Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

228. Memorandum of Discussion at the 424th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

November 12, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO (NSC 5433/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, dated January 22, 1957; NSC Action No. 2017; NIE 20–58; NIE 100–59; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Long-Range NATO and Related European Regional Problems”, dated March 11 and 23, 1959; NSC 5906/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Issues of U.S.

Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO”, dated November 5, 1959)¹

Mr. Gray said the President had recently indicated that he wanted to have the Council discuss major policy areas from time to time without necessarily attempting to arrive at decisions on specific proposals. In response to an inquiry, the President had agreed that NATO was one of the appropriate policy areas for Council discussion. Accordingly, a Discussion Paper on the defense posture of NATO, prepared by the Department of State, was before the Council this morning.² In the interest of getting the subject in front of the Council at the earliest possible time, the Planning Board had agreed to this unilateral submission by State. Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Merchant to summarize the Discussion Paper.

Mr. Merchant said that the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State after consideration of the subject by the Planning Board was concerned only with policy issues bearing on the defense posture of NATO. The Paper noted the threat to NATO, discussed the “trip-wire” strategy and the “shield” strategy, took up the U.S. contribution to the NATO Shield, and considered the effects of a reduction in the near future in the combat strength of U.S. NATO-committed forces in Europe. Mr. Merchant felt that our NATO allies, in the light of their improved economic capabilities, could do more than they are doing at the present time. The problem is how to induce them to increase their defense effort, to remedy their own short-falls, and to help the U.S. reduce its contribution to NATO. The Paper before the Council was a discussion of that problem against the background of our own budgetary and balance-of-payments problems. The NATO alliance was in a condition of malaise, as reflected in recent communications regarding the Western Summit Meeting. The causes of this malaise included De Gaulle’s attitude and actions, Khrushchev’s campaign of sweetness and light, news stories regarding prospective reductions in the U.S. contribution, and the knowledge that U.S. military aid will be reduced. Mr. Merchant felt that two major considerations were involved in the NATO problem:

(1) U.S. force commitments for Calendar Year 1960 in relation to the commitments and incentives of our allies;

(2) The impending negotiations with the USSR on disarmament and Berlin.

Mr. Merchant said the problem was: how can the U.S. effectively exercise leadership without discouraging our allies or causing them to panic? how can the U.S. deal with these matters in a fashion which will not risk dissipating our bargaining position vis-à-vis the USSR? In his view, earnest consideration should be given to reducing U.S. combat forces committed to NATO only in return for Soviet force reductions or withdrawal in Central Europe. Finally, Mr. Merchant noted that the Discussion Paper presented the factors in the NATO problem from the political point of view and that it made no suggestions as to tactics or timing.

Mr. Gray then called on Ambassador Burgess, who said he would make a few remarks to supplement Mr. Merchant’s exposition. The Annual Review of NATO force goals, just completed, showed that NATO had made substantial progress in the last year toward achieving its force goals. The German build-up was going forward steadily, although non-commissioned officers were still a limiting factor; German expenditures for defense were rising rapidly; Italian expenditures for defense were increasing at a rate of about four per cent a year; Belgium’s defense expenditures had risen some; and it was hoped that Danish expenditures would go up. Progress was being made in connection with training, coordination, and infra-structure. Weapons research was moving ahead promisingly. Mr. Burgess noted that U.S. aid had already been reduced substantially. In his opinion the cuts were too drastic. The U.K. and Germany were on a cash basis; i.e., they were receiving no military or economic aid, and France was practically on a cash basis. In fact, in the European area U.S. aid was going to “the under-developed countries of Europe”—Greece, Turkey and Scandinavia. The European Gross National Product had doubled per capita in the last ten years, but was still only one-half to one-third of the U.S. GNP. A study of European tax rates would show that the European tax burden was heavier than ours. Ambassador Burgess felt that the NATO goals were not completely out of reach; that with some effort on the part of the Europeans and some participation on the part of the U.S., the alliance could come close to achieving its goals. Manpower problems remained serious however. Twelve German divisions were needed and two French divisions should be returned from Algeria at the earliest possible moment; indeed the Algerian conflict should be resolved. In order for NATO goals to be fully achieved, U.S. assistance at the rate of $2 billion a year for two years would be required. Action was being taken to induce the European countries to make more rapid progress toward NATO goals; we were attempting to “apply the heat.” This, however, was a slow and difficult process. With respect to our balance-of-payments and budgetary problems, we had proposed a number of things the European countries might do, e.g., expanded trade, tourist expenditures, more European aid to underdeveloped countries. It would be necessary for us to select which of these various proposals we were most interested in; the European countries could not attempt them all.

Secretary Herter said he wished to call attention to two facets of the NATO problems:

(1) The concept of the Sword and the Shield appeared to be a generally acceptable concept.

(2) The psychological impact of a withdrawal of U.S. forces and shift of the burden to European countries would be tremendous. The psychological impact of anything we did with respect to NATO was very important and must be watched with great care.

Secretary Herter then asked whether Mr. Dulles would be willing to summarize the recent Special National Intelligence Estimate on “Special Aspects of the NATO problem” (SNIE 100–10–59).³

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the SNIE was limited to the probable impact of a substantial unilateral reduction within the near future of U.S. NATO forces in the European area on: (a) the political attitudes and defense policies of European NATO members and (b) the overall Western negotiating position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament. The Estimate was unanimously agreed on by the intelligence community except for Air Force reservations on two points. The Estimate concluded that:

(1) Any substantial unilateral reduction of U.S. NATO forces in Europe within the next few months would be regarded as an abrupt withdrawal from firm commitments to NATO.

(2) Diplomatic preparation could mitigate the bad effects of a unilateral US reduction.

(3) In any event, a U.S. decision to reduce its forces in Europe substantially would be widely interpreted as reflecting growing U.S. preoccupation with domestic economic concerns and a decreased sense of urgency about European security.

(4) A substantial unilateral reduction in U.S. forces would reduce popular willingness in Europe to support contributions to NATO at their present level and would intensify the underlying strains in the alliance, although not leading to a major split.

(5) A substantial and unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe at this time would weaken the Western bargaining position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament.

Secretary Anderson said that outstanding in the Discussion Paper was the argument that MC–70 goals require the U.S. to increase rather than decrease aid to NATO in order to hold the alliance together. He felt that no one had supported NATO more strongly than he, but wished to point out that the argument in the Paper was based on certain questionable hypotheses such as: (1) the Soviet threat to NATO has increased; (2) MC–70 is a bare minimum; (3) the Europeans feel we are committed to provide armed forces over a period of some years; (4) Europeans do not have the capability to make progress on MC–70 goals unless we increase our aid; and (5) the withdrawal of U.S. forces would threaten the political cohesion of the alliance.

Over the years, Secretary Anderson continued, it had been agreed in this government that at some time U.S. forces committed to NATO would have to be reduced, but no time seemed to be a good time for this reduction to take place. Some event always stood in the way, e.g., trouble in France, an election in the U.K., or the prospect that Germany would join NATO. It was also generally agreed that there could be no limited war in Europe; if this were so, one might question the size of the Shield. Our allies had indicated an unwillingness to meet MC–70 goals so that we constantly have to “prod” them. If the Europeans believed MC–70 to be essential to their security, we would not have to prod. Secretary Anderson was also worried about the implications in the Paper that we are committed for years to come. He did not wish to weaken Free World security, or the cohesion of the alliance, but he asked the Council to remember that every European country has been preoccupied with its own problems constantly, so that the U.S. should not worry overmuch about being preoccupied with its own problems. Balance-of-payments and budgetary problems were troublesome things with which the U.S. could not compromise, and the satisfactory solution of such problems was just as vital to the world as it was to the U.S.

The President felt that there had been too much talk about reduction of U.S. forces committed to NATO. For years we had talked about making our allies see the problem as we see it. When he was first assigned to SHAPE in 1951, he was told by President Truman that the commitment of U.S. forces to Europe was an emergency measure to induce a rise in European morale and to provide land forces to help meet an aggression in Europe. The President had recently been told that, although he went all over Europe in 1951 representing our commitment of forces to NATO as an emergency measure, no U.S. political authority had ever emphasized the emergency character of the mission. Consequently, the U.S. had maneuvered itself into a greater position of responsibility than was necessary. The President felt we should not ever admit that the 220 million people of Europe could not provide the ground forces necessary for their defense. Nevertheless, we should not talk about reducing our forces committed to NATO until we are able to educate our allies as to the facts of life. When we talk of U.S. troop redeployment, everyone misinterprets our meaning. We must make a political effort to let the people of Europe see that we want to be fair. At present we are bearing a large share of the infra-structure cost, we are bearing almost all the cost of the deterrent, and we are maintaining a large navy to keep the seas free. The President noted incidentally in this connection that Khrushchev was inclined to laugh at the U.S. for having a surface navy, and had recently canceled construction of some Soviet cruisers even though such construction was rather far advanced. This government, the President continued, must decide what is needed in NATO and must obtain the political agreement of our allies. If responsibility for defending the world is to be imposed upon us, then perhaps we had better rule the world; he was tired of having the whole defense burden placed on U.S. shoulders. In connection with the GNP which had been mentioned a while ago, he would like to say that our GNP was composed of some things we needed no more than a dog needs two tails. The fact is, we are putting money into elements of common defense, such as the deterrent, that our allies must be brought to appreciate. However, nothing could be more fatal than to withdraw our troops from Europe or to say we are about to withdraw them. It was high time that the thinking of Europe was reoriented and made more realistic before the NATO situation is further crystallized; it was high time that the population of Europe did its part with respect to ground forces. However, the U.S. could not initiate a definite scheme for the reduction of U.S. forces, and in the absence of agreement by Europe, say this and only this is what we are going to do.

Mr. Gray said that in its discussion of the subject, the Planning Board had raised some questions about various sections of the Discussion Paper.⁴ The Paper, for example indicated that the Soviet threat to NATO had broadened and increased since 1949.

The President, interrupting, asked Mr. Gray to record one minority vote against that view.

Mr. Gray, resuming his briefing, said that the Planning Board had raised the following questions:

(1) Even though Soviet capabilities have increased since 1959, are not NATO military capabilities also greater?

(2) Isn’t it true that Soviet intentions are less threatening than in 1949?

(3) Are all forces committed to MC–70 really necessary to an effective Shield strategy? For example, does every NATO nation have to have army, navy and air forces? Are NATO nations maintaining in Europe national forces which aren’t part of MC–70 and which could be reduced to help meet MC–70?

(4) Is it true that the U.K. and French Governments maintain that they must have independent nuclear deterrent forces to offset doubts that the U.S. strategic forces would respond to a Soviet offensive in force against Europe?

(5) Is the U.S. morally committed to support MC–70 strategy through 1963?

Mr. Herter said that prior to the adoption of MC–70 goals of 30 divisions by 1963, the force goals for NATO had been 70 divisions. Accordingly, MC–70 was supposed to represent a real reduction in NATO forces. The U.S. was committed to MC–70 to the extent that it took the lead in 1957 to get each NATO country to do its proportionate share in MC–70. The Annual Review provided for under MC–70 is an opportunity for a revision of MC–70, but in the minds of the Europeans we are committed to MC–70 goals to be achieved by 1963.

Mr. Gray asked whether the U.S. must keep 5-1/2 divisions in Europe through 1963. Mr. Herter said the number of divisions we must keep in Europe was a military question which he would not attempt to decide. He could only speak from the psychological point of view; but from that point of view we were committed in the minds of the Europeans.

The President believed that any changes in our commitment to NATO should not be taken up in connection with the Annual Review, but should be agreed to by the NATO Governments in bilateral negotiations. The President asked the Council to look at the 1914–1939 forces maintained in Europe. Western Germany appeared to be having difficulty in raising 12 divisions, but it had had no difficulty in raising a great many more divisions than twelve before World War II. The President thought we would be in bad shape if we did not get a better understanding of our duties and responsibilities on the part of the European countries.

Secretary Herter said the news of our preoccupation with certain economic matters had produced tremendous repercussion in Europe. The Europeans had begun to think of our budgetary and balance-of-payments problems very seriously. The Secretary also felt that before we approached European governments about reducing our forces committed to NATO we should have an understanding with General Norstad, who had worked his heart out on the problem. Any proposal to reduce U.S. forces would mean a new military assessment by all our allies.

The President felt that a new military assessment was not the gist of the problem. In his view we would not be much stronger or weaker than MC–70. He was arguing that Europe had never done its full duty in connection with NATO.

Secretary Herter said that General Norstad had suggested a “thin-out” of NATO forces, but with a compensatory Russian “thin-out”. This suggestion presented difficulties, however, because Germany was fearful of being pushed to the East; any feeling that we are weakening NATO automatically makes Germany uneasy. The President said we were not talking about reducing forces or about withdrawing forces, but about getting the NATO governments to understand our problems. He remarked incidentally that the late Secretary Dulles had always been reluctant to approach the NATO governments with this problem. Moreover, the President continued, he saw no reason why the U.S. should apologize for being preoccupied with its financial situation. The European countries were constantly preoccupied with their own problems and were inclined to say “If you won’t, we won’t.” He liked the suggestion that the Germans might do more. However, this idea would probably be unpopular in Europe, which had been obsessed with the idea that Germany should not have too many armed forces. The French had always been afraid of the German forces; when he was at SHAPE, he had had to go to the French and say “Who is your enemy—Germany or Russia?” The French had never given him a satisfactory reply. The President did not believe that we could possibly take the FY 1961 budget for NATO and reduce it in any way. This, he added, was a blow to him, because he had thought that the Europeans would volunteer to assist us in the light of our budgetary and balance-of-payments problems.

Mr. Gray remarked that the Council had been dealing with matters within the purview of the Department of Defense, but had not yet given Secretary McElroy an opportunity to speak.

Secretary McElroy said that he and his associates had devoted a great deal of thought to the question of the budget. All their work on the FY 1961 military budget made it apparent that if we are to have forces with modern weapons, we must reduce the numerical strength of those forces. It would be possible to increase military expenditures if the national interest required, but a level budget of about $41 billion would not permit the purchase of modern hardware. Our overseas deployments were an extravagant use of forces compared to the possibility of maintaining our forces in the U.S. Secretary McElroy agreed that a discussion with our NATO partners was needed, but care must be taken to see that such a discussion was not interpreted as a U.S. opinion that the threat had decreased. In his view, in the future, the threat of aggression would be more serious in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East than in Europe. Only the U.S. and the U.K. would be able to oppose aggression in Southeast Asia, for example, and the U.K. was being coy about that. He would not reduce the U.S. overall effort in behalf of the Free World, but he would be inclined to recognize a shift in the threat away from Europe and toward regions where our allies cannot carry a share of the burden. What, then, should the U.S. continue to contribute to the defense of the NATO countries?

Secretary McElroy felt that our number one contribution to NATO should be the maintenance of our deterrent nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.K. would be able to help us repel local aggression, but would be increasingly unable to help with the deterrent. Our second contribution to the defense of NATO should be an adequate number of troops in Europe—say two divisions—to establish the fact that the U.S. is committed to use its deterrent forces in the event of an attack on the ground in Europe. Secretary McElroy supported the views of the Secretary of State and the President that the present was no time to state that we will reduce our ground forces in Europe. To do so would lead the Europeans to feel that we were reneging on our commitments and would throw away our bargaining position vis-à-vis the USSR. The President could decide on a reduction of our forces committed to NATO, as well as on the creation of a political climate to make reduction possible, without engendering the feeling that we were running away from our responsibilities. This could be accomplished affirmatively without a sacrifice of the Sword or the Shield. On the ground, we should work toward the understanding that Germany, France, and others might each put up another division. Secretary McElroy asked whether General White wished to say anything. General White said he had nothing to add.

Mr. Stans said that the requirements of our NATO forces were a significant budgetary demand but only one among many such demands. He wished to present two sets of figures which had a bearing on the NATO problem. At the present time we had 700,000 men and dependents in the NATO countries, in Spain and in Morocco. The cost of this deployment was $2-1/2 billion exclusive of construction, pipeline, large equipment, back-up in the U.S., and $900 million in assistance for NATO. This figure had a $1,200,000,000 effect on the balance-of-payments. The total cost of our NATO commitment was $4 billion a year, not including the cost of the Sixth Fleet. Mr. Stans said that the possibility of balancing the FY 1960 budget has now disappeared. A $1 billion deficit was in prospect and a miracle would be required to bring the budget back into balance. Moreover, the FY 1961 budget will have built-in increases over the FY 1960 budget of about $2–$2-l/2 billion. Mr. Stans’ second set of figures referred to the savings which could be achieved by eliminating or deploying U.S. divisions now in Europe. $400 million would be saved the first year and possibly more thereafter by eliminating two U.S. divisions now in Europe. $200 million would be saved the first year by redeploying to the U.S. two U.S. divisions now in Europe. Mr. Stans concluded that the cost versus the benefits of various levels of strength of U.S. forces committed to Europe should be compared. Moreover, he believed the arguments presented in the State Department Discussion Paper against the “trip-wire” strategy were not particularly strong. If the arguments against the “trip-wire” strategy are not strong, are the alternative strategies worth what they cost? Referring to the assertion that the tax burden is higher in Europe, Mr. Stans pointed out that governmental expenditures of the European countries are devoted to considerable extent to “cradle to the grave” social benefits and state socialism. The U.S. devotes 60 per cent of its budget to defense as against 30 per cent for its NATO allies. Ten and one-half per cent of the U.S. GNP is devoted to defense against five per cent of the NATO countries’ GNP. Mr. Stans felt that if the Council endorsed the conclusions of the State Department Discussion Paper, such endorsement would amount to a budgetary decision which would affect the budgets for Fiscal Years 1961, 1962, and 1963. He associated himself with the points made by the Secretary of Treasury and the questions posed by Mr. Gray, and agreed with Secretary McElroy’s suggestions. Finally, Mr. Stans remarked that political and economic considerations govern the amount of money the European countries are willing to spend for defense; our defense expenditures should also be governed by political and economic considerations.

Secretary McElroy asked whether Mr. Stans’ figures meant that in order to save $4 billion or even $2-1/2 billion all our forces committed to NATO would have to be eliminated. Mr. Stans replied in the affirmative.

The President asked what effect the elimination or redeployment of troops would have on the balance-of-payments.

Secretary McElroy said the variables were so enormous that any estimate was really a guess, but in his view a reduction of three U.S. divisions committed to NATO would give us a $300 million “pick-up” in the balance-of-payments. Mr. Stans agreed with this estimate.

Secretary Anderson asked whether it would be practicable to modify our dependents policy if it were decided not to reduce U.S. forces committed to NATO.

Secretary McElroy said the dependents policy was being carefully examined, but it should be remembered that if all dependents were brought home, additional cost would be incurred because of the need for more rapid rotation of our forces. He said that if we decided to pursue MC–70 goals without change, then he would take a careful look at our dependents policy; but if redeployment were decided upon, he would wish to keep the present tour of duty in force. Mr. Stans said we had about one dependent overseas for each soldier.

The President said that despite his budgetary anxiety he did not believe that in the NATO field we could make any great move this year, and probably not next year, without losing more than we would gain. However, we must not drift. We should bring our problems to the attention of Europe bluntly and clearly, and should perhaps develop a better way of doing so. He was pleased that everyone now believes we ought to do something about our forces committed to NATO. He had been saying for a long time that something should be done, but heretofore had been unable to get anyone else interested.

Secretary Herter said the U.K. was considering our situation and desired to send a mission to the U.S. to talk to the Secretary of Defense about a more effective joint utilization of resources. The President suspected that the British want to be relieved of some of their nuclear expenses. Secretary Herter said that the British were willing to contribute more manpower to joint defense. Apropos of nuclear expenses, the President remarked that General De Gaulle wants to spend a great deal of money in order to produce an insignificant explosion in the Sahara.

Mr. Gray raised the question of the relationship of the Draper Committee recommendations to NATO.⁵ Secretary Herter said he had not covered this question in his remarks because he understood that the Council would be discussing the Mutual Security Program on November 25.

The President said the Draper Committee recommendations could be taken as a Bible if someone were able to suggest how we might reduce expenditures other than those recommended by the Draper Committee, or how we might raise taxes. He would not be a party to financing everything by the issuance of bonds. He felt that the Draper Committee had gone far beyond its charter and should have completed the job by recommending compensatory cuts in the budget.

Ambassador Burgess said that the Draper Report had suggested an increase in military assistance to Europe over actual appropriations, but no increase over the current rate of spending.

Secretary Anderson pointed out in this connection that provision of equipment to foreign countries has as much effect on the budget as the provision of money, but that the balance-of-payments effect of the provision of equipment is not as great.

Secretary McElroy said that 85 per cent of our military assistance did not affect the balance-of-payments.

The President said he would like to see prepared a combined paper indicating how we should approach the NATO countries, what our objectives should be, what we would like to emphasize and to de-emphasize. If we could formulate our own policy, we would know how to educate the Europeans.

Mr. Gray said that NSC 5915, “U.S. Policy toward Cyprus”, was on the agenda this morning, but that there would not be sufficient time to consider it, inasmuch as a Cabinet meeting was scheduled to begin in five minutes.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Discussed the subject, based upon the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State after discussion by the NSC Planning Board (transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 10, 1959), as summarized orally by Deputy Under Secretary of State Merchant; in the light of an oral report by Ambassador Burgess, and an oral summary by the Director of Central Intelligence of SNIE 100–10–59, “Special Aspects of the NATO Problem”.

b. Noted the President’s request that the Departments of State and Defense prepare for Council consideration a report analyzing and recommending U.S. policy regarding the future roles and contributions of the United States and other NATO nations with respect to the collective defense posture, as a basis for consultation with other NATO governments. The President stated that such a report should provide guidance as to the main factors that should be taken into account, and what aspects should be emphasized or de-emphasized in the future. The President also stressed the importance of recommendations which are plausible to NATO allies as well as sound from the U.S. viewpoint.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

The President decided that there would be no significant cuts in Calendar Year 1960 in the forces committed to NATO for that year, unless agreed to through negotiations.

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs. In another memorandum summarizing the highlights of this meeting, prepared on November 11, Gerard Smith wrote: “I think this discussion was the most useful NSC discussion of my experience. In returning, both Dillon and Merchant expressed great satisfaction with the outcome.” (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe 1959)
1. Regarding NSC 5906/1, see footnote 3, Document 225. Lay’s November 5 memorandum enclosing a Department of State discussion paper on “Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO” is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe 1959. For the remaining references, see footnote 1, Document 207.
2. See footnote 1 above.
3. SNIE 100–10–59, November 10, summarized below, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
4. As a result of NSC Planning Board discussion on November 6, a revised version of the November 5 Department of State discussion paper, dated November 9, was transmitted in a memorandum from the NSC Executive Secretary to the NSC, November 10. (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, NATO) According to NSC Action No. 2149 (see footnote 6 below), it was this revised version that Merchant summarized at the outset of this NSC meeting. The record of the meeting of the NSC Planning Board, November 6, merely notes the discussion of the Department of State discussion paper. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Planning Board Minutes 1959)
5. The recommendations of the Draper Committee are contained in Composite Report of the President’s Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, August 17, 1959 (Washington, 1959), vol. I, and Supplement to the Composite Report of the President’s Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, August 17, 1959 (Washington, 1959), vol. II.
6. Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2149, approved by the President on November 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Before the President approved this action, he had another meeting with McElroy and others on military and NATO matters on November 16; see Document 229.