Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/2–1353: Telegram

No. 631
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Tokyo, February 13, 1953—8 p.m.

2642. Pass to Defense. Our recent experience with Japanese security budget points up obvious need of written agreement on subject of military assistance for Japan.

As Department is aware (Deptel 1651)¹ there has been evident during past months on part of Japanese Government stubborn wait-and-see attitude which seems to be based on following considerations: (1) Japanese domestic politics; (2) desire to know more about policy of new US administration; (3) determination to keep Japanese expenditures to minimum on theory that US so acutely concerned about defense that in last analysis US will supply deficiencies; (4) ignorance on part of most leaders in Japanese Government regarding high costs of modern defense establishment and apparently no appreciation of time-lag factor between planning and being able to place modern equipment and trained men in readiness; (5) desire to explore in detail question of Japanese production of military equipment and supplies.

Our efforts to persuade Japanese Government voluntarily to increase security budget for fiscal year 1954 apparently did succeed in raising figure from yen 130 billions to yen 145 billions mytels 2101² and 2248)³ but this increase may be apparent rather than real because it includes yen 18 billion planned for vessel construction for coastal safety force. There is possibility that this item may be eliminated as it will be subjected to considerable discussion and attack in Diet.

As indication of Japanese reluctance provide necessary budgetary support for NSF even at current retarded level of 110,000, FCC points out that current budget proposed for fiscal year 1953–1954 yen 56 billions in place of minimum yen 99.6 billions which FEC estimates as necessary.

On the political scene we cannot rule out possibility of realignment of conservative leadership in such way as to provide more realistic treatment of national defense needs. There is also possibility that Yoshida’s “gradual approach” formula to rearmament may find political climate propitious later in year to permit increase of NSF ceiling from 110,000 to 150,000 which would require supplemental defense budget. At present this appears doubtful. While foregoing does not lead us to expect any form of request for military assistance from Japan in immediate future, General Clark and I have Embassy-FEC consultative group working on form which such military assistance might eventually take so that when and if political picture changes, we will not be found lacking a plan but would be in position to present to Japan carefully worked out plan as basis for assistance program. As work of this group takes shape, it will be submitted to Department for comments.

Objective of such planning should be an agreed position which both US and Japan can accept as guide for cooperative action; otherwise US financial support might conceivably fail and Japanese Diet on other hand could intervene to defeat program perhaps at critical juncture. This seems to add up to need for frank discussion with Japanese Government at propitious moment which would probably have to include understanding regarding disposition of article 9 of Japanese constitution in effort to conclude an agreement on military assistance.

General Clark and I studying proposal (see Young’s letter January 31 regarding Iseki talks)⁴ to establish combined planning group including representatives of Embassy and FEC as well as interested ministries of Japanese Government in order consider broad problems raised by proposed military assistance program. In any case negotiation such agreement would require participation diplomatic and financial as well as military experts and possible wider initial understanding and support could be obtained by their participation at early stage of discussions. General Clark, who has seen this message and concurs, will shortly submit to Defense his concept of the most advantageous balance of Japanese forces for immediate future.

I would appreciate benefit of Department’s thinking and advice because I believe that present irregular arrangement should not be prolonged if for no other reason than it gives Japanese Government greater leverage in extracting from us larger concessions.

Murphy

1. In this telegram, dated Jan. 6, drafted in NA and approved for transmission by Allison, the Department in part stated: “Disturbed by apparent unwillingness Jap Govt make adequate provisions for defense JFY 53–54 budget and agree some pressure shld be exerted privately on Yoshida and other appropriate officials in effort achieve our minimum objectives. From info available here no econ justification for defense appropriation below level current year and not convinced Yoshida support for new defense appropriations equal to current level wld jeopardize his position.” (794.5/1–353)
2. Document 623.
3. Dated Jan. 13; in it the Ambassador reported Cabinet approval of a defense budget of 145 billion yen, of which 62 billion yen was for support of U.S. security forces. (794.5/1–1352)
4. Not found in Department of State files. Yujiro Iseki, Director of the International Cooperation Bureau at the Foreign Ministry, was also the Japanese representative on the Joint Committee created by the Administrative Agreement. Concerning his visit to Washington in January, see airgram 696, Document 637.