229. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Sec. McElroy
- Mr. Gates
- Gen. Twining
- Mr. Sprague
- Gen. Randall
- Gen. Persons
- Mr. Gordon Gray
- Dr. Kistiakowsky
- Gen. Goodpaster
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Mr. McElroy said that to relieve the budget further, he would like to pull a number of our Air Force units out of NATO. He said this matter had become an issue between the State Department and the Defense Department, centering on the record of action of the last NSC meeting.1 In view of the fact that the French denied us bases from which to conduct attack operations with these Air Force units, he thought we were justified in planning to pull them back. The President supported this general view, commenting on the fact that we have in NATO the equivalent of 6 divisions, which we never intended to keep there permanently. The reason we have them there is the NATO allies are almost psychopathic whenever anyone suggests removing them. Gen. Twining commented that the Air Force would like to pull these air units out. Gen. Norstad is vehemently opposed to this idea. The President commented that we cannot pull out committed forces suddenly. We break faith with our allies. Mr. Gray said that we are committed for the calendar year 1960 with respect to these forces but not beyond. Mr. McElroy said he would like not to be rockbound with regard to these forces. The denial of bases in France has obliged us to put our forces in crowded areas in Great Britain. After further discussion of the matter, the President said we should not prepare our budget on the basis of pulling these units back. We must get the word gradually to NATO that we are going to reduce them. He said we must keep them there in the meantime, even if this costs us extra money. Mr. McElroy said the Air Force would try to rework their budget so as to keep these units there.
[Page 517]The President then asked, what about the Sixth Fleet? He said he is getting very doubtful regarding the value of having this Fleet sitting in the Mediterranean. The British and French have strength there, and this has traditionally been an area of their responsibility. In fact, they want to exercise greater influence there now. Our fleet gives us in fact only two groups of aircraft. He is very doubtful regarding its value in a big war. Mr. Gates said that he shared the doubt that the Sixth Fleet should be kept in the Mediterranean. He said the Navy argues that its presence there holds together our cold war allies. Again it would take a lot of political preparation to be able to remove the fleet from the Mediterranean. The President commented that this was an area in which he and Mr. Dulles had divergent views. Mr. Dulles had practically a phobia against raising the question of reduction of these forces. The President said he was certain we should make the Europeans do more. However, he did not see much use talking about the NATO force in relation with the current budget. He recognized that reduction in some fields in NATO might however prove possible. Mr. McElroy asked if it would be acceptable to take these questions up with NATO. The President said it would, adding that we should go to NATO and tell our allies that the time has come for us to backtrack a bit. He added that we should not get this question into an emotional stage before we have had private talks with our major allies one at a time. We should stress that what we are seeking to do is keep our economy strong—on which all of NATO depends— and at the same time be faithful to our commitments. He repeated that we cannot make a budget for FY ‘61 that contemplates a pullout. We must find other ways. Mr. McElroy said this means that we must pay another year of the NATO bill. He thought that work should start at once to change the political base for our procedure by which these commitments are made. The present one was made in mid-1959 without Bureau of the Budget and NSC consideration. Mr. McElroy said this should be a matter of authorization by the President before annual commitments are made. The President stated that he would bring this matter up with Macmillan, Adenauer and De Gaulle, and would point out that we have a special burden—of keeping up the over-all deterrent. He recognized that they would say that we of course have to do this anyway, so it is not a commitment to NATO. Gen. Twining said he did not think the NATO allies would be as surprised as some people visualized. Several have indicated to him that they are surprised that we have stayed as long as we have.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 2.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 228.↩