Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

761.5622/11–1952: Telegram

No. 618
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Tokyo, November 19, 1952—5 p.m.

1603. Re Deptel 1246, Nov. 17. I heartily concur in action authorized by JCS 923816 to CINCFE. Such positive action is necessary not only to assure security of our forces in Jap and effectively demonstrate firm intention to meet any implied obligations under article one of security treaty with Jap but of equal importance to deny Russians opportunity to gain psychological advantage by portraying US as impotent and unreliable in face of flagrant show of force in violating Jap sovereignty.

As stated CINCFE’s message C 58941,²Clark and I intend discuss this matter with Yoshida. Propose inform him of our desire consult with Jap Govt on matters affecting defense of Jap under article one of security treaty and our view that situation presented by Sov overflights constitutes threat to Jap. Wld assure him Jap Govt will be kept generally informed of Sov overflights. At same time would state that we consider ourselves free, both under security treaty and as recognized in Okazaki–Rusk talks at time of administrative agreement, take necessary action to protect security US forces in and about Jap, and that such action would include right to repulse hostile Sov overflights.

CINCFE’s C 58941 in which I concurred expresses opinion that it would not serve useful purpose to issue public announcement that we intend to engage aircraft violating Jap territory. I note that O’Shaughnessy’s 790³ suggests that some form of warning against Sov overflights would seem desirable. Pending discussion Yoshida and further study it would in our opinion be preferable to avoid a prior public announcement. It is noted that the B–29 apparently was either shot down or forced into sea by Sov aircraft without prior Sov public announcement. Naturally we would welcome O’Shaughnessy’s further comment if there are urgent reasons unknown to us for public announcement.

I do not believe it necessary or wise to notify the Sovs of our intended action or make any public announcement concerning our policy. Little is to be gained by thus putting them on their guard and would hardly be expected by them in view of their provocative action in shooting down our B–29. Any public pronouncement would only invite a precipitation of public comment which might prove disadvantageous to us, playing into the hands of those who use the argument that the presence of US security forces in Jap constitutes provocation for hostile Sov action. The dramatic circumstances surrounding the forcing to land of Sov aircraft or the destruction while actually violating Jap territory would provide much more advantageous atmosphere in which to make any public announcement.

Re para 3 Deptel 1246. Although the maintenance of the security of Jap as stated in NSC 125/2⁴ has been adopted as US natl policy and in addition that defensive action may be justified under preamble and article one of the security treaty, etc, language in CINCFE’s CX 57735⁵ “contracted by treaty to protect” is inapt.

Murphy

1. Repeated for information to Moscow.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Dated Nov. 14, not printed. (761.5622/11–1452) Elim O’Shaughnessy was Chargé at Moscow.
4. Document 588.
5. Dated Oct. 25; see footnote 1, Document 613.