794.5/12–1054
No. 720
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(Wilson)1
top secret
Washington, 21 December 1953.
Subject:
- Japanese Defense Forces
- 1.
- This memorandum is in reply to your memorandums of 18 May 1953 and
23 May 1953,2 on the above subject, which requested the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following matters relating
to development of Japanese defense forces:
- a.
- Japanese force levels which should be established and maintained.
- b.
- Possibility of an early agreement by the Japanese to a buildup of forces beyond 4 divisions.
- c.
- Estimated schedule in the event such a build-up is believed probable.
- d.
- Data as to the probable annual yen requirements of U.S. forces in Japan over a 10-year period.
- 2.
- This memorandum also contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a message No. 1415, dated 7 December 1953, from Ambassador Allison in Tokyo to the Department of State on this subject.
- 3.
- With regard to Japanese force levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the revised force goals for the Japanese National Safety Agency (JNSA), as enumerated in the Appendix hereto, represent the minimum forces necessary for the adequate defense of Japan when U.S. forces have been withdrawn. The revised force goals recommended herein should supersede the previous Japanese force levels indicated in the memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated 13 December 1951,3 subject: “High-level State–Defense Mission on Japanese Defense Forces”.
- 4.
- Ambassador Allison, with the concurrence of the Commander in Chief, Far East, (CINCFE), has recommended a U.S. position for negotiations on the build-up of Japanese forces. Based on discussions with Japanese officials, it is the Ambassador’s view that the Japanese are likely to agree to an early build-up of their defense forces, but they are unlikely to deviate substantially from the 5-year program previously proposed by them in Washington, i.e., a [Page 1561] ground force of 180,000, a navy of 150,000 tons, and an air force of 1500 planes. The Ambassador believes that these goals represent the most the Japanese Government can attempt at this time. Therefore, he considers the immediate objective in negotiations should be to obtain agreement on a reasonable build-up of forces at once, with the understanding that the schedules proposed represent a minimum phasing and will not reduce the ultimate requirements.
- 5.
- Although the Ambassador has proposed as a negotiating position a ground force of 210,000 by April 1956, he has submitted an alternative proposal which he considers politically more palatable, i.e., a ground force of 180,000 (excluding civilians) by April 1956 in exchange for certain commitments on the part of the Japanese Government. Acceptance of this alternative proposal would permit the Ambassador to press for a higher budget for naval and air forces thereby emphasizing the build-up of these forces and tending toward a more balanced force structure.
- 6.
-
Although the Japanese have been informed that the U.S. is willing to consider supplying destroyers and destroyer escorts on a loan basis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would be to the best interests of both the United States and Japan, if Japan, with appropriate financial assistance, constructed the majority of the ships for the Coastal Safety Force. However, in order that the Japanese will have sufficient experience and training to operate naval units effectively, the U.S. is willing to provide on a loan basis, the following ships, to be programmed during the first year of military assistance (estimated JFY 54):
2 Destroyers (1600 Ton type)
2 Destroyer Escorts (DE)
1 Submarine (SS)
2 Minesweepers (AMS)
1 Minesweeping Craft (MSB)
in addition, naval air squadrons (Patrol or ASW attack aircraft) will be provided, with one squadron programmed in JFY 54.
- 7.
- In the air force build-up proposed by the Ambassador and CINCFE, the number of training aircraft is far in excess of that previously recommended to CINCFE by the Commander, Far East Air Forces (COMFEAF), but there is no provision for combat aircraft during JFY 1954. A message from CINCFE has indicated a requirement which makes it essential that combat aircraft be introduced into the program at the earliest practicable stage in the development of the Japanese air force. To achieve the most effective defense program within budget limitations, COMFEAF’s recommendations should be used as a guide in resumed negotiations.
- 8.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize that the negotiating position proposed by the Ambassador is only a basis upon which to resume negotiations with a view toward getting a build-up started as soon as possible. Further appraisal of the over-all program will be made as the negotiations proceed and upon receipt of detailed information concerning the proposed build-up schedule covering the entire 5-year period.
- 9.
- As to the estimated schedules referred to in subparagraph 1 c above the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider it possible to predict the schedule of build-up, at this time, to which the Japanese Government might be expected to agree.
- 10.
- With regard to the probable yen requirements of U.S. forces in Japan, mentioned in subparagraph 1 d above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider it possible at this time to prepare the data you have requested. This data is contingent upon the phase-out of U.S. forces from Japan which in turn depends upon (1) the adequate buildup of Japanese forces, and, (2) the final U.S. policies and objectives which may be adopted with respect to Korea affecting the deployment of U.S. forces in the Far East.
- 11.
- In light of the foregoing it is recommended:
- a.
- That the revised force goals for the Japanese National Safety Agency (JNSA) as enumerated in the Appendix hereto be approved for planning purposes.
- b.
- That, subject to the comments in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, above, the Department of Defense concur with Ambassador Allison’s proposal for resumption of negotiations with the Japanese.
- 12.
- Upon your concurrence with the foregoing recommendations, CINCFE will be informed accordingly.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chief of Naval Operations
Robt. B. Carney
Chief of Naval Operations
- Attached to the letter from Secretary Wilson to Secretary Dulles dated Dec. 10, 1954, Document 836.↩
- Neither found in Department of State files.↩
- The correct date is Dec. 12, 1951. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1432.↩
- Number of each may vary between types. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Number of each may vary between types. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Air Defense Control Center. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Ground Control Intercept. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Early Warning Ground Control Intercept. [Footnote in the source text.]↩