693.941/4–752: Telegram
No. 550
The Acting United States Political
Adviser to SCAP (Bond)1
to the Department of
State
priority
Topad 2134. Re Taipei’s 1264 to Dept rptd Tokyo 207, April 2; Mistel 2123, rptd Taipei 116, April 4, and Taipei’s 1282, rptd Tokyo 213, April 5.2 Ability Nationalist Govt obtain maximum concessions bilateral treaty and expeditious settlement understandable. However, Mission gravely concerned possible consequences of suggestions US put pressure on Japs. Jap press and public indifference Taipei talks thus far reflects general opinion Jap has little to gain from Taipei treaty since Nationalist China in their view only minor power and also has little to lose if negots fail since Yoshida letter and govt Diet commitments involve no implications beyond Formosa. Jap concern with overall China problem, however intense and any pressure to secure Jap concessions to Taipei especially on points related to Chinese mainland would produce severe reaction. Every opposition party has attacked various aspects govt decision negotiations Taipei even on present limited basis. Nor is there enthusiasm within Liberal Party for Taipei pact and only Prime Minister’s personal prestige and authority have won grudging acceptance opening negotiations after critical Diet interpellations defining close limits Japanese opposition. Before independence attained and Korean war ended Japanese extreme unwilling prejudice future China policy by any appearance acknowledging Nationalist China sovereignty over mainland, a position in which they no doubt believe they can count on British support.
Regardless foregoing attitudes believe Yoshida govt sincere in its expressed desire conclude peace treaty with Chinese Nationalists on basis Yoshida letter. Iguchi has told me his govt strongly resents implication, which he attributes to “China lobby” that with US Senate ratification San Francisco peace treaty Japanese have ceased to care whether or not bilateral with Chinese Nationalists concluded.
Since general election due within nine months, situation cld become critical if govt compelled under foreign pressure exceed commitments to Diet on this unpopular issue. Recent resurgence independent spirit throughout Japanese society pronounced, and [Page 1235] Japanese can be expected react with pent-up feelings of six occupation years to deny protracted dictation for [from?] foreign powers. Japanese officials acceding such pressure wld be subject public condemnation. In current pre-election maneuvers, every party and candidate now endeavoring prove self “worthy of sovereignty.” Thus any major instance govt yielding Japanese interests under foreign pressure cld also become decisive election factor.
Appreciation this danger plainly revealed in such developments as growing sensitivity FonOff to discuss Taipei negotiations with Mission, sudden Japanese stiffness in preliminary working group, advance re Commonwealth garrison conditions, and strong attitude toward Korean treaty.
US pressure on Japan to conclude Taipei pact on distasteful terms cld hardly be concealed successfully since issues already clearly known to public. Moreover, Japanese public alerted by Kyodo report at Taipei Mar 31 quoting “highly competent source” to effect US intervention probable if talks broken off. Also, notwithstanding denial, Japanese public regards even initiation Taipei talks as concession to US pressure, and wld attribute any unfavorable terms beyond previous Japanese Govt commitments to US intervention.
In viewing problem Taipei negotiations Mission fully aware necessity maintain integrity and cooperation Chinese Nationalist Govt as anti-Commie ally, especially in consideration China’s UN seat. Believed, however, this situation must also be weighed against vital part US expects Japanese to play in consequence security treaty and administrative agreement. US still retains considerable political capital in Japan but many difficult issues involved in post-treaty security arrangements, plus such problems as future of democratic reforms, retention export controls and Korean problem, all competing for its expenditure and total may prove insufficient ensure satisfactory attainment all US objectives in Japan. If treaty with Taipei becomes symbol Japanese subjection foreign intervention in closing phase occupation, adverse Japanese public reaction will unquestionably prejudice future relations with US as well as important issue future Nationalist China-Japanese cooperation in security field.