Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/2–1353: Airgram

No. 637
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan

top secret

Washington, March 12, 1953.

A–696. Embtel 2642.¹ The Department is concerned over the failure of the Japanese Government to take a more positive approach on defense questions, but appreciates the limitations imposed by the present political climate and wishes to avoid any pressure on the Yoshida government which may jeopardize its position and result in longer delays in the defense buildup. The rearmament question was discussed with Iseki by Defense and State officials during his recent visit to Washington. He indicated that the major obstacles to the Japanese rearmament program are lack of information in the Japanese Government regarding long-range United States military objectives in Japan and lack of mutuality in the approach to the Japanese rearmament problem generally. His view, which the Department shares, is that the Joint Planning Group is an inadequate instrument for joint military planning and that the terms of reference and the representation on both sides must be enlarged if the military and related economic and political problems are to get adequate attention.

In view of the desirability of obtaining maximum Japanese Government understanding of, and participation in, the defense program for the Japan area, it is considered advisable that you and CINCFE continue the discussions with the Japanese Government regarding the long-range United States military objectives in Japan. Conversations should cover the overall defense problem, including a statement of the United States military policy vis-à-vis Japan, force goals, objectives with respect to the production of military goods in Japan, military assistance, and a joint planning organization. Subject to your and CINCFE comments, these discussions should include the following points:

1. Basic Policy Objective. The United States policy is to assist Japan to develop balanced ground, sea and air forces which ultimately will be capable of assuming responsibility for the defense of Japan against external aggression.

2. Force Goals and Timing. The details of the Joint Chiefs of Staff force goals of December 1951² for the Japanese ground and naval forces and air force goals which were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 30, 1952, should be revealed to the Japanese Government. Defense is sending out a concurrent telegram which will contain this information. As to timing, you should indicate the time lag in the production of aircraft and other heavy equipment, but stress the possibility of beginning the training of pilots and technical personnel as soon as the Japanese Government is ready. You are urged to stress the utmost importance of maintaining the secrecy of your disclosure to the Japanese Government of United States views with respect to the Japanese military force.

The Japanese Government should be to consider these goals in detail, to discuss them jointly with you and CINCFE in the light of their own thinking, and to work out mutually acceptable plans for the development of their defense forces, including the time schedule for the achievement of force goals and for the transfer of responsibilities. Emphasis should beplaced on the development of joint long-range plans. Although it is considered highly desirable to negotiate a formal written agreement along the lines of the recommendations in your telegram 2642 and including the section 511 (a) assurances, such written agreement is not actually required by law until goods or services are delivered to the Japanese under the Mutual Security Program. Therefore, from a legal point of view, a written agreement is not required for several months, although negotiations can take place at an earlier date if politically feasible. In any event, the first step is to lay United States plans and objectives before the Japanese and establish a forum which can discuss and reach agreement on these basic policy questions. The Department’s comments on your proposed mutual defense assistance agreement, which were contained in your telegram 2795,³ will be forwarded soon. The agreement as to force goals and timing, joint command, transfer of responsibilities, etc., can be handled in a separate classified document. The need for consistency with agreements with other countries and the interest of other Washington agencies necessitate prior clearance of such agreement in Washington.

3. United States Assistance. In the interest of the collective security of the free world, the United States is prepared to assist Japan, subject to Congressional authorization, in the development of its forces on a basis comparable to the assistance being provided other governments. At whatever point in these continuing discussions you consider that it is desirable, the Japanese Government may be informed that up to $500 million worth of equipment can be made available for Japanese ground forces under Army appropriations already made. This includes the equipment already loaned to the National Safety Forces. Legislation is being prepared which will authorize the transfer of the equipment already loaned and of additional equipment as required. In addition, the Fiscal Year 1954 Mutual Security Program may propose that Congress authorize the expenditure of additional funds, including funds for aircraft procurement. Action by Congress on legislation and decisions with respect to actual turnover of equipment to the National Safety Forces will be influenced by the decisions of the Japanese Government on its own program for defense.

It is imperative that no commitments, either expressed or implied, should be made to the Japanese Government regarding the size and nature of possible future military assistance programs. The conversations should be on the order of magnitude, and it should be emphasized that the aid program figures are tentative and used as a basis for discussion only. It should be pointed out, however, that effective planning and Congressional presentation of these programs require: (1) a joint understanding as to force goals, time-phasing, and equipment requirements; (2) an analysis of Japan’s capacity to produce or finance such equipment; and (3) an analysis of the total defense burden which Japan is capable of assuming. The Fiscal Year 1954 Program is still uncertain. For your information only, it is expected to provide a maximum of $150 million new funds, with the bulk going for aircraft procurement.

4. Defense Production. The United States desires to assist Japan in the development of its capacity to produce military equipment and supplies, the production of which in Japan is determined to be in the mutual interest of both Japan and the United States. The United States desires to discuss with Japan its military production potentialities and its problems associated with such production. It is essential that Japan be, within the limits of strategic considerations and its capacity to finance, able to produce in Japan the maximum share of her needs. It should be stressed that discussion of this problem would be greatly facilitated by a joint agreement on long-term military objectives, timing and equipment requirements. The United States will assist in this development through the provision of technical assistance, off-shore procurement, and other means consistent with strategic and other considerations and where necessary to supplement Japan’s own efforts. In view of the present uncertainty of the future off-shore procurement program, this program should not be unduly stressed.

5. Tokyo Organization. State and Defense have noted the reference, in the penultimate paragraph of your telegram 2642, to your consideration with General Clark of the possible establishment of a combined planning group. If you and he agree to the establishment of such a group, there is no objection here.

For your information, State intends to discuss the Japanese rearmament program with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the Philippines, and possibly other governments in the near future, in an effort to allay fears of the creation of a Japanese military force of aggressive potentialities. These discussions will stress the defensive character and general size limitations of the planned forces, the economic limitations of Japanese rearmament, the Security Treaty which permits the stationing of United States forces in and around Japan, and United States security treaties with other governments.

Defense concurs in this airgram and is sending a simultaneous message to CINCFE regarding this matter. State has concurred in the Defense message.

Dulles

1. Document 631.
2. See the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Dec. 12, 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1432.
3. Dated Feb. 27, not printed. (794.5 MSP/2–2753)