Office of the Historian

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France0

March 19, 1959, 6:10 p.m.

3470. Following is text of letter from General De Gaulle re French Mediterranean fleet.1 The President has directed this be shown to General Norstad to be sure it does not create great difficulties for him. Following this consultation with Norstad2 letter should be delivered soonest to General De Gaulle. Advise date time delivery.

“March 19, 1959.

Dear General De Gaulle:

As I said in my letter to you of March fourteenth,3 I continue to attach the greatest importance to maintaining the strength of our military posture through the fullest and closest cooperation in NATO. As you are aware, I have long had a deep and natural interest in this common effort, because of my conviction that the fate of France and of Free Europe is of incalculable importance to my own country. Since assuming the office of the Presidency, I have earnestly supported the concept of the NATO ‘shield’ as an indispensable element of Western security. Because of your long association with Western military cooperation and planning, I know that you too have a particular interest in these subjects.

I believe that in NATO we have the best guarantee of mutual defense. Through it, additionally the Federal Republic of Germany has been brought into close political and military union with the West. NATO has become a flexible instrument, as is well illustrated by the growth of political consultation within its framework in recent years.

In light of these views, I believe I would be remiss if I did not inform you of the concern caused us by the letter from the French Government [Page 439] regarding the withdrawal of its Mediterranean fleet from its earmark for assignment to NATO in time of war. I do not consider the NATO structure as unalterable; it is an organism which must grow to survive. We have long sought to improve and perfect it. It was in this spirit that I asked Secretary Dulles to talk to you on this subject when he was in Paris in February and to tell you that the United States would view sympathetically a French request to NATO for greater status within NATO for the French naval forces in the Mediterranean.

I cannot hide from an old friend my fears that the action of your Government has had unfortunate psychological and political repercussions. As you said in your letter of March twelfth,4 Western solidarity in the critical Berlin and German issue is of paramount importance. I fear that the unilateral action of the French Government may give the impression of divisions within our alliance, divisions which I am convinced do not exist on fundamental issues.

It is my hope that the military command structure of NATO will always be such as to deserve support of all the member nations. Specifically, I believe that in this respect the Mediterranean fleets of the United States, United Kingdom and France should be on equal footing. For the present, the most logical status for all three would appear to be that held at present by the fleets of the United States and the United Kingdom, that is, under national control during peacetime, earmarked for NATO in the event of war. I further hope that, as we have said before, France will impart to NATO her thoughts on such arrangements. I am sure NATO would view such action with sympathy and would give the most careful consideration to France’s views. The result of such consultation in NATO would, I am sure, contribute to the strong and united posture which we all desire in this crucial period.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration and sincere friendship. Dwight D. Eisenhower”.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Timmons, McBride, and Brown and cleared with the White House.↩

  2. This letter was based on a draft that Herter sent to the President. In a memorandum to the President, March 16, attached to the draft, Herter wrote:

    “We do not propose to the General that he withdraw the communication to the Council. Our letter may serve, however, to cause him to reflect on this decision perhaps to change its emphasis so as to make it a declaration of intent rather than an ultimatum. There are some indications that French officials are trying to take this line, as the enclosed telegram suggests.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) The enclosed telegram was telegram 3360 from Paris; see footnote 4, Document 203.

    ↩
  3. Telegram 3484 from Paris, March 20, reported that the letter was “enthusiastically approved in every word” by Norstad. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/3–2059)↩
  4. See Document 203 and footnote 1 thereto.↩
  5. Regarding De Gaulle’s letter to Eisenhower, March 11 (delivered on March 12), see Part 2, Document 100.↩