Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/12–1054

No. 836
The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, December 10, 1954.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to your Department’s proposed State–Defense message¹ concerning formal talks with the Japanese regarding defense and related matters.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted their views on this proposed State–Defense message in a memorandum dated 5 November 1954 as modified by a subsequent memorandum dated 8 November 1954. Copies of these memoranda are attached as enclosures 1 and 2.

It will be noted that with regard to Part III-B of the proposed State–Defense message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still consider that naval and air forces should be expanded as outlined in their memorandum dated 21 December 1953, subject “Japanese Defense Forces.” There is attached as enclosure 3, for ready reference, a copy of this memorandum together with its Appendix.

The Department of Defense concurs in the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and urges that these views be used as the basis for the United States position in discussions on this subject with Japanese officials in Tokyo.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 5 November 1954.

Subject:

• Formal Talks with Japanese Regarding Defense and Related Matters.

1. This memorandum is in reply to your memorandum dated 23 September 1954,² subject as above, which requested comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proposed State–Defense message, and also requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop criteria upon which to base further reduction in the Japanese contribution under Article XXV of the Administrative Agreement with Japan and guidance on the long-range strategic role conceived for Japan.

2. With regard to Part III B of the proposed State–Defense message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still consider that Naval and Air Forces should be expanded as outlined to you in their memorandum dated 21 December 1953, Subject: “Japanese Defense Forces.”

3. With regard to your request for criteria upon which to base reductions in the Japanese contribution under Article XXV of the Administrative Agreement with Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that there has already been a substantial reduction (the equivalent of $7,000,000 in Japanese currency) in the Japanese contribution. This reduction was made with the specific understanding that Japanese force goals and budgetary support remain as previously agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the criteria upon which to base any further reduction in the contribution are:

a. Substantial fulfillment of Japan’s obligation to develop defense forces as agreed to in the April 6 exchange of letters between Ambassador Allison and Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki;

b. The acquisition of land necessary to extend run-ways at five Far East Air Force bases; and

c. The willingness of Japan to develop satisfactory JFY 55 force goals and to increase its total defense budget for JFY 55 above a reasonable base figure (minimum of 76.3 billion yen which the Japanese originally planned to contribute to their own support in JFY 54). The United States will agree to a reduction in its share of the defense budget equivalent to one-half of the amount of that appropriated above the base figure.

4. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the last paragraph of Part III of the proposed message be reworded as follows:

“In view of Japan’s balance of payments difficulties, possibility some reduction total U.S. force strength Japan during JFY 55 and in order to encourage and facilitate development of Japanese forces, the United States is willing to consider further substantial reduction of Article XXV (of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty) contribution, but only after substantial fulfillment of Japan’s obligation agreed to in the 6 April exchange of letters between Foreign Minister Okazaki and Ambassador Allison, and this however would be contingent upon satisfactory agreement force goals and defense budget for JFY 55; and upon acquisition of land necessary to extend runways at five Far East Air Force bases. If Japan is willing to increase its total defense budget for JFY 55 above a [reasonable] base figure (minimum of 76.3 billion yen which the Japanese originally planned to contribute to their own support in JFY 54). The United States will agree to a reduction in its share of the defense budget equivalent to one-half of the amount of that appropriated above the base figure.”

5. With regard to Part IV of the proposed State–Defense message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that mid-November would be a more logical date to conclude both economic and military discussions in Tokyo.

6. The long-range strategic role conceived for Japan is contained in NSC 125/2, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan,” dated 7 August 1952, amplified by NSC 125/6, dated 29 June 1953.³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the military point of view, the long-range strategic role conceived for Japan is basically sound. The U.S. security interests in the Pacific area are of such importance that we would fight to prevent the enemy gaining any control of Japanese territory. Current national policy is to assist Japan to rapidly develop (1) the means for its own defense, thereby relieving U.S. forces of the sole responsibility for Japan’s security, and thereafter (2) the capability to contribute to the defense of other free nations of the Pacific area. As long as CINCFE’s overriding mission continues to be the defense of Japan and the Ryukyus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that some U.S. forces will have to remain in and around Japan until Japanese defense forces have been built up to the scale recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to you of 21 December 1953, Subject: “Japanese Defense Forces,” or such other scale of Japanese forces as may be subsequently determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their continuing review of this matter.

7. The threat to Japan from Chinese Communist and Soviet Air Forces is admittedly great. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, however, that such a threat does not require revision of the long-range strategic role conceived for Japan. Any tendency toward reducing defense forces in order to foster the economic development of Japan would seriously endanger the U.S. military position in the Pacific vis-à-vis Soviet and Chinese Communist forces.

8. In a memorandum to you dated 9 April 1954, Subject: “U.S. Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East”⁴ (NSC Action 1029–b)⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in part:

“It is obvious that for the foreseeable future United States power will be an essential element in developing and maintaining a position of military strength in the Far East. It is equally obvious that, under present circumstances, inordinate reliance is placed upon United States power to achieve that end, and too little upon the development of the collective military capabilities of the Asiatic non-Communist countries in that area.”

In this same memorandum they further stated:

“Basic to the establishment of a non-Communist position of strength in the Far East is the rehabilitation of the Japanese military forces—not along the lines of the ultra-national military attitude of pre-World War II, but along moderate and controlled lines that will enable Japan to exert a stabilizing influence in the Far East. …⁶ It is recognized that a military revival in Japan would be attended by certain risks, although there are counteracting factors which would materially limit those risks. In addition to restrictions which would be imposed upon Japan by economic and political factors, it is believed that so long as the United States furnishes the principal offensive air and naval elements of the combined military forces in the Far East, adequate safeguards against the recrudescence of Japanese military power as an aggressive force would be provided.

“If Japan is ultimately to assume responsibility for her national defense and to join in a concerted effort to resist Communist aggression, the United States must accept the risks, while exerting its efforts to influence the course of Japanese policy to conform to our security interests. Even though, at this time, Japan would not be wholly acceptable as a member of a Pacific regional pact, it is considered to be in United States security interests to foster and support the healthy development of the Japanese military structure to the end that Japan will become capable of providing for her own security and of becoming a contributor to collective security in the Western Pacific.

“Time will be an essential element in the dissolution of the obstacles to the formation of the comprehensive system of regional security in the Far East area, but this should not deter the United States from proceeding toward this as an objective.”

9. From the foregoing considerations the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the United States should seek to reduce the friction and to resolve the differences which now constitute a major obstacle to a collective security arrangement in the Far East; more specifically, seek to promote the acceptance of a rearmed Japan as an important element in the common defense of the area.

10. It is recommended that with respect to any review of the long-range strategic role of Japan the foregoing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be taken into consideration. It is further recommended that the foregoing considerations be reflected in any additional State–Defense guidance furnished the Ambassador and CINCFE regarding the long-range strategic role of Japan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford

Chairman

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 8 November 1954.

Subject:

• Formal Talks with Japanese Regarding Defense and Related Matters.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 5 November 1954, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that the referenced memorandum be amended as follows:

a. Subparagraph 3c, first sentence, amend to read: “The willingness of Japan to develop satisfactory JFY 55 force goals and to increase its total defense budget for JFY 55 above a base figure on the order of 85 billion yen.”

b. Paragraph 4, quoted portion, final sentence, amend to read: “If Japan is willing to increase its total defense budget for JFY 55 above a base figure on the order of 85 billion yen, the United States will agree to a reduction in its share of the defense budget equivalent to one-half of the amount of that appropriated above the base figure.”

3. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining

Chief of Staff United States Air Force

1. Draft message not found in Department of State files.
2. Not printed.
3. NSC 125/2 is Document 588. NSC 125/6 is Document 657.
4. For text, see the attachment to the memorandum from Lay to Secretary Wilson dated Apr. 10, 1954, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 412.
5. See footnote 6, Document 167.
6. Ellipsis in the source text.