Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 723
Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 23, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, December 23, 1953

[Extracts]

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board (for Items 7 and 8); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (for Items 7 and 8); the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (all for Items 7 and 8). Also present for Items 7 and 8 were the following members of the NSC Planning Board: Robert R. Bowie, State; Frank C. Nash, Defense; Gen. Porter, FOA; W.Y. Elliott, ODM; Elbert P. Tuttle, Treasury; Col. Hugh Cort, JCS; Robert Amory, Jr., CIA; George A. Morgan, OCB; and Paul L. Morrison, Budget. Philip H. Watts, Department of State; Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Department of Defense; and Christian Herter, Jr., of The Vice President’s Office, were also attending the meeting for Items 7 and 8. Also present were the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Arthur Minnich, Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Ina Holtzscheiter, NSC Staff (for Items 7 and 8).

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

5. U.S. Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands (NSC 125/6,² para. 4; NSC Actions Nos. 824³ and 965;⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “The Japanese Treaty Islands”, dated June 15, 1953)⁵

In response to a question from Mr. Cutler, Secretary Dulles stated that he was not yet prepared to present the report requested by the National Security Council on the civil administration in the Ryukyu Islands, but that he would perhaps be ready to give his views at the next meeting.⁶

Secretary Dulles then turned to Secretary Wilson and asked him whether he wished to go ahead with the announcement of the return of the Amami group of islands. Secretary Wilson replied in the affirmative, unless Secretary Dulles’ forthcoming report on the civil administration of the Ryukyus made it desirable to postpone the announcement. In any case, Secretary Wilson added, he liked Secretary Dulles’ proposed draft of the announcement.⁷

Secretary Dulles warned the members of the Council that when we announced that we were going to continue for an indefinite period our control of all the Ryukyu Islands except the Amami group, we could expect a very unpleasant reaction, not only from Japan but in the UN as well. While Secretary Dulles said that he was very much inclined to defer to the views of the Defense Department as to the necessity, from a security point of view, of retaining U.S. control of these islands, it would nevertheless make more difficult relations between the United States and Japan. The effect of such bad relations might go far to offset the military advantages we would gain from the military rights we retained in Okinawa, for instance.

The President noted the very strong feeling in Japan for the removal of our forces stationed there, and wondered whether it would not be best not to emphasize in the announcement our intention of holding on to all the Ryukyu Islands except the Amamis indefinitely.

Secretary Dulles said that he would like to hear the Vice President’s views on this issue, since he had recently been in Japan.

The Vice President replied that he had little new to add to the Council’s information. While at Okinawa he had chiefly heard the familiar military viewpoint, namely, that the United States would soon have to remove its forces from Japan proper, and accordingly it was vital to retain our hold on Okinawa. However, the Vice President added, he found himself compelled to agree with what the Secretary of State had said as to the difficulties which this decision would involve us in, not only with respect to Japan, but to many other parts of Asia. A major weapon of the Communist campaign against us throughout Asia was the charge that we supported colonialism. If we continue to stay in Okinawa we must expect the Communists to agitate on this theme. Nor would the agitation be confined only to the Communists. Nehru and the Asian Nationalists would also make use of it. Accordingly, said the Vice President, if we propose to persist in our decision to stay in the Ryukyus, we should begin now to develop some sort of face-saving legalistic device, such as double citizenship, lease or something else, which would sugar-coat the pill for the Japanese.

The President suggested that we not lose sight of the fact that the Russians are in the Kuriles and lots of other places where they don’t belong. We should not neglect to use this fact. It was a good argument.

Governor Stassen stated his own belief that if our military situation in the Far East deteriorates seriously, it is going to be a much more difficult problem than that of meeting charges of colonialism. After all, the Orient, said Governor Stassen, respects strength.

Furthermore, said the President, it seemed to him that there was very little we could do to win Nehru over to an understanding of our position. Did the Vice President agree? The Vice President answered in the affirmative, but noted the success of Soviet propagandists in pinning the colonial-imperialist label on the United States while avoiding it themselves.

Secretary Dulles then asked if he could read to the Council the proposed text of the announcement on the retention of the Ryukyus. After he had read the announcement, the President inquired whether it would not be more persuasive if we would stress why we have decided to remain in some of these islands, but that as soon as our objectives and those of the free world have been assured, we would get out.

After further discussion of the problem, Secretary Dulles noted that it would be necessary to issue this statement within a very few days. While this did not exclude the possibility of thinking about other arrangements which could be worked out in the future, it seemed, on balance, best to issue the proposed announcement at once.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would report the results of their further study of the subject pursuant to NSC Action No. 965, at the next Council meeting on December 30, 1953.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the issuance by the Secretary of State of an announcement dealing with the return of the Amami Islands to Japan, and the retention of U.S. control over all the other islands mentioned in Article III of the Peace Treaty with Japan, pursuant to NSC 125/6.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on Dec. 24.
2. Document 657.
3. For NSC Action No. 824, see footnote 10, Document 655.
4. This action, taken at the 171st meeting of the NSC held on November 19, reads: “[The National Security Council:] Deferred action on a draft directive on the subject [of U.S. civil administration in the Ryukyu Islands] prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, pending further study by the Secretaries of State and Defense and report back to the Council before the end of December.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95) The draft directive mentioned is apparently that dated Nov. 9. (Attachment to memorandum from Robertson to the Secretary, Nov. 16, 794C.0221/11–1653) The memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting held on Nov. 19 does not indicate any discussion of the draft directive prior to the taking of NSC Action No. 965. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)
5. Document 651.
6. See footnote 2, Document 730.
7. A draft text of the announcement, attached to a memorandum dated Dec. 23 from Drumright to the Secretary, is identical to the announcement as issued by the Secretary at 10 a.m. on Dec. 24. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 17.
8. Lettered paragraphs a. and b. constitute NSC Action No. 992. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)