794.5/9–2854
No. 806
The Chief of Staff Far East Command
(Magruder) to the Deputy Chief
of Mission in Japan (Parsons)
secret
[Tokyo,] 24 September 1954.
My Dear Mr. Parsons: With respect to our conversation on the Embassy study to be prepared1 in accordance with the memorandum for the Secretary prepared by the Embassy and dated September 9, 1954, I have asked Major General Elmer J. Rogers, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, to assist whomever you designate to prepare the study.
[Page 1732]I have set forth below the additional views I hold that are most in disagreement with the Embassy memorandum:
- 1.
- The effect of enemy atomic attack is over-stated.
- 2.
- No government can be strong which is not prepared to defend itself. The degree with which the Japanese on Hokkaido cooperate with the Russians is an indication of the degree to which all Japan would probably cooperate with Russia if U.S. forces were withdrawn and Japanese forces were not prepared to defend the country.
- 3.
- The conception of making Japan rich before we make her militarily strong would only weaken the moral fiber of her people and delay indefinitely Japan’s achieving the ability to defend her own interests.
- 4.
- Making Japan rich before we make her militarily strong would make her a more desirable prize to the Russians.
- 5.
- General Hull has considered the withdrawal of U.S. forces before Japan is fully able to defend itself only as a measure to in fluence Japan to rearm, never with “an acquiescence in the military impotence or neutralization of Japan”.
- 6.
- If we cannot inculcate in Japan a spirit, such as now motivates Germany to rise from defeat into a position of power and leadership, then Japan should be protected from Russian capture by U.S. troops but it would be a waste of money to invest in Japan more funds than those essential for the prevention of disease in epidemic proportions and the prevention of unrest that would threaten the security of our own garrison.
- 7.
- Before we accept a defeatist approach, I feel we should endeavor in every way to kindle in Japan a more aggressive spirit such as, for example: by urging the Japanese Government to establish itself more strongly with respect to Japan itself, by actively seeking the replacement of the present Japanese Government if it is unable to take a stronger grasp on Japan’s affairs; by discontinuing economic aid so that Japan has to struggle for her livelihood and therefore feel the need of military power in supporting her commercial ventures such as fishing in the waters off the Kurile Islands and Korea; by urging Japan again to seek a position of leadership in Northeast Asia; by seeking to arrange a Northeast Asia pact in which Japan would be the leader and even by indicating that the United States would view favorably the re-establishment of the Japanese Empire under a moderate Japanese Government.
Sincerely,
Carter B.
Magruder
Lieutenant General, General Staff
- See Document 818.↩