396.1/2–1653: Telegram
No. 632
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State
2656. Embtel 1977.1 Foreign Minister Okazaki tells me that Yoshida requested him to discuss with me possibility of some form of tripartite discussions (US, Britain and Japan) re several issues of importance such as recent US order affecting Seventh Fleet,2 question of blockade of Chinese coast and Korean conflict. Concerning latter, Okazaki explained that this does not contemplate actual hostilities in Korea obviously as Japan is not party, but what is contemplated is matters such as question of eventual bombing of points in Manchuria.
I mentioned fact that Yoshida some weeks ago had expressed desire to have tripartite talks in Tokyo (see mytel 1977). Okazaki replied that this is same idea brought up to date. He explained that after mentioning idea to me, Yoshida had also asked him to broach subject to British Ambassador but that latter had been unresponsive. He said that idea would be to have discussion among representatives [Page 1387] with authority to speak freely although not necessarily making commitments of any kind. In their opinion, he said, Ambassador Dening not suitable because of his supercaution and tendency to stick well within letter of his instructions. Perhaps, he said, Washington would be better place than Tokyo but they preferred Tokyo. If necessary, he could go to Washington.
I said that I would report what he said to Department and that due to change of administration obviously Department had not had opportunity to consider idea as yet. Of course, there would be reservations to such a plan stemming from other interested countries, I said, and added that naturally we are always eager to have benefit Japanese views and certainly want them to understand ours.
Okazaki then launched into review of Japanese experiences with blockade of Chinese coast and difficulties which arose re control of land frontiers. At present, he declared, coastal blockade would emphasize importance and increase Communist Chinese reliance on volume of supplies from USSR. Flow of goods over Thailand, Burma and India would increase. He assumed blockade would apply to ports of Dairen and Port Arthur but not to Vladivostok. Hong Kong, he said, is a two-way street useful both to Chinese and outside world which lives by smuggling. Imposition of blockade would not necessarily mean Chinese occupation of Hong Kong. He discounted Chinese Nationalists strength to make large-scale landings on mainland, saying he felt Chinese Nationalist potential limited to small landing parties able to hold very limited territory for five or six days and that only possible with American aid. He asserted Japanese Government believes there would be many defections of individual members of Chinese Nationalist landing parties if attempted on large scale. He said this would be true especially of soldiers and aviators in the older age brackets, men aged 28 or 29 because of family ties. He also stressed that Japanese Government believes Chinese Nationalist Forces’ reputation not good in many regions China mainland because of extortion allegedly practiced by them at time their departure from area. He referred frequently to Japanese experiences in occupation portions China requiring ever deeper penetration of territory with accompanying headaches of supply, especially foodstuffs for millions of people. He seemed to assume that Chinese Nationalist Forces would be as unpopular with Chinese people as were Japanese.
This is first time that Okazaki has spoken to me in this vein reference China. He said there had been some discussions in Cabinet on subject but I am uncertain of his reason for stressing the problem now except perhaps as prelude to suggested tripartite talks.
- Dated Dec. 20, 1952; in this telegram the Embassy reported that in a conversation held in Tokyo with Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R–Iowa) and John J. Sparkman (D–Alabama), Prime Minister Yoshida had suggested a tripartite conference of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, to be held with the object of arriving at a joint policy. (790.00/12–2052)↩
- For documentation concerning the order announced by President Eisenhower in his State of the Union address on Feb. 2, see Documents 73 ff.↩