Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/11–652

No. 617
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1952.

Subject:

• An Air Force for Japan

The Problem:

To determine whether steps should now be taken to commence the development of a Japanese air force.

Discussion:

NSC 125/2² provides that the first stage of our military courses of action with respect to Japan should be to “assist Japan to develop a balanced ten-division ground force and appropriate air and naval arms”. Until recently, no steps had been taken in the direction of the development of an “appropriate air arm”. Some thinking about the necessity of building a balanced defense force has taken place in Japan among various private and semi-official groups, especially one in which Admiral Nomura is prominent. There has also been a fair amount of speculation on this subject in the press in Japan.

So far as the United States is concerned, the Joint Chiefs last December approved planning goals for a Japanese air force. (See the table below.) Operating on the basis of this approved program, Defense included $187,000,000 for assistance for the development of a Japanese air force in their preliminary submission to the Bureau of the Budget of the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1954. The following table shows the aircraft in the present approved program and the portion of the aircraft which would be financed in Fiscal Year 1954:

Planes (Figures show unit equipment, without provision for war reserve.)

	JCS-approved program	FY 1954 program submitted by Defense
Day fighter	300	174
Fighter bomber	150	83
Tactical reconnaissance	54	30
Transport	96	32
Trainer	50

As the result of a recent joint request by the State and Defense Departments for recommendations by the Embassy and the Command in Tokyo as to what should be done about Japanese rearmament in Fiscal Year 1954, telegram 1475 of November 6 from Tokyo (Tab A)³ submitted a joint recommendation that $287,000,000 be authorized in Fiscal Year 1954 for a Japanese air force. This sum would provide technical and flying training schools, two F–86 fighter squadrons, one air depot wing, and service and support units. This is part of phased program through June 1956 to provide 2,500 technical and 300 flying graduates annually, three F–86 interceptor wings, one F–89 interceptor wing, two fighter bomber F–86 wings, one tactical reconnaissance wing, two air transport wings and two air depot wings.

General Clark in a separate telegram on October 31 (Tab B)⁴ recommended that planning for a Japanese air force should proceed promptly and that he be authorized to discuss this question with the Japanese Prime Minister in company with Ambassador Murphy. He reasoned that the most immediate and the greatest single threat to the security of Japan lies in the Communist air threat. However, he believes that forces capable of external aggression—specifically such forces as long-range bombers and carrier borne aircraft—should not be developed by Japan. In consequence, his recommendation accords closely with the earlier planning by the Joint Chiefs.

I believe that the Department of State should support the development of a Japanese air force. While it is desirable that as much as possible of the initiative in these matters should be taken by the Japanese themselves, it is clear that both the Government and private circles in Japan are giving a great deal of thought to this subject. It is therefore the more important that we place ourselves in a position to assist them in the further development of a balanced defense force. If we are to do so, we must proceed at once since the lead time on aircraft is at least two years; and unless the Korean war ends, it will be 1956 or 1957 before the aircraft authorized in the Fiscal Year 1954 program can be delivered to the Japanese. Furthermore, the training of technical and ground personnel should begin as soon as possible.

Various arguments have been cited against undertaking a Japanese air force program at this time. One of them is the fact that the Japanese Constitution specifically forbids the maintenance of defense forces. However, the Japanese are through various devices moving ahead with the development of a ground force and are apparently willing to take at least the preliminary steps (including training of ground and flight personnel) toward the development of an air force. In addition Prime Minister Yoshida has told Ambassador Murphy that he plans to take steps to build up public support for rearmament in Japan and to move in the direction of an amendment to the Constitution. Another argument against a Japanese air force lies in the fears which it will arouse in other nations in the Pacific area of a possible renewal of a Japanese aggressive threat. However, these fears can be counteracted by concentration on the types of aircraft which are clearly designed primarily for the defense of Japanese territory, and by advance notification and careful explanation to the other nations who are most concerned.

The basic policy decision was made in NSC 125/2. The present question is therefore one of timing and of defining what is meant by an “appropriate air arm”. In State-Department-distribution-only telegram 1097 to Tokyo on October 28 (Tab C),⁵ which was cleared by S/MSA, S/P, BNA, C and G, a tentative conclusion was reached that it is desirable to proceed now with the development of a Japanese air force of a primarily defensive character. I believe that that tentative decision should now be affirmed and the necessary action taken to carry it out.

Certain more general questions with respect to Japanese rearmament, involving the timing of the approach to the Japanese Government and the nature of the agreement to be reached with that government, will be treated in a subsequent memorandum. However, these questions with respect to the air force need to be settled now while the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1954 is taking shape.

Recommendations:

I therefore recommend:

1. that the Department support the inclusion of funds for the commencement of a Japanese air force in the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1954. (In your letter to Mr. Ohly dated November 18,⁶ you urged DMS to support a figure of $436 million for military assistance to Japan. This amount includes the $287 million for the air force discussed above.)

2. that the Japanese air force should be of a nature designed to assist in the defense of Japanese territory.

3. that personnel training be begun in Fiscal Year 1953 if possible.

4. that I be authorized to notify the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines of the foregoing recommendations. The timing of such discussions will be agreed upon with Defense and DMS, and will depend upon progress in preparation of the Budget for 1954.⁷

1. Cleared prior to submission to the Acting Secretary in S/P, BNA, S/MSA, and C, and by Matthews in G. Matthews wrote the following note in the margin. “I agree subject to consideration of competing priorities of other areas.”
2. Document 588.
3. Document 611.
4. Not found attached. The telegram was CX 58128 from CINCFE to the Department of the Army for the JCS. (Department of Defense files)
5. Document 608.
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. This memorandum has an approval line, on which the following is hand written: “D[avid] B[ruce] Subject to consideration of competing priorities of other areas.”