Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

202. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

March 12, 1959, 8:50 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Quarles
• General Twining
• General Goodpaster
• Rear Admiral Francis J. O’Beirne
• Colonel G. W. Mason, USA
• Captain F. H. Schneider, USN
• Captain Aurand
• Colonel Littleton C. Selden
• Major Eisenhower
• QM 1C Durezzo

Colonel Selden¹ opened the briefing by a quick rundown of Army and Air Force force assignments to SACEUR. These forces, which comprise the Seventh U.S. Army and the air forces assigned to USAFE are assigned to CINCEUR and simultaneously to SACEUR in time of peace as well as in time of war.

Captain Schneider² then took the floor to brief on the subject of naval forces available to SACEUR. These forces have become a matter of considerable concern in recent weeks because of the professed intention on the part of General De Gaulle to withdraw the French fleet from NATO in time of war as well as in time of peace. Captain Schneider’s briefing may be summarized along the following lines:

(1) The command arrangements under which naval forces in the Mediterranean exist in peacetime differ from those which would be in effect in the event of a NATO war. In peacetime, U.S. forces, namely, the Sixth Fleet, will remain under the operational command of USCINCEUR and earmarked for, but not assigned to, SACEUR. In the event of a NATO war, they will become available to SACEUR. The British fleet in the Mediterranean observes the same command arrangements. The peacetime assignment of naval forces in the Mediterranean poses no particular problem.

(2) Command arrangements under wartime conditions, in which the NATO chain of command will be in effect, are considerably more complicated. In fact, there are two major headquarters, both directly subordinate to SACEUR, who command the naval forces in the Mediterranean. These commands are CINCSOUTH (commanded by a U.S. Flag Officer, and including the Sixth Fleet under the name of STRIKEFORSOUTH) and AFMED (commanded by a British Flag Officer and comprising an extensive grouping of sub-areas commanded by Flag Officers of the U.K., France, Turkey, Greece and Italy). This combined command arrangement grew out of an early divergence in view between the U.S. and Great Britain as pertains to the role of Mediterranean fleets. In the U.S. view, the Mediterranean constitutes the right flank of NATO. In the British view, the Mediterranean comprises a lifeline to the Middle East. Accordingly, CINCSOUTH and AFMED both control naval forces of different characteristics patrolling the same waters.

(3) The present status of the U.S., U.K. and French fleets has grown out of SACEUR’s terms of reference of 1955.³ This agreement specified that forces of all participating countries in the area of Allied Command Europe were to be assigned in peacetime to SACEUR. However, it included an “exclusion clause,” which specified that in peacetime the fleets of the U.S. and the U.K. should remain in their former command status, i.e. under national command. This placed the U.S. and U.K. fleets in a somewhat privileged status, responsive to national needs, whereas the French, Turkish, Greek and Italian fleets could be moved only with the approval of SACEUR. In 1956 this exclusion clause was, in effect, extended to all other fleets, but it was agreed that any nation, in case of emergency, might withdraw their forces from NATO command for national use.⁴ (For a complete treatment of this subject, see Memorandum for Record dated March 3, 1959, NATO file.⁵ This Memorandum for Record has been briefed in toto to the President.)

(4) There is much evidence to establish that the French government had misunderstood the command arrangements under which the U.S. and U.K. fleets had operated prior to their decision for unilateral withdrawal. This is indicated primarily by a French statement of January 23rd.⁶ Actually, the Sixth Fleet operates under CINCEUR, who is the same person as SACEUR. Furthermore, in the year 1958, eleven NATO exercises were conducted in which the Sixth Fleet participated under SACEUR. Finally, as has been mentioned, the exclusion clause of 1956 gave the French fleet essentially the same privileges as the British and American.

(5) Secretary Dulles, on his trip to Europe, discussed the matter of the French fleet with General De Gaulle.⁷ He expressed the U.S. determination to study the French problem sympathetically and requested De Gaulle to deal in NATO channels on this matter. In a recent conversation with General Ely, General Norstad was informed that it would not be sufficient for French purposes to place their Mediterranean fleet on the same status as that currently held by the U.S. and U.K. fleets.⁸ The French fleet must be completely responsive to national needs in peace as well as war. The seriousness of the situation lies totally in a psychological impact. Actually, the French have only seventeen ships and twenty-two patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean.

At the end of the briefing Secretary Quarles expressed the view that we have two major points in question on this whole matter. First is the distinction in wording between the status of Army and Air Force forces which are assigned to SACEUR in peace time, and the status of U.S. and U.K. fleets which are not assigned but “earmarked.” This is an important point and was spelled out in the 1955 terms of reference for SACEUR. The second point is that when General De Gaulle found out that restrictions actually did exist on the U.S. fleet, he still refused to accept such restrictions as to give him a situation parallel to ours. He withdrew his fleet entirely as a unilateral action. This leaves the outcome in doubt.

The President then remarked that our main difficulty is that the people dealing with De Gaulle in such matters were not sufficiently acquainted with his temperament. General De Gaulle is not by nature a reasonable man when he is dealing in such terms as Glory, Honor and France. In the President’s view, it was obvious that for prestige purposes it would be inadequate for De Gaulle to go on the same basis as the U.S. and the French—he would have to go further. The President added that he had been urging the Department of Defense to place our fleets on the same status as the others. However, the fat is now in the fire and we must see what can be done in the light of the existing situation.

The President voiced one slightly optimistic note which is that Macmillan, in a cable which the President had received the night before,⁹ had expressed the belief that he had made a dent in De Gaulle’s intransigent attitude.

[2 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President admitted to a special interest in the NATO command arrangement in the light of the full command which he personally had enjoyed as SACEUR. He remarked that in the discussion of these matters in 1959 [1949], Admiral Forrest Sherman¹⁰ had, at a point of particular intensity, secured an hour of recess. During this recess the then General Eisenhower had gone to President Truman and in a brief conversation had secured full command of all forces. This represented the only time in his career in which he placed a “condition” on his services, that is, said he would serve only if certain arrangements were effected.

Turning back to the matter of the French fleet, the President stated that we may be witnessing a beginning of a crumbling of NATO in this French action. He admits that we should probably not disturb the CINCEUR/SACEUR relationship for the time being, but stated that we must find a way to deal with the withdrawal of the French fleet.

Captain Schneider and Mr. Quarles expressed the view that in the event of Soviet attack, CINCEUR would probably begin the fighting on the principle of the inherent right of a commander to defend his forces. Mr. Quarles also took note of the erosive effect of the agreement of 1956 which gave each nation authority unilaterally to withdraw its fleets for “emergency use.” The President agreed.

This ended the informational briefing.

John S. D. Eisenhower

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John S.D. Eisenhower on March 12 and initialed by Goodpaster.
1. Not further identified.
2. Assistant Head, National Command Matters, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. Reference is presumably to the NAC resolution (C–M (55)82) adopted on October 5, 1955; see Document 192.
4. This 1956 agreement has not been further identified.
5. Document 192.
6. Not further identified.
7. See Part 2, Document 95.
8. An undated memorandum from Norstad to Twining summarized the former’s conversation with Ely on March 5. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NATO)
9. Not found.
10. Chief of Naval Operations, 1949–1951.