Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

033.9411/10–1453: Telegram

No. 701
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan

secret

Washington, October 14, 1953—6:15 p.m.

892. No meeting held October 13. Fourth meeting today on internal economic questions.¹ Further discussion defense October 15.

Following is summary Ikeda’s personal study Japan’s defense program, reflecting general up-to-date thinking Japanese Government but not official or final, presented Robertson October 13.

Goals (1) land forces—in three years 180,000 constituting 10 divisions and two artillery and tank groups; (2) Naval—210 vessels (156,550 tons) in 5 years including 103 patrol boats, 74 escort vessels (26 DDEs and 48 DEs) and 31 minesweepers. Personnel 31,300; (3) Air—518 aircraft in 5 years consisting two wings jet fighter-bombers (150 F84 Gs), one wing jet all weather fighters (36 all weather F94Cs) plus some 300 trainers. Personnel 7,600; (4) Air base forces—air control and warning groups and one air base supply wing in five years. Personnel 13,000; (5) Cost—901.1 billion yen. Japanese share 621.1 billion yen, balance US.

Explanation. (1) Land forces—Reduce division slice from 27,500. 18,000 proper level. Eliminate unnecessary overhead, bulk, supply, maintenance, medical group and cut by 1/3 small arms groups. Maintenance by civilian industries. Propose reorganize 110,000 into 5 divisions each consisting 12,000 combat personnel. 180,000 will constitute 10 divisions plus 2 groups artillery, tanks and miscellaneous rear groups. Expenditures foregoing 482.7 billion yen to be expended by end March 1957. Japanese cost 345.5 billion yen; US 137.2 billion yen. In JFY 1954 by recruiting 24,000 persons and reducing division slice, propose increase 3 divisions with strength 134,000 personnel constituting in total 7 divisions with group artillery, tanks etc. Cost JFY 54 92.6 billion; Japanese share 65 billion yen; US balance.

(2) Naval—Purpose protect sea routes. Necessity of sharing this burden. Japan concentrate sea routes indispensable its foreign trade. (50% DEs necessary direct escort in areas 72 hour voyage). Recognize desirability anti-submarine task forces but must concentrate direct convoy forces. Desire US transfer 14 DDE 2050 ton class and 25 DE; Japan build 12 DDE 1500 ton class, 23 DE, 31 minesweepers, 35 submarine chasers and 2 supply and repair ships. Expenditures JFY 54–58 be 263 billion yen. Excluding transfer vessels US Japanese share 190.5 billion yen; US balance. In JFY 54 desire transfer 4 DDE and 8 DE from US; Japan build 4 minesweepers. Increase personnel 5400. Expenditures 41.2 billion yen; Japanese share 18.5 billion yen; US balance. 2 guard ships 1500 tons, 4 minesweepers and 1 supply ship to be built JFY 1953 appropriation.

(3) Air—Immediate emphasis on training. First three years—require 200 primary trainers, 50 basic trainers and 50 jet trainers. Fourth and fifth year plan 2 wings jet fighter bombers (150 air craft), 1 wing jet all weather fighters (36 craft), patrol planes (16) and group transports (16). Total expenditures 84.2 billion yen. Assuming planes for initial use and replenishment supplied by US, Japan’s share 50.1 billion yen; US balance. JFY 53 budget contains appropriation 100 primary trainers, JFY 54 desire transfer from US 100 primary trainers and 50 basic trainers. Expenditures JFY 54 5.7 billion yen; Japan’s share 3.7 billion; US balance.

(4) Air base forces. Organize air-control and warning groups in first three years and 1 air base wing in fourth and fifth years. Personnel—13,100. Total expenditures 71.4 billion yen. Assuming US facilities and equipment in Japan be transferred Japan, Japanese share 35.2 billion yen; US balance. JFY 54 expenditures 4.5 billion yen; Japanese share 1.7 billion yen; US balance.

(5) As Japanese defense forces increased, expected US forces decrease. Assuming all US forces except part air and naval forces will withdraw by end JFY 1958, requested that Japanese defense contribution be reduced from 62 billion yen to 12.²

Dulles

1. Hemmendinger’s minutes of this meeting, drafted on Oct. 16, are in FE files, lot 55 D 388, “Ikeda Talks”.
2. In telegram 907 to Tokyo, Oct. 15, Hemmendinger summarized the Fifth Meeting of the Ikeda talks, held that day. The section concerning U.S. reaction to the Ikeda defense plan concludes as follows: “United States summarized plan inadequate all three categories, therefore difficult express opinion any particular part. Best balance when total inadequate extremely difficult question. Expressed preference further military discussions Tokyo. Ikeda emphasized political problem and economic support. Asked if assumptions in plan re United States share costs acceptable. United States side indicated hopeful not so far apart on force goals that question could not be fruitfully pursued further in Tokyo.” (033.9411/10–1553) Hemmendinger also prepared minutes of this meeting (drawn up Nov. 6). (FE files, lot 55 D 388, “Ikeda Talks”)