Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5 MSP/12–753: Telegram

No. 719
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Tokyo, December 7, 1953—7 p.m.

1415. I recommend following US position for Tokyo negotiations on Japan’s defense program. General Hull concurs.

1. Talks with Ikeda Washington and here and discussions with NSA officials suggest Japanese presently plan propose at resumed talks (a) ground force of 180,000 by April 1957 with increase of 30,000 (including 10,000 civilians) during JFY 1954 and 20,000 in JFY 1955, (b) navy of 150,000 tons in five years with 30,000 ton increase JFY 1954, (c) establishment of air force with 1,500 planes in five years with 150 light planes as starter next year (Japanese plan tentatively includes army aviation types), and (d) NSA budget of 144–149 billions in JFY 1954 compared with current years 123.4 billions. 144–149 figure in (d) will break down into 87–92 billions for Japanese defense forces compared with present appropriation of 61.4 billions of which 5 billions to be obtained by reduction in contribution to US forces from 62 to 57 billions.

2. Japanese position formulated with full knowledge Washington views and apparent understanding probable extent US assistance available. It is unlikely Japanese can be persuaded deviate substantially from foregoing program.

3. In secret talk with Ikeda November 27, he told me Japanese program which he did not reveal, now fairly firm and under consideration by Finance Ministry in anticipation budget decisions about December 25. He said it would be held close and expressed concern lest it be substantially less than US absolute minimum in which case long negotiation would be necessary.

4. In my view long delay in arriving at US minimum position for long negotiation should be avoided because the respective US-Japanese program, real or fancied, would be bandied about in press and Diet; propensity to support lower figure would be built up in public mind; whatever was eventually agreed on would inevitably give rise to charges of American pressures; Government would again be under attack for secret diplomacy and subservience US; and next forward step would start out under cloud because program adopted would appear to be US rather than Japanese product. Ikeda himself foresaw this possible sequence of events and stressed importance from standpoint of interests both countries that we must find some way to avoid it.

5. Because of these considerations I promised Ikeda I would try to supply in not more than two weeks time those initial yearly increases in forces which the US considers the minimum required as effective steps toward reasonable force goals for Japan. In return he promised not to let Japanese position be frozen in meantime.

6. In view long talks with Ikeda in Washington, no useful purpose would be served in going over same ground. We should now put in figures which may not satisfy us but represent the most, especially on ground forces and budget, that Government and conservative forces in this country can attempt. In formulating our position we compelled face Japanese realities, particularly constitutional problem, unreadiness of large part of public opinion, and vulnerability of conservative forces to leftist attack if build-up too rapid, at this time. Moreover, we cannot ignore widespread fear here, shared by Yoshida himself, of return of military clique if build-up too rapid, and impact on budget of irresistible demands for relief from this year’s great flood damage and crop failure which will require heavy expenditures next fiscal year.

7. While we should maintain that US considers ground force of at least 300,000 is minimum adequate for Japan’s defense, do not think it desirable or practicable seek present commitment to this figure. Any insistence on commitment this time that Japan should have ground force this size would not only fly in face of Japanese realities outlined paragraph 6 above but would obstruct maturing efforts towards conservative cooperation and unification. With Yoshida–Shigemitsu agreement on defense and return Hatoyama and most of his followers to Liberal Party real progress has been made in this direction. Efforts to win over progressives to unified party of all conservative forces expected to bear fruit early spring. This obviously in US interest for it would provide firmly based government that could then move forward more swiftly on all fronts including adoption realistic defense policy.

8. Reason I am certain such commitment would block this most desirable development and that Japanese Government would never agree now to US ground force goal is that public opinion would be alarmed by such figure and enable left opposition to capitalize on public fears. Government as well as opposition conservatives, whom Liberal Party now wooing, would regard such commitment as serious political liability which might well tip the scales against conservatives should there be early election. It would be unfortunate if we obtained such a commitment only to have a united conservative party publicly repudiate it for electoral reasons. Finally, if we obtained secret commitment, we must bear in mind secrets are not kept in Tokyo and secret agreement would not be binding on any new government. For all these reasons I believe we should at this time concentrate on immediate objective of getting initial build-up started at once. Japanese are finding first steps hardest; once they are taken road will become easier.

9. In view these considerations which I put to General Hull, he and I agree we should take the following positions:

A. Ground forces:

(1) In JFY 53 and JFY 54 add 50,000 soldiers, and in JFY 55 add 50,000 more to reach 210,000 by April 56. (Japanese favor 170,000 plus 10,000 civilians by April 57.)

(2) As alternative US could accept an increase of 30,000 in JFY 54 and 40,000 in JFY 55 to reach 180,000 (excluding civilians) by April 56 in exchange for following Japanese Government commitments:

(a) Agreement to enter into effective combined planning for defense of Japan including appropriate arrangements for exercise of US command in emergency, and

(b) Development of adequate basis for immediate expansion of ground forces through the medium of an active reserve system.

B. Naval forces:

(1) In JFY 53 and JFY 54 add to existing forces from US and Japan sources eight destroyer types, five destroyer escort types, three submarine chasers, two submarines, two supply mother ships, one small minelayer, seven mine sweepers, four mine sweeping boats, one naval aircraft squadron and 4400 tons miscellaneous craft.

(2) In JFY 55 add 1 escort flagship, 6 destroyer types, 10 destroyer escort types, 22 submarine chasers, 1 mother supply ship, 1 mine layer ship, 2 squadron naval aircraft, and 18 other vessels.

C. Air Force:

(1) In JFY 53 create a third staff (Air Force headquarters) and in JFY 54 establish technical training, primary, basic and advanced flying schools, to include 200 training aircraft.

(2) In JFY 55 add 125 training aircraft, 4 fighter-interceptor squadrons (UE 25 aircraft), 1 tactical reconnaissance squadron (UE 18 aircraft), and radar surveillance equipment.

D. Variations in force strengths or goals from the foregoing on an equivalent basis would be acceptable.

E. Japanese to be made to understand that above represents minimum effective phasing from US viewpoint and does not reduce ultimate requirements for defense of Japan.

10. Budget:

A. Embassy estimates 30,000 man increase ground force in JFY 54 would mean at least 48 billion yen for ground force (33 billion for maintenance of present 110,000 man force and 15 billion for increment). Large increment would cost correspondingly more.

B. On basis NSA plan given Embassy September 25 and Ikeda program given Department October 13 (Department telegram 892),¹ Japan appears prepared spend between 23.9 and 27.7 billions in JFY 54 on air and navy. Because we think political opposition to more rapid ground force build-up may limit what we can get in JFY 54 to maximum of 30,000 men, we think we should press for higher sea-air budget of at least 30 billion yen. To implement sea and air program in paragraph 9B and C would require exact determination of costs and of sharing of these costs as agreed between US and Japan. Embassy hopes proposed Japanese appropriation of 30 billion plus drawing on reserve of 15 billion (see 10C below) as necessary will be adequate to finance Japan’s share of costs.

C. We should also seek to commit Japanese to 15 billions to finance any increment ground force over 30,000 men, to constitute obligational authority for wide range of necessary supporting facilities, and as reserve on which we can call to finance projects we will try to persuade them to undertake during course JFY 54.

D. Adding 62 billions as continuing contribution support US forces to foregoing (48 billions for ground, 30 for sea-air, and 15 for reserve) would give total defense budget of 155 billions or 31.6 billions over JFY 53 budget.

E. In view limited Japanese performance contemplated by this program we should not offer remission of Japanese contribution support US forces JFY 54. We should, however, reserve our position for bargaining purposes and be prepared make some concession in order obtain maximum Japanese defense effort.

11. Treasury Attaché² concurs all foregoing. Request comments of State, Defense and FOA with view to immediate commencement negotiations in Tokyo.

Allison

1. Document 701.
2. William W. Diehl.