Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5 MSP/12–953: Telegram

No. 722
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

secret
priority

Washington, December 22, 1953—7:25 p.m.

1502. State–Defense–FOA Message. Your 1415² and 1433.³

1. Agree your general analysis and plan for negotiations.

2. Believe task now is obtain best agreement possible in short time. Subject to comments this message you and CINCFE authorized pursue negotiation to conclusion. Your joint conclusions on best program which is negotiable should be submitted here for final approval. If serves your purpose at any point you may tell Japanese your instructions do not permit going below certain levels. Will avoid any independent statement here of U.S. position but keep us fully informed by telegram.

3. Following specific comments:

(a) Believe may be desirable concentrate negotiation on JFY54 goals in effort obtain firm agreement, establishing 55 goals tentatively only.

(b) Unable evaluate on information here significance Japanese proposals employ 10,000 civilians. Swelling force totals by merely counting clerks who would be required in any case of course not acceptable but if reasonable possibility adequately discharging military functions through civilian personnel would not rule out some compromise this area. Matter for expert judgment on basis detailed analysis.

(c) Noted that your budget estimate re ground force JFY54 lower than Japanese estimate. As we understand initial cost of 1 million yen per man full amount this cost incurred even if man inducted last day of year. If Japanese figures correct 30,000 man increment would therefore cost 30 billion not 15. Our interpretation that maintenance costs new forces would be additional. Assuming even phasing 30,000 new men, this would add about 5 billion yen more. Therefore your cost estimate appears approximately 20 billion yen below Japanese estimate for equivalent forces.

(d) From talks here with Ikeda believe best discuss Japanese financial contribution in relation to analysis actual cost particular forces under consideration. If cost in judgment U.S. side below Japanese financial capacity, this can be used as one argument supporting effort get Japanese raise sights. See some merit Ikeda’s argument here that cost should be examined from standpoint expenditures as distinguished appropriations since we are interested results and actual impact on economy. In view probable carry over expenditures may be somewhat higher than appropriation and this approach may assist Congressional justifications. We told Ikeda budgetary contribution of about 200 billion yen would be necessary for justification aid to U.S. Congress. Our thought was could probably accept 180 billion expenditure for JFY54 if other elements defense arrangements generally satisfactory.

(e) Not now in position discuss specific end-items to be supplied by U.S. You may reiterate general statements made Ikeda. (See paragraph 2(i) U.S. memorandum dated October 21.)⁴

(f) JCS will communicate to CINCFE further detailed Defense views.⁵

Dulles

1. Drafted and approved for transmission in NA; cleared with S/MSA, FE, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Department of Defense.
2. Document 719.
3. In this telegram dated Dec. 9, the Embassy added certain details to the program outlined in telegram 1415. (794.5/12–953)
4. This memorandum is summarized in telegram 958 to Tokyo, Document 706. In it, numbered paragraphs 1–3 summarize paragraph 2(i) of the memorandum.
5. In telegram 1582 from Tokyo, Dec. 24, Ambassador Allison stated that after consultation with General Hull he was giving to Ikeda and Okazaki a memorandum recommending Japanese force goals for JFYs 1954 and 1955 along the lines given in paragraph 9 of telegram 1415, indicating that the United States desired Japan to spend or obligate in JFY 1954 at least 200 billion yen including carryovers and defense support, and “emphasizing urgent importance Japan prepare program for defense industrial development.” (794.5 MSP/12–2453)