Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

790.00/9–2854

No. 805
Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Japan¹

secret

[Tokyo,] September 20, 1954.

Participants:

• Japanese Foreign Office:
• Mr. R. Takeuchi
• Mr. Nakagawa²
• Mr. Yukawa³
• Mr. H. Takeuchi⁴
• American Embassy:
• Mr. Parsons
• Mr. Morgan
• Mr. Kerr
• Mr. Diehl
• Mr. Leonhart

This was one of the meetings held alternately every three weeks from 5 to 7 at the Imperial Hotel and the Parsons house and attended by Bureau Directors and senior Embassy officers. There was an atmosphere of greater friendliness, frankness, and congeniality than at previous meetings, with Mr. R. Takeuchi apparently making a particular effort to be affable. The conversation ranged over a wide variety of subjects of which the following were discussed at greatest length:

1. The political problem of Mr. Yoshida. Internal politics as a theme was chosen by the Japanese, presumably by pre-arrangement. Mr. Takeuchi said that it was extremely difficult even for well-informed Japanese to assess recent domestic political developments. The significance of the Hatoyama–Shigemitsu statement is being variously interpreted. He illustrated the point further by describing his recent conversations with three highly placed Japanese, one of whom interpreted the recent trend as indicating that Mr. Yoshida would be forced out of office before the end of the year; the other as indicating the probable retention of power by Mr. Yoshida beyond the first of the year. The third said that he didn’t know what to expect. To Mr. Takeuchi the significant item was that none of the three even mentioned the possibility of Diet dissolution and an election.

Mr. Takeuchi then launched into a long history of the Surrender Cabinet and the role which he and Mr. Okazaki played in the Central Liaison Office. He implied that he at that time was a Shigemitsu man. Throughout this conversation it seemed that Takeuchi wished to convey the information that he still regards himself as somewhat detached from the Yoshida regime whereas, so he said, Okazaki was now too closely identified with Yoshida. The freedom with which he spoke of this in front of the others, added to Mr. Nakagawa’s aside to Mr. Morgan that it really didn’t matter from a U.S. point of view whether Mr. Yoshida retained power or yielded to Mr. Hatoyama or Mr. Ogata, gave the impression that the prevailing view in the Foreign Office might be similar to that of Mr. Takeuchi.

Mr. Takeuchi noted, almost with an air of approval, that the U.S. had not given any presents to Mr. Yoshida this time, at which point the conversation turned to the significance of the Department’s statement of April 1953 which, one of the American officers ventured, had perhaps not had any real influence on the outcome of the election except perhaps to cause resentment because of the apparent intervention. Mr. Takeuchi disagreed, saying that the statement was taken by the Japanese people as a very clear indication that the U.S. was backing Mr. Yoshida and many then voted for him because of that backing. It seemed significant that in discussing the lack of presents for Mr. Yoshida, no mention was made of the imminent establishment of a USOM in Japan or of the suggested top-level committee on MDA about which Mr. Shimoda⁵ had approached Mr. Bassin⁶ on the previous day.

Mr. Takeuchi said there were many rumors of difficulty at the time of the Prime Minister’s departure on Sunday,⁷ which could include the possibility of labor picket lines attempting to prevent the Prime Minister from reaching the airport and also American and other diplomats from seeing him off. Mr. Parsons’ remark that all the United States was interested in was keeping the gates open was not picked up. The further suggestions that it might be well for the Prime Minister to proceed to the airport by helicopter, landing in the middle of the field, or that he leave from Atsugi, were received with surprising good humor by the Japanese. Mr. Takeuchi said he thought he would get off on schedule, that he really must do so and that it had to be from Haneda.

It seemed to be the consensus of the Japanese side that Mr. Yoshida’s visit to the U.S. would be of a ceremonial character only and there was little expectation that anything of major importance would be accomplished.

[Here follows discussion of the United States elections, Japanese reparations, GARIOA, Japanese productivity, and the question of contamination of the Japanese tuna catch by atomic radiation.]

1. Attached to a letter from Parsons to McClurkin, which reads:

   “I enclose a self-explanatory memo of a conversation with Foreign Office Bureau Directors on September 20. You will note that Mr. Takeuchi made it a point to be particularly friendly whereas on Friday the 24th in a formal session with other Japanese Government agencies and our military people present, he accused the United States of premeditated bad faith.

   “The memo is misleading at the very end of Section I or perhaps, better, the Japanese were misleading in implying that Yoshida’s visit would be of a ceremonial character only. Evidence is accumulating indicating concerted and serious efforts to garner ‘presents’.”

   Concerning the incident of Sept. 24, see the enclosure to Document 809.

2. Perhaps Toru Nakagawa, Director of the Asia Bureau of the Deliberation Office.
3. Morio Yukawa, Director of the International Cooperation Bureau.
4. Harumi Takeuchi, Chief of the First Section in the Bureau of European and American Affairs.
5. Perhaps Takezo Shimoda, Director of the Treaty Bureau in the Foreign Ministry.
6. Jules Bassin, Legal Attache at the Embassy.
7. Sept. 26. The Prime Minister stopped first in Canada and then sailed for Europe from New York on Sept. 29. On Nov. 2 he arrived back in New York to begin his official visit to the United States.