Office of the Historian

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France0

March 22, 1959, 1:06 p.m.

3515.1. We are equally concerned with possibility extensive elucidation by De Gaulle at next week’s press conference of his views of NATO “shortcomings” and with possible suggestions for re-organization free world’s defenses which could have divisive effect, especially during this crucial period. We also fear unjust criticism would create undesirable atmosphere for NATO Tenth Anniversary Meeting.

2. We have taken series of steps counter this possibility.

(a)
After initial hesitation as result French Mediterranean fleet decision, we have suggested having tripartite talk on Africa at first opportunity, e.g., immediately after NATO Ministerial meeting. We have told French here we willing hear their views on any subject at any time and intimated this could be done in tripartite forum.
(b)
President has replied to General De Gaulle’s private letter in terms which express appreciation of French stand on Berlin.1
(c)
President’s second letter on fleet2 expresses concern at manner action taken and makes suggestions as to how we could all deal with problem in manner aimed at minimizing its possible effects. Tone is moderate and friendly.
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3. We believe following are actions which we should take in immediate future:

(a)
We hope Ambassador may be able to see De Gaulle personally before press conference despite recent talk on occasion delivery President’s first letter. Meeting should be arranged so as to permit substantive talk with General on broader subjects than merely French fleet.
(b)
It is realized it may be impossible see De Gaulle but believe attempt should be made in view of fact De Gaulle himself will make ultimate decisions as to tenor and content his news conference. Failing this, Ambassador should try to see both Couve and particularly Debre and ask them to pass on US views to De Gaulle on urgent basis.
(c)
Embassy officers, being guided by general tone and content of President’s letters but not mentioning their existence, should see selected influential French before De Gaulle press conferences. These approaches should be discreet and aimed both at Gaullists close to General and at strong supporters NATO such as Mollet, Pflimlin, and Pinay.
(d)
Now that second letter delivered, we will make same points here with French Embassy. We are not convinced however that this channel is best one to get across to French Government and specifically to General De Gaulle and Prime Minister Debre, exactly what our views are. We therefore think steps mentioned in points (a) through (c) immediately above should be taken.

4. In preparing to discuss this general subject with French we wish draw Embassy’s attention to Deptel 3321 in which we stated we should not reject out-of-hand French attempts put forward their ideas on various subjects in tripartite forum.3 We also recall Secretary’s expressed willingness during December meeting with De Gaulle to talk freely and frankly with French.4 Appears to us therefore time may have come turn this to more positive approach. We make this analysis in recognition of possibility that unilateral and public declarations by De Gaulle on matter affecting whole alliance pose greater danger than that which could be caused by their introduction into tripartite forum. We would of course prefer French to take their views on NATO to NATO itself. De Gaulle however seems disinclined do this and now appears ready air controversy publicly.

5. We are willing therefore, authorize Ambassador say to De Gaulle that French will find door open in Washington to propositions [Page 442] they may wish make. We continue believe we cannot institutionalize Washington discussions but believe they can provide forum wherein any of three parties can introduce matters of concern and importance of which other parties can take note. This is, of course, without commitment, and on certain topics our response would doubtless be that these matters should be raised with SACEUR or in other NATO forums, as appropriate. Finally, we believe private exposition French views and French concerns is wiser course to take, given possibility press and public misinterpretation on both sides of Atlantic and spirit of tripartite talks themselves.

6. Ambassador will of course wish to draw this message urgently to General Norstad’s attention.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–2259. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Brown on March 21; cleared with McBride, Turner C. Cameron of the Office of Western European Affairs, Timmons, Merchant, and Thomas J. Dunnigan of the Executive Secretariat; and approved by Murphy. In an attached memorandum to Merchant, March 21, Timmons expressed his doubts about clearing the telegram, since he felt that giving way to De Gaulle even in the limited way recommended in the telegram would only “feed his ego.” He also believed that Norstad, who had taken a strong stand that NATO command problems affecting him should first be discussed with him, would be unhappy with the telegram. (ibid.)↩
  2. Reference is to President Eisenhower’s March 14 reply to De Gaulle’s March 11 letter; see Document 203 and footnote 1 thereto and Document 204 and footnote 4 thereto, respectively.↩
  3. See Document 204.↩
  4. Regarding presentation of De Gaulle’s ideas on various subjects, telegram 3321 to Paris, March 11, reported that because De Gaulle appeared to be dissatisfied with the progress of the tripartite talks, he might create difficulties within NATO by trying to secure his objectives through NATO channels. Thus it might be better not to reject any French ideas put forward in the tripartite framework. “An indication by us that we would listen would additionally force French to spell out their thinking, outlines of which remain most murky.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–759)↩
  5. A memorandum of conversation between Dulles and De Gaulle, December 15, is not printed.(ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169)↩