plan, May 14, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1959, pp. 779–781.
3. Dillon visited Western Europe December 7–14; see Documents 80 ff.
4. See footnote 1, Document 170.
5. See Document 237.
5. See Document 237.
6. Toward the end of his statement at the morning session, December 15, Herter proposed a cooperative long-range planning effort for the 1960s, which would put into better perspective the problems with which NATO was wrestling. He believed this effort would provide NATO “with affirmative objectives towards which we could strive over the years that lie ahead—in our relations with each other, in our relations with other free nations, and in our relations with the Communist powers.” He then detailed how such planning “could be addressed to the various components of our political, military, arms control, scientific and economic programs to the extent that they bear upon NATO.” (Polto 1159 from Paris, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1559)
7. See footnote 4, Document 237.
8. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union issued a four-power communiqué on September 7, in which they agreed to set up a Ten-Power Disarmament Committee, and a U.N. Disarmament Commission Resolution (U.N. doc. A/4209) unanimously approved this communiqué on September 10. For text of the communiqué and resolution, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1441–1443.
9. Hans Rudolf van Houten, Dutch Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
10. December 17.
11. December 22.