Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/10–2052: Telegram

No. 608
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

top secret
priority

Washington, October 28, 1952—2:17 p.m.

1097. State Dept distribution only. Eyes only Amb Murphy. Embtel 1279.² Dept as long-range policy favors development balanced Jap mil estab including appropriate air and naval arms as provided current NSC policy for Jap. Dept has been concerned over slow development planning re Jap air and naval forces and has raised questions these subjs with Def at various levels. We believe planning for MSP for Jap forces requires careful consideration of most efficient and practical contribution which Jap, in US view, shld make in types and size Jap armed forces for joint defense with US forces in event Pac hostilities. On basis polit factors alone, wld appear preferable Jap contribution shld be for defense Jap terr such as forces to hold main islands, intercepter air force, and anti-sub naval forces.

Def has submitted to ODMS and Budget Bureau tentative MSP figures for Jap air force for FY54 showing 184 mil dols for 174 day fighters, 83 fighter bombers, 30 tactical reconnaissance and 32 transports with necessary spares and equipment. Separate provision made for training program for flight and ground personnel. This is first portion total program which wld include additional 375 aircraft for unit equipment and 743 for war reserve of which 150 unit equipment and 450 war reserve wld be day fighters. Tentative Navy program for Jap for FY54 shows 30 mil dols with no breakdown. Tentative ground force program calls for 308 mil dols for FY54. We have been unable get clear answer from Def on extent to which this will complete basic ten div program. Def explains these tentative programs will be revised in light Emb and CINCFE comments to identical tels of inquiry now in process final clearance.³

Under MSP procedures public presentation MSP for FY54 will show merely total figure for Title III with any detailed country figures being given only in exec session. However any large increase in Title III figure will undoubtedly be attributed to program for Jap since inclusion Jap only significant difference from FY53 situation.

Dept recognizes internatl and Jap polit difficulties inherent in proceeding with air and naval forces for Jap particularly in view likelihood this becoming matter of public knowledge. Nevertheless achievement our long-range politico-mil objectives re Jap and whole Pac area depends upon steady progress toward Jap rearmament and we do not believe we can assume our time is unlimited. Particularly important include funds for air force programs of some kind in FY54 MSP since (1) lead-time on most aircraft is at least two years and at best Japs cld not expect actually get delivery any aircraft until the late 1955 or 1956 and (2) necessity get personnel training under way. This fact re delay before delivery aircraft to Japs will help lesson adverse polit reaction. Air section Joint Weeka Nr 29 Embtel 1267⁴ indicates Jap and perhaps joint planning re air force. We wld be interested in further details especially any comments re timing, personnel training and plans for US assistance. Perhaps some method can be found to begin training with FY53 funds. One possibility might be training on US equipment at US bases in Jap as was done to train NPR in use heavy equipment.

As sidelight re air force development see separate tel quoting NY Times re bldg Fletcher FD–25 by Tokyo Aircraft Co.⁵ Wash rep Fletcher told Dept Tokyo Aircraft hopes sell substantial quantity these relatively inexpensive (12,000 dols) aircraft to NSF in Jap for tactical support purposes.

Re Navy program Dept wonders what possibility exists Japs may find it possible commence construction on own behalf anti-sub vessels or similar craft with armament to be supplied under MSP. Such clearly defensive craft wld not be likely arouse fears outside Jap resurgence Jap aggressive potentials.

Suggest this tel also be discussed with Allison on his arrival with particular ref to possible Aust, NZ and Phil reactions when matter becomes public. It is Dept’s understanding that neither at time of negot Jap Peace Treaty or subsequently have these countries been given any reason believe Jap defensive forces wld not eventually include balanced air and naval arms and that possibility adverse reaction can be met by informing them at suitable time prior to matter becoming public.

This tel gives present Dept thinking to help you in discussions with ClNCFE. Believe desirable further discussions these matters with Japs except at their initiative shld await govtal consideration your recommendations and those CINCFE as requested in separate tels referred to second para, especially since preferable have as much of initiative as possible these matters come from Japs and to avoid any earlier public disclosure than necessary.

Bruce

1. Drafted in NA; cleared with EUR, S/MSA, S/P, and Matthews in G; and approved for transmission by Johnson.
2. Ambassador Murphy reported in this telegram of Oct. 20, marked “Eyes only Alexis Johnson” and “No distribution outside Department”, that in response to an inquiry from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Clark had drafted a reply which would discourage the development of Japanese military aviation. The Ambassador added that he planned to discuss the matter with General Clark and Gen. Otto P. Weyland, Commander of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and urge that in conversations with Yoshida the United States “take a positive approach looking to early beginning in establishment of Jap security air force.” In conclusion Murphy stated his assumption that the Department desired a balanced development of Japanese ground, naval, and air forces. (794.5/10–2052)
3. See telegram 1125 to Tokyo, Document 610.
4. Not printed. (794.00(W)/10–1752)
5. No telegram as described has been found in Department of State files.