Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

192. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Assistant Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)⁰

March 3, 1959.

REFERENCES

• Memorandum 1/23/59 from the Secretary of State to the President in regard to Commitment of French Forces to NATO and the President’s response 1/26/59¹

1. At 9:30 AM on the above date, I visited Colonel William B. Rosson (Army member, Chairman’s Staff Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff). Also present were Colonel Edward H. Nigro, USAF, Captain James W. O’Grady, USN, and Major John J. Hennessey, USA.

2. The purpose of this visit was to clarify the NATO command arrangements with respect to peacetime assignment of forces to SACEUR.

3. NATO Command Arrangements in the Mediterranean

In time of peace, U.S. and U.K. naval forces remain technically under national command, except during training exercises when they may be placed under SACEUR’s operational command. The Sixth Fleet becomes available to SACEUR between D-Day and D+2. Its title becomes STRIKEFORSOUTH, and at this time it comes under the operational command of CINCSOUTH, a subordinate commander under SACEUR. U.K. naval forces become available to SACEUR over a thirty-day period, from D-Day to D+30, while almost all of the French naval forces are planned to become available on D+2.

The actual command arrangements are somewhat complicated. Naval forces in the Mediterranean actually come under two major headquarters, CINCSOUTH, as mentioned above, and AFMED, both of which report to SACEUR. STRIKEFORSOUTH, the purely U.S. command comprising the Sixth Fleet, is under CINCSOUTH and constitutes his only naval component. AFMED, commanded by a British Flag Officer, is primarily responsible for maintenance of Mediterranean LOC’s, and is composed of naval forces of the U.K., France, Italy, Greece and the U.S. (a few submarines and naval aircraft).

4. Status of the French Fleet

The status of the French Fleet has come to the fore because of the impending threat of withdrawal by General De Gaulle. Essentially, De Gaulle’s allegations that the French Fleet does not enjoy the same freedom as the others is unfounded. There is, however, a technicality which he is able to play upon.

In October of 1954, a nine-power conference made extensive revisions in the NATO setup. One of these revisions was the arrangement to include Germany in NATO. One of the other revisions had to do with assignment of forces to SACEUR. Significant to the question of assignment of forces to SACEUR are the following:

(1) “All forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under SACEUR, with the exception of those which NATO has recognized or will recognize as suitable to remain under national command.

(2) “The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the National Authorities concerned.

(3) “Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his (SACEUR’s) consent, subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.”

The wording in (1) above was revised significantly in the North Atlantic Council’s resolution to implement the nine-power actions. Instead of the words “on the Continent of Europe,” the implementation resolution utilized “in the area of Allied Command Europe.” It went on to specify that this includes forces in the Mediterranean as well as on the Continent, but further stated that the change does not “alter the present status of U.S. and U.K. forces in the Mediterranean.”

SACEUR’s Revised Terms of Reference are derived from this Council Resolution, and they do, in fact, place peacetime restrictions on French, Italian and Greek forces in the Mediterranean which are not placed on U.S. and U.K. forces. As a result of these restrictions, the French must obtain SACEUR’s consent to locate, redeploy or use her forces operationally within the Mediterranean.

The provisions of the terms of reference and their implementation above have been largely nullified by a resolution subsequently adopted by the North Atlantic Council. This resolution, adopted on October 5, 1955,² provides that if a government feels compelled to withdraw units which are committed to NATO to meet an emergency elsewhere, “it shall at once inform the appropriate NATO military authorities, and the Council, at the first opportunity.” In effect, this provision gives each nation license to withdraw units which have been committed to NATO at their own volition without the concurrence of SACEUR, provided that the country involved considers it an emergency. It is noteworthy that the emergency is determined by the country involved and not by SACEUR. For all practical purposes, this provision puts all NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean on a co-equal basis. As a matter of practice, the U.S. informs SACEUR of any intended movement of U.S. forces committed to his command.

In the light of this 1955 resolution, it becomes obvious that: (1) For all practical purposes the French Fleet under existing arrangements is as responsive to national control as are the Fleets of the U.S. and U.K. Accordingly, General De Gaulle, as a matter of French national pride, is belaboring a technicality when he claims the French Fleet does not have adequate freedom. (2) If U.S. naval forces were assigned to SACEUR in peacetime, they could still be legally withdrawn without undue difficulty to perform unilateral U.S. missions. The psychological impact on NATO of such an action under these conditions and the advisability of altering this arrangement is another matter.

John S.D. Eisenhower

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Top Secret.
1. Documents 187 and 188.
2. Not found.