794.5 MSP/10–154
No. 809
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan
(Parsons) to
the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
(McClurkin)
confidential
official–informal
Tokyo, October 1, 1954.
Dear Bob: The enclosed memorandum is self-explanatory.
It was drafted by Andy Kerr who was chairman on the
United States side at the meeting in question. Also present for the
Embassy were Duke Diehl and Van
Swearingen.1 Admiral Smith
(J–4) represented the Headquarters, and Brigadier General
Moore represented MAAG.
Andy and Duke reported this
incident immediately, of course, to me and the Ambassador. While the
Ambassador was still considering what action to take—for example, a
stiff representation to Mr. Okazaki—Takeuchi
paid an official call on the Ambassador to present an expression of
regret over the Toya Maru disaster.2 The Ambassador decided to take
this opportunity to read the riot act to Takeuchi. I will not attempt to summarize at secondhand
the
[Page 1736]
points made by the
Ambassador in expressing his views of this extraordinary variety of
“diplomacy”, except for the following reference to the Toya Maru disaster. The Ambassador informed Takeuchi that American newsmen in Tokyo
had proposed to him that, following the precedent established by the
Japanese Government in the Fukuryu Maru case, the
United States Government should demand compensation, and he pointed to
the respects in which the two incidents were parallel: The Toya Maru disaster was apparently due to neglect
on the part of the Japanese Government, and approximately 56 American
lives were lost, although there was no question in either case of ill
intent. The Ambassador added, of course, that he had no thought then of
taking this position publicly.
The interview lasted almost an hour, and the Ambassador reports that
Takeuchi’s response left
nothing to be desired. Takeuchi
indicated, for example, that he had promptly retracted his accusation of
bad faith when challenged by Andy Kerr. He
protested his friendship for the United States and pointed to the fact
that he had taken the initiative in setting up a series of bimonthly
off-the-record meetings between Bureau Chiefs in the Foreign Office and
senior Embassy personnel for frank, cordial, and off-the-record
discussions.
The Ambassador has decided to let the matter rest, at least until a
similar transgression is repeated. Distribution of the enclosed five
copies of the memorandum is left to your discretion.
Because various other Japanese agencies—Finance, MITI, Defense, etc.—were represented at this official
meeting, we have decided that Andy should make a
statement at the next meeting of the group that is calculated to serve
notice to these other Japanese Government agencies that such tactics are
neither advisable nor condoned. It is possible that Takeuchi himself may say something in
the spirit of retraction, and if so, Andy will
tailor his statement accordingly.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 1737]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First
Secretary of the Embassy in Japan
(Kerr)
confidential
[Tokyo,] September 26, 1954.
At a regular meeting of the US-Japan Consultative Group on September
24,3 Mr. Takeuchi unexpectedly raised again
the question of utilization of the $40 million of yen proceeds
arising from sales of wheat and barley under Section 550 of the
Mutual Security Act. He repeated the proposition that the JG had been given firm assurance during
the negotiations that offshore procurement in Japan during USFY 1954
would total $100 million so that payments would amount to $60
million in dollars and $40 million in yen whereas only $70 million
worth of contracts had been placed. He indicated that these Section
550 purchases would not have been acceptable to Japan if it had been
known that offshore procurement would total only $70 million.
I explained again that the estimate of $100 million was not a
commitment but only a target, that in fact it is impossible to make
a firm commitment concerning the volume of offshore procurement
because of various factors. On the US side, for example, after
appropriations are made, there is need for provisional division of
the total procurement program between Stateside and offshore,
provisional division of the worldwide offshore procurement program
on a country-by-country and item-by-item basis, determination of a
pricing policy for procurement in Japan, and issuance of purchase
authorizations to US procurement agencies in Japan. By the time such
US actions have been completed, the US fiscal year is well advanced
and the actual volume of contracts that can be placed in Japan
during the time that remains depends upon such factors as price,
quality and delivery dates. Thus, failure to achieve the target
figure of $100 million in USFY 1954 was due in part to factors on
the US side causing delay and in part to factors on the Japanese
side (notably price) which prevented placement of contracts after
purchase authorizations were finally received.
Mr. Takeuchi stated that he was
thoroughly familiar with this explanation, having listened to it to
the point of weariness. He then proceeded to accuse the US of bad
faith by advancing the fantastic charge that the. US had never
intended to achieve the $100 million target for offshore procurement
in Japan. He stated that the US must have known by the time of
signing the surplus-purchase
[Page 1738]
agreement (March 8) that achievement of this
target would not be possible. He said he realized that the US had
not committed itself in legal terms to achieve this target, that in
fact “US negotiators are very clever in devising legal language that
permits escape from what is regarded by the naive Japanese
negotiators as a binding commitment.”
Referring to the Robertson–Ikeda talks in Washington in the fall of 1953, Mr.
Takeuchi expressed
confidence in his knowledge of the English language and stated that
there could not be the slightest doubt that the $100 million
“Commitment” had also been made at that time. He expressed the
opinion that, during these talks as well as during subsequent
negotiations concerning the $50 million purchase of US surplus
agricultural commodities, the naive Japanese negotiators had been
taken in by the Americans who are adept at sharp practices which
enable them to advance apparent commitments which they have no
intention of keeping. He expressed regret that he had not been
permitted to participate in these talks (except as an observer),
implying that he would not have been so easily fooled.
He implied that, in all future negotiations with the US, it behooved
the Japanese side to be on guard and take care to leave no loopholes
in any agreement because the good faith of the US cannot be taken
for granted. In effect, he served notice to the US officials present
that they would find him much less easy to hoodwink than the
Japanese negotiators during the Robertson–Ikeda talks in Washington or the Japanese
negotiators of the $50 million surplus-purchase agreement.
The US representatives at the meeting were officials of the Embassy
and of the Far East Command who are charged with responsibility for
seeking to maximize the volume of US contracts placed in Japan in
order to strengthen the Japanese economy in general and to expand
Japan’s defense production industries in particular. It is hardly
necessary to point out that it is primarily Japan’s interest that is
served by placement of these contracts. Mr. Takeuchi’s tactics were hardly
calculated to encourage the US in its efforts to maximize the volume
of offshore procurement in Japan.
The US officials present were shocked by Mr. Takeuchi’s fantastic charges against
the US as well as by the nasty manner in which he presented these
charges. Throughout his outburst, Mr. Takeuchi exhibited obvious hostility to the US. Such
tactics are least expected from a high-ranking diplomatic official
who is charged with conduct of US affairs.
